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WHEN  war broke out with France in February, 1793, 
the pound sterling, which with its subdivisions, the 
shilling  and  the  penny,  iormed  the  (( E  s. d."  in 
which  all  English  money  accounts  and  contracts 
were  expressed, was  (as it was  again from 1821 to 
1914)  interchangeable  with  123$ grains  or  nearly 
8  grammes  of  22  carat  (i.e.  eleven-twelfths  fine) 
gold.  Owing to variations in the rating of  the  gold 
and silver coins which took place long before, there 
was  indeed  no  gold  coin  representing  £1, but  the 
gold  coins  called  guineas  (because the  gold  from 
which the first issue of  them was made came from 
the Guinea Coast) passed for twenty-one twentieths 
of  £1,  half-guineas  for  twenty-one  fortieths,  and 
seven-shilling pieces for seven twentieths, and these 
gold coins were  all  legal  tender to any amount at 
those rates.  One troy pound  of  22  carat gold  was 
coined into 444 guineas,  and anyone who had gold 
could demand that the Mint should coin it for him at 
that rate, but in practice he found it better to accept 
the  slightly  lower  price,  £46  10s.  the  pound  or 
£3 17s.  6d.  the  ounce,  given  on  the  spot  by  the 
Bullion  Office  of  thc Bank  of  England.  Gold  was 
thus freely (( convertible"  into coin, and though the 
law  forbade  exportation  of  coin  and  of  bullion 
produced  by melting  it, thk seems in  practice  to 
have had so small an effect that the coin was in fact 
readily convertible into gold for mintage in foreign 
countries and for industrial uses both at home and 
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abroad, whenever any appreciable profit  presented 
itself. 
Silver coins were legal tender by tale for amounts 
under  £25 ;  but  above  that sum  they  were  only 
legal tender by weight, at the coinage rate of  5s. ad. 
an ounce, and there was no possible inducement to 
anyone to tender  them at that rate,  as they were 
commonly very much worn,  and consequently any- 
one paying them away at 5s. zd. to the ounce would 
have lost heavily as compared with passing them in 
small  amounts at their  nominal value. 
There was no  legal-tender  paper.  Bank of  Eng- 
land notes,  promising to pay the bearer on demand 
£10,  £20,  and a  few larger  sums,  circulated freely 
in London and the immediate neighbourhood.  Out- 
side that area there were in circulation similar notes 
for  sums  of  £5  and upwards,  issued  by  over  two 
hundred  banks with less than  six partners,  called 
the "  country banks " because the London private 
banks  had  long  ago  abandoned  the  business  of 
issuing notes.  The country banks did not go below 
£5, because the law had forbidden smaller notes since 
1777 ;  the  Bank  of  England's  abstention  from 
issuing £5 notes (maintained by it till soon after the 
beginning of  the war) seems to have been due to mere 
conservatism-it  had only begun to issue £10  notes 
in  1759.  The  whole  amount of  Bank  of  England 
notes  in  circulation  was  about  12  millions :  the 
amount  of  country  notes  is  unknown,  but  later 
statistics suggest that it may have been not far off 
the same figure.  The amount of  gold coin  in the 
country is  supposed  to have  been  from  zo  to 30 
millions,  but  it must  be  remembered  that  a  far 
larger  proportion  than  in modern  times  would  be 
locked away in hoards only coming into circulation 
at long intervals. 
The business of  banking was still very imperfectly 
understood.  Failures  of  country  banks  were  fre- 
quent, and the Bank of  England often had moments 
of  anxiety caused by these failures and by its own 
inability to resist the prevalent feeling of  the public 
by being cautious in lending in times of  speculation 
and liberal  during depressions  and alarms.  It was 
apt to change its policy too late, so that it continued 
liberal  advances  when  drawing  in  was  required, 
and began to draw in when it was no longer desirable 
to do so, with the natural result of  disaster accom- 
panied  by confusing recriminations about the com- 
parative advantages  of  the "  restrictive " and  the 
'  expansive " policies,  both  of  which  were right  if 
only  adopted  at the  proper  time.  Moreover, the 
legal prohibition of  all interest above 5 per cent often 
stood in  the way  of  effective restriction. 
The near  approach  of  the war  in  the winter  of 
1792-3  caused or coincided with considerable trouble 
among the country banks, which spread to London, 
and  was  only  prevented  from  causing  complete 
disaster by the Government undertaking to lend five 
millions  of  Exchequer  bills  to merchants  in  diffi- 
culties.  This offer restored  confidence, and bills for 
only ~Z,~OO,OOO  were  actually issued. 
Nearly two years of  the war passed away without 
much  financial  difficulty,  but  towards  the  end  of 
1794 the Bank directors began to complain of  Pitt's 
excessive demands for accommodation.  The public 
expenditure  had at first risen but  slowly, as may be 
seen in Table I. on p. xliii. below.  Including the ex- 
penditure of  Ireland, it had been under 174 milliolis 
in 1792, and it was only z4$ millions in 1793 and zg-$ 
in  1794.  But  the  revenue  had  scarcely  increased 
at all ;  it was ~g&  millions in 1792  and only ZO$  in 
1794.  In a  country with  an aggregate  income  of 
between zoo and 300 millions mostly belonging to a 
Poor  population,  even  the nine  millions  borrowed 
ln  some way  or  other by the Government in  1794 
must  have been  a large sum in proportion  to the 
usual  annual savings  of  the people.  In 1795  and 
I796,  however,  the  public  expenditure  shot  up to x  INTRODUCTION 
518  and 57$ millions, while the revenue was only 20 
and 21% millions.  It is utterly impossible to believe 
either  that  the  aggregate  produce  of  the  nation's 
labour had risen so that this enormous  increase of 
government expenditure could be met without any 
reduction of  individual consumption and investment, 
or that the consumption and investment by indivi- 
duals had been cut down as much as the Government 
expenditure rose,  and it is wholly improbable that 
increase  of  production  and  reduction  of  private 
consumption  and investment  would  together  any- 
thing like counterbalance the increase of  Government 
expenditure.  Doubtless  what  has  constantly  hap- 
pened in great wars was happening in this country in 
1795-6  : the  Government  and people together were 
spending  much  more  money  than  they  could  go 
on spending without either a sharp monetary crisis 
leading to a reduction of the aggregate money expen- 
diture or a dilution of the currency which enables the 
large  money expenditure to go on by providing  a 
larger nominal  amount of money to be expended in 
the  purchase  of  the  same  amount  of  goods and 
services-at  higher  prices.  In  a  country of  com- 
promise  it was  to be  expected  that both  of  these 
alternatives  would  be  embraced. 
At  the  end  of  February,  1794,  as is  shown  in 
Table  11.  on  p.  xliv. below,  the  Bank  of  England 
held almost 7 millions of  coin and bullion while its 
liabilities were less than 182 millions (of  which  10% 
were notes in  circulation).  Next year  the position 
was  only  a  little less favourable,  but  in  1796  the 
coin and bullion had shrunk to z$  millions while the 
liabilities had only gone down to 166 millions.  On 
August  31  the  coin  and  bullion  had  gone  down 
another  ~400,000,  while  the  liabilities  were  still 
almost 16  millions.  By what particular incidents the 
crisis was finally precipitated is of  little importance. 
It arrived at the end of  February, 1797.  The coin 
and bullion in the Bank was reduced to so small an 
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amount and the drain was continuing at such a rate 
that the directors informed Pitt that  the situation 
was desperate.  In similar circumstances a modern 
pvernment would declare a bank holiday of  three 
days, and spend the interval in printing and securing 
authorisation  for  legal  tender  government  notes, 
which it would then lend to the Bank to be paid out 
instead  of  coin.  Pitt  adopted  a  less  simple  but 
equally effective plan.  First thing on Sunday morn- 
ing, February 26, he secured  the attendance of  the 
King,  the Lord Chancellor, the Lord President,  the 
Duke of Portland, Marquis Cornwallis, Earl Spencer, 
the Earl of  Liverpool, Lord Grenville and himself  at 
a Council which passed and communicated at once to 
the Bank a resolution which declared "the unanimous 
opiliion of  the Board that it  is indispensably necessary 
for the public service that the Directors of  the Bank 
of  England should forbear issuing any cash in pay- 
ment until the sense of  Parliament can be taken on 
that subject and the proper measures adopted there- 
upon  for  maintaining  the  means  of  circulation 
and  supporting  the  public  and  commercial credit 
of  the  kingdom  at this  important  conjuncture,'' 
and  (( required "  the  directors  " on  the  grounds 
of  the  exigency  of  the  case  to  conform  thereto 
until  the  sense  of  Parliament  can  be  taken  as 
aforesaid." 
Opening as usual  on Monday morning,  the Bank 
prudently made no attempt to explain why the order 
was  issued, but  exhibited it along with  the follow- 
ing notice : 
"  The  Governor, Deputy-Governor, and Directors 
of the Bank of  England think it their duty to inforin 
the proprietors of  Bank Stock as well as the Public at 
large that the general concerns of  the Bank are in the 
most  afAuent and prosperous  situation, and such as 
to preclude every doubt as to the security of  its notes. 
The Directors mean to continue their usual discounts 
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paying  the amount in bank-notes,  and the dividend 
warrants will  be paid in the same manner." 
At noon a great meeting of  merchants and bankers 
was  held  which  passed  a resolution undertaking  to 
accept  bank-notes,  and eventually 4,000  signatures 
were  attached to this. 
On the same day the King thought it "  proper to 
communicate  to the  House  of  Commons  without 
delay  the measure  adopted  to obviate the effects 
which might be occasioned by the unusual demand 
of  specie lately made from  different  parts  of  the 
country  on  the  metropolis."  His  Majesty  did  not 
apparently think it proper to refer in any way to the 
difficulties caused by his Minister's demands on the 
Bank, nor did  Pitt himself  when  he proceeded  to 
present  the  Minute  of  Council  recording  Sunday's 
resolution and to move for a committee to inquire 
into the outstanding engagements of  the Bank.  He 
said  he  would  propose  that  the  liabilities  of  the 
Bank should  be  secured by the State (an intention 
never  carried  out), and  that  its  notes  should be 
accepted in all payments  due to it.  In answer  to 
questions he declined  to  say whether  he favoured 
making the  notes  legal  tender  or not, and said he 
would  bring  in  a  Bill  to  allow  the  issue  (by all 
banks)  of  notes  for  sums  less  than  £5.  Fox  and 
other speakers expressed the utmost consternation, 
and prophesied  that the notes would go the way of 
assignats.  Next  day  in  the House of  Lords  the 
Government announced that they had decided against 
making the notes legal tender.  Lansdowne gloomily 
asseverated, "A fever is as much a fever in London 
as in Paris or Amsterdam  . . . . the fall will be  slow 
perhaps, and gradual for a time ; but it will be  cer- 
tain." 
The Order in Council was confirmed by the Act 
37  Geo.  111.  c. 45,  called  the "Bank  Restriction 
Act,"  passed on May 3.  How temporary the emer- 
gency was supposed to be is shown by the fact that 
this act was only to continue till June 24 :  in fact 
it was kept in force by continuing  acts for nearly 
quarter  of  a  century. 
An  Act  (37 Geo. 111, c. 32) had been passed three 
days earlier to suspend the prohibition embodied in 
the Act of  1777 and thus allow the issue of  bank-notes 
for sums under £5 down to but not below LI.  Noth- 
ing in the legislation made bank  notes legal tender, 
nor was there any provision for country and Scotch 
banks.  From the time when the news of  the Order 
in  Council  reached  them,  these  banks had  appar- 
ently acted as if  the Restriction required them as well 
as the Bank of  England to refrain from cash payments. 
But they did not claim to be able to insist on paying 
out nothing except their own notes, like the Bank 
of  England.  They had always been ready to give 
Bank of  England notes or drafts on London in ex- 
change for their own notes, and continued to be so. 
Consequently  though their  notes were  not conver- 
tible  into coin,  they were  always convertible into 
Bank  of  England  notes,  and  thus  each  bank 
remained  subject  to  the  ordinary limitations.  It 
was  the Bank of  England alone which was relieved 
from all fear of being asked to give other money for 
its notes. 
Gold  coin was soon little seen, much of  it being 
exported and most of  the rest pllt away in hoards. 
Silver, required  for  all  payments  under  £1 in  the 
absence  of  half-guineas  and  seven-shilling  pieces, 
was very scarce, and the want of  national coins was 
to some extent relieved by the stamping of foreign 
dollars with the King's head and by the Bank  issuing 
silver tokens for 5s. :  why these should have been 
issued by the Bank as tokens instead of  by the Mint 
as coins  does not  appear. 
The  currency  situation  thus  created  differed 
that  which  prevailed  after  August  1914  in 
Several  ways.  In the earlier  period  there  was  no 
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notes and Bank of  England notes were legal tender 
to any amount.  On  the other hand, in the earlier 
period  Bank  of  England notes  were  inconvertible, 
whereas, "in the later, Bank of  England  notes were 
convertible into Treasury notes and Treasury notes 
could be converted into gold coin by any one who had 
the temerity to demand it at the Bank, running the 
risk  of  being suspected of  an intention of  breaking 
the law  which  prohibited  melting  the coin  of  the 
realm.  But neither of  these differences are important. 
Under the Restriction Act of  1797 the Government 
was bound to accept and pay Bank of  England notes 
as equivalent to the pounds sterling which the Bank 
still promised on the face of  the note to pay.  The 
ordinary  law-abiding  private  individual,  whatever 
tile  comparative  value  of  note  and  bullion,  could 
gain  nothing  by  refusing  notes  and  insisting  on 
guineas,  because  he  was  unable  to smuggle  them 
abroad or to melt  them down  and swear that the 
bullion  was  not  produced  from coin  of  the realm. 
Such  guineas  as  remained  in  circulation  or  were 
brought from hoards from time to time could only be 
passed in respectable circles for a pound and a shilling, 
and no  one  seems  to have  thought  of  treating  a 
guinea  as z~s.,  and a pound-note as, say, only  19s. 
The EI  of  the note issue became the standard £1 in 
1797  just  as later  in  1914.  The  convertibility  of 
Treasury notes into sovereigns which continued all 
through the war of  1914-18  made no real difference, 
since transport difficulties prevented the exportation 
of  sovereigns and the law forbade their conversion 
to ornamental  or industrial  uses.  When transport 
difficulties  ceased  to  operate,  a  prohibition  of 
export  was  promptly  issued.  As  sovereigns could 
only  be  used  for  currency,  for  which  purpose £1 
notes  were  just  as good, there was no inducement 
to ask  for  them in place  of  notes. 
It must  not  be  supposed  that the transition  of 
1797  from a metallic to a paper standard was effected 
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a total absence of disturbance and confusion. 
The hfemoirs of a Banking  House, by a Scotch banker, 
Sir William Forbes, published long after the need for 
professing a confidence which was not felt had passed 
awa~7,  provide a useful supplement to the dry bones 
of  official  notices  and  brief  newspaper  reports  of 
meetings.  Sir William  says that a meeting called 
by  the  Lord-Lieutenant  of  Midlothian  to  concert 
measures for the defence of  the country in case of 
invasion and reported in the Edinburgh newspapers 
of  Feb 18,  caused  a  panic  among  the farmers and 
lower  classes of  country people. 
"  On Monday the zoth," he continues (p. 82), "  they came to our 
counting-house  in  considerable  numbers,  evidently  under  the 
impression of  terror, calling for payment of  their notes that had 
been  lodged at interest.  This lasted  the whole  of  that week 
and the two first days of  the following.  Nor was it confined to 
us  alone, for the public banks experienced it in a  still greater 
degree, and we were beginning to think there was to be a similar, 
perhaps a still severer, demand on us than what had taken place 
in  1793 ; when,  early in the morning  of  Wednesday,  the  1st 
March, an express arrived from London  to the directors of  the 
Bank of  Scotland from Thomas Coutts & Co., their correspondents 
there, informing them that the demand for gold on the Bank of 
England had risen to such an alarming height that the Directors 
had thought it proper to state the circumstance to the Chancellor 
of the Exchequer,  who  immediately procured  an order of  the 
Privy Council to be issued, prohibiting that bank  from making 
any  more  issues  of  specie  in  exchange  for  their  notes.  Mr. 
Mansfield, who was a director of  the Bank of Scotland, informed 
our Mr. Anderson of  this interesting event, and he immediately 
brought the intelligence to me, a little before the usual hour of 
commencing business.  My  ideas,  at various  times during the 
course of  the war, had  been  often not a  little gloomy when I 
thought  of  the state of  things in the  kingdom, and  indeed in 
Europe ;  but now it was that I certainly did think the nation was 
ruined beyond redemption, when so novel and alarming a circum- 
stance had taken place at the Bank of  England, which had ever 
been considered as the bulwark of  public and private credit.  Mr. 
Hay, Mr. Anderson, my son and I all repaired as fast as possible 
to the counting-house,  which  at ten o'clock  was  crowded  as 
Usual  with  people  demanding  gold.  We  were  soon  joined 
by Mr.  Simpson, cashier,  and Mr.  James,  deputy-governor of xvi  INTRODUCTION  INCONVERTIBLE  PAPER  xvii 
the Royal Bank, and by Mr.  Fraser, the treasurer of  the Bank of 
Scotland, and we sent for Mr. Hog, manager of  the British Linen 
Company,  for  all  ceremony  or  etiquette  of  public  or  private 
banks was now out of  the question, when it had become necessary 
to think of what was to be done for our joint  preservation on 
such an emergency.  Thence we repaired to the Bank of  Scotland, 
where their directors were assembled, and after some time spent 
in consultation with them. it was agreed that there was no choice 
left but to follow the Bank of  England, and suspend all further 
payments in specie.  The Lord  Provost  instantly  gave orders 
for calling a meeting of  the principal inhabitants that day at two 
o'clock,  which was very numerously  attended,  considering the 
shortness of  the notice. . . . After stating the order of  Council 
for suspending the payments in specie by the Bank  of  England, 
and the similar resolution  taken by the banks of  Edinburgh, a 
resolution  was instantly and unanimously entered into by those 
present to give every countenance and support to the Edinburgh 
banks-including  our firm-by  receiving their notes in payment 
with the same readiness  as herctofore,  and a handbill was in- 
stantly circulated over Edinburgh, and inserted in all the news- 
papers.  Expresses  were  likewise  despatched  to  Glasgow, 
Greenock, Paisley,  Ayr,  Perth,  Dundee  and  Aberdeen-at  all 
which places  there were banks-to  inform  them of  what  was 
passing.  The instant this resolution of  paying no more specie was 
known in the street, a scene of  confusion and uproar took place 
of  which it is utterly impossible for those who did not witness 
it  to form  an idea. 
"  Our counting-house, and indeed the offices of  all the banks, 
were  instantly crowded  to the door  with  people  clamorously 
demanding payment in gold  of  their interest-receipts, and voci- 
ferating for silver in change of  our circulating paper.  It  was in 
vain  that  we  urged  the  order  of  Council-which,  however, 
applied, merely to the Bank of  England-and  the general resolu- 
tion  adopted  by  all  other  banks  in  Edinburgh.  They  were 
deaf  to every argument and although no symptom, nor indeed 
threatening  of  violence  appeared,  their  noise,  and the bustle 
they  made,  was  intolerable ;  which  may  be  readily  believed 
when it is considered that they were mostly of  the lowest and 
most ignorant classes, such as fish-women, carmen, street porters 
and butcher's  men,  all bawling  out  at once  for  change,  and 
jostling one another in their endeavours who should get nearest to 
the table, behind which were cashiers and ourselves endeavouring 
to pacify them as well as we could. 
I'  Of  our interest-receipts we were prompt in payment ; but 
instead of  giving our own circulating notes, as heretofore, we paid 
the value in notes of  the public banks . . . the sums had been 
deposited with us not in specie, but in such notes as we  now 
gave back to the holders.  With regard to our circulating notes 
we  felt the hardship on the holders, who were deprivedof 
ihe'means of  purchasing  with  ready money  the necessaries of 
life, as there were no notes of less value than twenty shillings and 
it was with the utmost difficulty they could get change anywhere 
else ;  for the instant  it was  known  that payments in  specie 
were suspended, not a person would part with a single shilling 
that they could keep, and the consequence was that both gold 
and silver specie was hoarded up and instantly disappeared.  . . . 
Saturday was the day on which we  had the severest outcry to 
encounter  . . . many master-tradesmen  requcsted in the most 
earnest manner to have a little silver for enabling them to pay 
their  workpeople.  All  we  could  do when  sensible  that  their 
demand proceeded from veal necessity, was privately to change 
a note or two by taking them into a separate room, for we durst 
not do it openly in the counting-house for fear of  raising a riot. 
" It was a matter of agreeable surprise to see in how short a time 
after the suspension of paying in specie, the run on us ceased.  . . . 
It  was remarkable, also after the first surprise and alarm was over, 
how quietly the country submitted, as they still do, to transact all 
business  by means of bank notes  for which the issuers give no 
specie as formerly.  The wonder was the greater because the act 
of the Privy Council first, and afterwards the act of  Parliament, 
applied merely, as I have already said, to the Bank of  England, 
while all other banks, both in England and Scotland were left to 
carry on their business without any protection from Parliament." 
Forbes a.dds in  a  footnote  that no  attempt had 
till then (he was writing in 1803) been made to force 
any Scotch bank to pay in specie ; nor to his know- 
ledge had any similar attempt been made in England, 
except  against  Oakes  &  Son of  Bury St. Edmunds 
by  a  Mr.  Grigby,  whose  conduct  was  severely 
reprobated  by  Mr.  Baron  Hotham, who  tried  and 
apparently managed to shelve the case. 
The crisis, with  its excitement  and alarm, eased 
the  situation.  Private  expenditure,  both  for con- 
sumption and investment, was doubtless checked by 
the general consternation, and the Government now 
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began to check it further by imposing additional taxa- 
tion, which made it more difficult for the individual 
both to buy what he wanted and to save money out 
of his income.  Even public expenditure was checked 
to some extent ; in the next four years it was rather 
less than in 1796, and then only rose slowly, so that 
in 1810  it was but 76%  millions, while the revenue had 
risen  to 67.  The rake had suspended his progress, 
and there was no need of  a depreciation of  currency 
to square the account of  aggregate produce and aggre- 
gate money expenditure.  Cash payments might have 
been resumed after a few months, and the Bank was 
quite willing.  But no government involved in a peat 
war is willing to give up so potent an engine for surrep- 
titiously fleecing its subjects as an inconvertible cur- 
rency, whether in its own hands or in that of  a bank 
which  it influences.  For  "  political  reasons " the 
Restriction Act was continued. 
Joined with the determination of  the public to ac- 
cept notes, the Act placed in the hands of  the Bank 
the power  of  creating money  without limit for  the 
benefit of  its shareholders, or Proprietors, as they were 
called.  It could have lent notes  to every one who 
offered one per  cent. for an advance ; it could have 
bought up all the public funds except those belonging 
to the most  careless or  obstinate  stockholders ; it 
could  have subscribed the whole  amount of  every 
Government loan for the war.  But the Directors had 
long managed the Bank with one eyeeiildeed on the 
interest of  the proprietors but with the other on that 
of  the "  monied interest " generally.  The example 
of  the assignats, just  f~nislling  their meteoric career 
in France, was sufficient to prevent them from adopt- 
ing the fantastic belief of  the cranks who believe that 
currency-alone  among all objects of  commerce-can 
be offered in indefinite quantity without depreciation 
of value.  They recognized that to prevent eventual 
disaster to their class and country the issue of  notes 
must be subject to limitation, and with their natural 
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they  thought  it sufficient to limit  it 
as they had  limited  it before  the  Restriction Act. 
~~w before the Restriction Act they had been in the 
habit of making advances of  notes whenever it seemed 
safe to do so, and the issue of  notes thus appeared to 
be  limited to the amount which could be advanced 
with safety.  What could be better  than to go on 
being guided by this rule ? 
They overlooked the fact that the conditions were 
altered.  Before the Suspension the convertibility of 
the notes absolutely prevented the Bank from increas- 
ing its issue whenever the value of  a given quantity, 
of gold was appreciably greater than that of  the notes 
which promised to pay that quantity ;  the Bank could 
not lend additional notes promising to pay the bearer 
on demand, say, £210  at a moment when any bearer 
would  find it profitable  to demand the zoo golden 
guineas to which he was entitled because he could sell 
them for substantially more than £210.  At such a 
moment more notes would be coming in than were 
going out, and more gold going out than coming in, 
and this would continue until parity was restored or 
the Bank broken.  In order to continue doing as they 
did before  the Suspension,  therefore,  the Directors 
should not only have considered the soundness of  each 
particular  advance but should also have considered 
how  the whole  position  would  have looked  if  the 
Suspension had not been in force.  Had they done so, 
they would clearly have limited advances and reduced 
the amount of  notes in circulation whenever £1  in notes 
became worth appreciably less than  123$ grains of 
standard gold in the market-or,  as it  would common- 
ly be expressed, whenever the price of  gold rose appre- 
ciablyabove~3  17s. IO*~.,  and would have maintained 
this policy until £1 in notes and 123i grains of  gold 
were again equal in value. 
When a  bank's  advances of  notes are  unlimited 
except by the lack of  additional solvent borrowers, 
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than when they are limited not only by that but also 
by the necessity of  keeping the notes up to the value 
of  the gold  promised  on  their  faces  (see Report, 
p. 50).  The Bank of  Ireland, put by the Irish Parlia- 
ment under the same Restriction as the Bank of  Eng- 
land, and adopting the same policy, caused an obvious 
severance of  the  value  of  its notes from  that of 
the promised gold in a very short time.  The Bank 
of  England, perhaps  because  of  a  higher  standard 
of  security in  the individual  case, perhaps  because 
its stereotyped 5 per cent. rate was more deterrent to 
borrowers in the circumstances of  the time and coun- 
try than the charge made by the Bank of  Ireland, 
moved  more  slowly.  In  the  earlier  years  of  the 
Restriction such dealings in gold as were recorded, 
the foreign exchanges,  and the quantity of  bullion 
which  the  Bank  managed  to obtain  and hold,  all 
indicate little discrepancy between the value of  notes 
and gold bullion.  The pound sterling, in which all 
transactions were calculated, was always worth less 
than 123i grains of  gold, but the difference was never 
large  enough  to be  important.  In 1808,  however, 
owing, it is said, to the opening up of  South America 
to British  commerce,  a  wave  of  optimism-called 
"  speculation " by  contemporaries-among  traders 
caused an excessive rise in the price of  many articles. 
The Bank was prevented by the usury laws from at 
once benefiting  its Proprietors  and moderating the 
enthusiasm of  the traders by raising its rate of  dis- 
count,  and,  being  by no  means  exempt  from  the 
failings of  the crowd, would probably not have done 
so even if  it had been able.  Under convertibility a 
check would have been imposed by the limited quan- 
tity of gold, which would eventually have made the 
Bank "  anxious for the safety of  its establishment " ; 
with the means of  manufacturing unlimited amounts 
of  money on the premises, the Bank had no fears, and 
G~accommodated  the public,"  perhaps  not quite  as 
liberally as usual, though of  that there is no evidence, 
but at any rate too liberally to allow £1  to remain 
nearly equal in purchasing power  to 123i grains of 
gold.  Early in 1809 the price of  gold went up to gos., 
or to put it the other way £1 in notes would only buy 
as much  as 107 grains of  gold instead of  123i. 
The foreign exchanges told the same tale.  On August 
29 the first of  three letters from Ricardo (reprinted 
for Johns  Hopkins University, 1903) appeared in the 
Morning Chronicle.  It begins with a statement that 
the present excess of  the market price of  gold over the 
mint price has excited much attention, but that the 
public "  do not seem to be sufficiently impressed with 
the importance of the subject, nor of the disastrous 
consequences which may attend the further depreci- 
ation  of  paper,"  and  goes  on  to  explain,  with  a 
lucidity never  surpassed in the author's later works, 
how the insufficient limitation of notes, due to their 
inconvertibility and the absence of  any substituted 
check, had led to a difference between the value of  £1 
in notes and the 123) grains of gold to which £1 was 
formerly equal. 
On February I,  1810, Francis Horner, who till then 
had played no prominent part in Parliament, moved 
the House of  Commons for  various "  accounts  and 
returns respecting the present state of  the circulating 
medium and the bullion trade,"  and said he intended 
to move for a committee  to  consider  the  subject. 
The Commitee was appointed on February 19  with 
the reference given at the head of  the Report below 
(p. 3).  The members, a list of  whom will be found 
below  on  p.  xlii. were  largely  experts.  They took 
evidence  on  twenty-two  days  from  Thursday, 
February  zz,  to March  26 ;  on  seven  days  from 
March 26 to April 18, and on May zz and 25.  Horner 
was  Chairman, and the Minutes of  Evidence  show 
him to have occupied the Chair at  all these meetings 
''"ti1  March 15,  after which, owing chiefly to his ab- 
sence  on  circuit,  he  only  presided  at three  of  the 
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three, and Davies Giddy one.  The Minutes of  Evi- 
dence, like all others of  the period, never attribute 
the questions asked to particular questioners : ques- 
tions were doubtless supposed to be put by the Com- 
mittee  as a  body,  speaking  by the mouth  of  the 
Chairman.  That some at least of  the questions were 
read out from slips of  paper handed to the Chairman 
by members is suggested by the occasional appearance 
of  questions beginning  with the  word "  Whether," 
the words "  please ask the witness " being no doubt 
understnnd if  not actually prefixed. 
In Horner'q  J4eg1~oif/s  and Correspondence  (vol. ii. 
p. 47) there is ;L  letter written on June 26, when the 
Report was still in the printer's hands, in which he 
says : "  The  Report is  in truth  very clumsily and 
prolixly drawn ; stating nothing  but very  old  doc- 
trines on ihe s11b;ect  it treats of, and stating them in 
a mole imnerfrct  I~iln  ihan  thy  have  frequently 
appmrec'l in before.  It is a motley composition by 
Huskisson,  Thornton,  and  myself ;  each  having 
written parts which are tacked together without any 
care to give them an uniform style or a very exact 
connection.  One grea.t meritthe Report, however, 
possesses ; that it declares, in very plain and pointed 
terms, both the true doctrine and the existence of  a 
great evil growing out of  the neglect of  that doctrine. 
By keeping up the discussion, which  I mean to do, 
and by forcing it on the attention of  Parliament, we 
shall in time (I  trust) effect thc rectoration of  the old 
and only safs :>.7:erx,.  ' 
A detailed sunlmary of  the Report is given  below 
(p.  xlvii.). Here it need only be said that what Horner 
calls its  (( true doctrine " was  that when  a  paper 
currency originally '  i,._lcd 011  and coi-lvertible into 
coin has become iiicsilverll!~1(~  it  can only be  kept 
up to its proper value by a limitation of  its quantity 
based on observation of  the price of bullion and the 
,I.  cxcfin  1  $;fJ?.  'i'he "  great evil growing out of 
neglect of that doctri~le  " was the  gap between  the 
value of  £1 sterling (i.e.  £1  in notes) and that of  123& 
grains of  gold, as indicated by the price of  gold and 
the foreign exchanges. 
The Report assumes, without any attempt to prove, 
that the proper value of  £1 at any tine is the same 
as that of 123* grains of  gold at that time.  In view 
of the general belief that money ought to bc stable in 
value, it was, strictly speaking, a mistake to assume 
this, since it may be alleged by an opponent that it 
is desirable that there should be a divergence between 
the value of  £1 and that of  123i grains of  gold if  it 
happens  that the  value  of  the gold,  measured  in 
general purchasing power  (such as is indicated by an 
index number of  prices), undergoes some alteration. 
If,  for example, gold will buy double or will only buy 
half as much of  ordinary servic(.c; and commodities 
as it bought clown to a year or two ago, and as it will 
buy again after a year or two, there would be much 
to be said for an inconvertible currency which showed 
a considerable divergence from it, provided that the 
divergence indicated greater st  ability.  So it could 
not be assumed straightway that the value of  £1 in 
notes ought to be always the same as that of  123+ 
grains of  gold : the value of  jtlr  in notes at any  moment 
might be nearer the normal or ordinary value of  £1 
than the value of  1234 grains was.  But this was of 
no importance for the practical controversy then in 
hand, since then, as in most, if  not all, modern wars, 
no  one  could  possibly  deny  that gold  had  in  fact 
varied bss  from its normal purchasing power than the 
paper currency.  Prices, it .., as I ln i~,7ers.(  11 y admitted, 
were  much  above  tl,:.'.  i  . .  ,  i hat  is,  £1 
would buy much less than  usilal.  The 1233  grains 
of gold would also exchange for much less, but at any 
rate they would  buy  mow  than  £1 in  notes -you 
could get gos. lor all ounce, which is equal to 23s. rd. 
for 123;  grains. and 23s. ~tl.  rliiL  t buy more than £1. 
All that the Bullion Committee  need have  claimed 
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(or "  value ")  of  £1 to fall below  that of  1z3$ grains) 
of  gold  at a  time  when  the  Purchasi~ag  power  (or 
"  value "  ) of  gold was admittedly-and  with admittedly 
unsatisfactory  results-itself  much below  the  normal. 
If the Committee had done this and avoided putting 
an  unproved assumption in place of  it,  much confusion 
would have been avoided : but in the extreme infancy 
of  the invention of  price  index numbers, so much 
could scarcely have been expected. 
"  The Report,"  says Smart in his Alz~za  ls, p. 255, 
"  was  presented  on  the day previous  (June  8) to 
the  prorogation  of  Parliament,  and  could  not,  of 
course,  be  discussed.  Copies  in  fact  were  not  in 
the  hands  of  members  till  the  middle  of  August 
(the  number of  tables in the appendix having delayed 
the printing),  but the substance and the recommenda- 
tion were circulated in the newspapers immediately 
after it was laid on the table.  Its arguments were 
at once  combated  by  a  host  of  pamphlets ;  its 
conclusions  said  to  be  inconsistent  with  the  evi- 
dence;  and  even  the  motives  of  its  members 
questioned.  In  reply,  Huskisson,  who  had  been 
one of  the most active members of  the Committee, 
followed  it up  in  October  by  an  able  pamphlet, 
entitled  The  Questiout  concevni+zg the  Depreciatiovt 
of  our Cuwency stated'  and examined-restating  and 
expanding the Report-which  ran through  several 
editions in  a  few  months." 
Davies Giddy, another prominent  member of  the 
Committee,  attempted  A  Plain  Statement  of  tlze 
Ih3ullion  Question, which is at least as successful as 
most  modern  efforts  at elementary  exposition  on 
the subject.  Malthus  discussed  the  question  with 
Ricardo in private conversation and correspondence, 
and wrote  an  article  for  the February  Edi~zburgh 
Review, to which Ricardo replied in an Appendix to 
the  fourth  edition  of  his  High  Price  of  BmZZion 
(see Ricardo's Letters to Malthus, p. 10, and Horner's 
Memoirs, vol.  ii.  p.  68).  Horner,  we  may  gather 
from his own  and other speeches in the House  of 
Commons  on  April  5,  1811,  thought  the  Report 
would lose  nothing  by  delay,  and  it was  not  till 
May  6  that he  moved  the House  into Committee 
to consider it. 
With what would now, at any rate, be regarded 
as  very  bad  parliamentary  strategy,  though  he 
says  that it was  recommended  to him  by parlia- 
mentary  experts,  he  moved  sixteen  resolutions, 
all academic and  only  likely  to raise  unnecessary 
controversy except the fourteenth, which declared it 
to be the duty of  the Bank to consider the foreign 
exchanges and the price  of  bullion  in  determining 
the amount of  its issues so long as the Suspension 
continued, and the sixteenth, which pronounced  it 
expedient  that  the  Suspension  should  terminate, 
whether the war was at an end or not, in two years' 
time. A four days' debate took place, in which Horner 
spoke  for three hours and was supported by Henry 
Thornton,  Huskisson  and  five  other  members  of 
his  Committee  and  by  Canning,  whose  speech  he 
thought the best of  all.  The most doughty opponent 
was  Rose,  whose speech, however, is  not  reported 
in  Hansard  but  merely  copied  from  a  printed 
version  subsequently  published  by  him.  There 
were  two  divisions,  the first  of  which rejected  the 
theory  of  the  resolutions  by  151  to 75,  and  the 
second rejected  the definite time limit for  Suspen- 
sion by 180  to 45. 
On  May 13 Vansittart, according to notice given 
in this debate, brought  forward seventeen counter- 
resolutions  modelled  on  Horner's,  but  taking  the 
line that there was no divergence of  value between 
notes  and  coia,  and  that  the  divergence  between 
notes and coin on the one hand and bullion on the 
other  was  due  not  to superfluity  of  notes  but  to 
shdrtage of  bullion, and was therefore quite proper. 
Owing to the failure of  the Bullion Report to explain 
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coin lay in the fact that it made the prices of  commo- 
dities  more  abnormal than  they otherwise would 
be,  this  argument  that  the  paper  had  the  right 
value and gold the wrong value was never adequately 
dealt  with ;  Vansittart  and  his  friends  were  not 
asked to explain why they thought the paper stan- 
dard better than the gold standard, in which prices 
would have been appreciably lower than they were. 
Vansittart  himself  in  the  sixteenth  resolution  ad- 
mitted  that  the  Suspension  should  terminate 
as soon as "  the political  and commercial relations 
of  the  country "  rendered  it  "  compatible  with 
the  public  interest,"  which  implies  that  the gold 
standard was better for ordinary times.  The seven- 
teenth  resolution  declared  it "  highly  inexpedient 
and dangerous now  to fix a definite period for the 
removal of  the Restriction earlier than the existing 
limit  of  six months after the  conclusion of  peace." 
All the resolutions were carried on May 15  (Hansard, 
pp. 1-127,  134-46,  150-75). 
The  third  of  Vansittart's  resolutions  asserted 
that "  the promissory notes of  the Bank of  England  . 
have hitherto been,  and are, at this time,  held  in 
public estimation to be equivalent to the legal coin 
of  the  realm,  and  generally  accepted  as  such  in 
all transactions to which such coin is legally appli- 
cable."  This  equivalence  was  denied  by  several 
members in the debates, and Lord King, a descen- 
dant of  Locke,  who  had  written  as early  as 1803 
a  pamphlet  to prove  that notes  were  depreciated, 
resolved to give the lie to it.  Before the Midsummer 
quarter-day  he  addressed  a  letter  to  his  tenants 
saying that he could no longer accept notes in satis- 
faction  of  their  contracts  in  their  leases  to  pay 
"  good  and  lawful  money  of  Great  Britain,"  and 
that he therefore required  payment  in  guineas,  or 
in an equal weight of  Portuguese coin, or  in notes 
sufficient to purchase an equal weight  of  standard 
gold at the market  price  of  the day. 
The effect  of  this was  to compel Parliament to 
pass  legislation  which  was  equivalent  to  making 
bank notes legal tender, though there was a childish 
,ttempt  to avoid  doing  it in  so many words. 
In November,  1810, the price  of  gold was  down 
to 84s.  6d., but  soon  began  to rise  again,  and in 
August, 1813,  it attained the height of  IIOS., making 
the value of  £1 in notes only equal to that of  87& 
grains  of  gold  instead of  123a.  By October, 1814, 
the divergence  had  greatly  diminished ;  the price 
of gold had sunk to 85s.  In February, 1815,  just 
before the escape of  Napoleon from Elba, it was a 
little higher, at 8gs., and that event made it shoot 
up to 107s.  After Waterloo it fell rapidly, and was 
only  83s.  in  October,  1815.  In  the  next  twelve 
months  it fell  to 78s. 6d., never  again  during the 
Suspension to rise  above  83s.  (Lords'  Committee 
on  Resumfition of  Cash  Paymejtts, 1819,  App.  C.1, 
in  sessional  vol.  iii. :  Commons  Committee  on  the 
Bank  Charter  1831-2,  App.  96  in  sessional  vol. 
vi. ) 
Vansittart  told the House of  Commons on Febru- 
ary 10,  1815,  that everything  that had  happened 
since  the  beginning  of  the  Bullion  controversy 
went  to show  that  Horner's  doctrine  was  wrong. 
It must be admitted that the course of  events from 
1810,  to 1816  was unfavourable to the easy propaga- 
tion and acceptance of  the doctrine, for from August, 
1810, to August,  1813,  while  the Bank  of England 
circulation did not increase at all, the price of gold 
was rising, and from August, 1813, to October, 1814, 
while  the  circulation  rose  3$  millions  the  price 
of  gold  was  falling.  And  the  violent  fluctuation 
in the price  of gold in the year of  Waterloo could 
certainly not be  attributed to changes in the note 
circulation. 
But  economics  resembles  therapeutics  in  the 
difficulty  of  isolating  causes.  A  patient  is  not 
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for him was wrong simply because he recovered from 
his illness without taking it.  He niight have recov- 
ered  quicker  if  he  had ;  or  a  change  of  weather, 
habits or diet may have acted as an effective sub- 
stitute.  So here  the defender  of  the  Report  may 
effectively  reply  to  Vansittart  and  his  supporters 
that if  the Bank  had "  adverted  to " the price  of 
gold  and  the  foreign  exchanges  in  regulating  its 
issue,  and  consequently been  stiffer in  giving  ad- 
vances, and so reduced its issue from 1810  to 1813, 
the price of  gold would not have gone up, and the 
price  of  commodities in general would have fallen 
I  faster  than  it  actually  did.  Commodities  were 
falling in consequence of  the diminution of  readiness 
to buy-to  part  with  money-characteristic  of  the 
reaction  after  a boom  or period  of  "  speculation," 
and the Bank  by  maintaining  its circulation  un- 
diminished  made  the  fall less than it would have 
been  if  the circulation had been contracted. 
Supposing  the  Bank  had  adopted  this  policy 
with  its  eyes  open,  it might  be  defended  on  the 
ground  that  though  it  was  desirable  that  prices 
should  come  down  from  the  abnormal  height  of 
1810,  it was  not desirable  that they should  come 
down  with  too  much  of  a  rush.  Unfortunately 
for  this  defence,  however,  the  diminution  of  the 
rapidity of  the fall from 1810  to 1813  only aggravated 
the precipitousness of the fall at the end of  the war. 
That fall, like  other  falls at the  ends  of  wars  in 
face of  a currency stationary in amount, was caused 
in the first place by the sharp drop in public expendi- 
ture (just as the rise at the beginning  of  a war  is 
caused  by  the  opposite) and was  ~naintaiiied  by 
the increased ease of  obtaining ordinary commodities 
(from the price of  which we  form our idea of  general 
prices).  It was  bound  to  take  place  unless  the 
paper  currency  had  been  enormously  increased, 
like that of some countries after the war of  1914-18, 
and this not being attempted, it would clearly have 
been  better to have let prices  down  more  rapidly 
between  1810  and 1813 
About  the  effect  of  the  Napoleonic  escapade  of 
1815,  it may be recalled that the Report expressly 
confines  the  application  of  its  theory  to  "  any 
considerable period  of time " (p. 45).  It certainly 
does not ask us to believe that each sharp fluctua- 
tion  of  the  comparative value  of  notes  and  gold 
shown  either  by  the  price  of  gold  or  the foreign 
exchanges was caused by alterations in the circulation 
of notes. 
Any one who is puzzled by the fact that although 
when some other standard is established, gold  "  is 
only a commodity,"  yet the price (in notes) of  gold 
does  not  always  vary  in  the  same  proportion  or 
even  in.  the  same  direction  as general  prices  (in 
notes), must  be  reminded  that it is not necessary 
for  the  price  of  each  commodity  to vary  in  the 
same proportion  and  direction  as the  price  of  all 
commodities  taken  together.  Each  has  its  own 
set of special circumstances, and the special circum- 
stances of  gold were by no means unimportant.  For 
one thing, it was still current as money over a wide 
area ;  for  another,  its  production  and  movement 
was  less  interrupted  by  warlike  operations  than 
those of  most articles of  commerce ; for a third it 
was  more  subject to being  locked up in hoards at 
one  time and poured  out of  hoards  at another. 
On  the  whole  we  may  condemn  Vansittart's 
theory as being as unsound as his financial adminis- 
tration  was  feeble. 
After  October,  1816,  with  the  price  of  gold  at 
78s. 6d., only 7id.  above the coinage par, Resumption 
of  Cash  Payments  should  have  seemed  easy  of 
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fortable under the Suspension, and felt no enthusiasm 
for a  return  to a  system which did not guarantee 
it against being asked to pay its debts at a possibly 
inconvenient  moment ;  and  the  Government  and 
Parliament were  as slack  as they usually are after 
a great war.  Moreover the quantity of  coin likely 
to be  required  for  the circulation  was  enormously 
overrated, so that a belief  prevailed that the Bank 
would  have  to  accumulate  an enormous  stock  of 
coin  (or bullion ready to be made into coin) before 
it  could  safely undertake  once  more  to  fulfil  the 
promise  (which  it  had  continued  throughout  the 
Suspension to make on every note) to pay the bearer 
on demand such and such number of  pounds.  Now 
from February, 1808, to February, 1815,  the Bank's 
L I  treasure,"  as its stock  of  gold and silver  bullion 
and coin  was  often  conveniently called, had fallen 
very  steadily  from  nearly  8  to  very  little  over 
z millions.  The Directors set to work  to increase 
the amount, and for  some time  were  even  willing 
to  pay  80s.  an  ounce  for  gold  for  the  purpose, 
which  was  much  the  same  as  giving  £1  0s.  6d. 
each  for  sovereigns.  It does  not  seem  to  have 
occurred  to  them  that  their  promises  to pay £1 
being  at the moment  worth less  than a sovereign, 
and being certain to be worth as much as a sovereign 
when  Resumption  took  place,  it  would  be  much 
better  to  apply  their  resources  to buying  in  and 
cancelling their promises to pay.  If  they had means 
to buy gold, they obviously had the means to cancel 
their notes at once, and it would clearly be better to 
do so at once, and pay £1, than to lay up the means 
of  cancelling themin the future  at  the cost of £1 0s. 6d. 
In  short  it  could  not  possibly  be  good  policy  to 
give forty-one promises to pay £1 and get in exchange 
what  would  soon  only  suffice to redeem  forty  of 
these  promises.  But  this is  a  truth which  many 
authorities fail to see even now, when they advocate 
the accumulation of  a backing to depreciated incon- 
vertible  paper  instead  of  asking  for  the reduction 
of  the paper. 
In November,  1816,  the price of  gold being then 
78s. Gd., and the treasure probably over 8 mglions, 
the  Directors  decided  to  find  out  by  experiment 
how  much  coin  the  public  was  likely  to  ask  for 
on  Resumption.  In  accordance  with  a  provision 
which had been  in  the Restriction  Acts  ever since 
1797,  they  gave  notice  to  the  Speaker  that  they 
intended  on  and  after  December  z, 1816,  to pay 
gold on  demand to all holders of  notes for £1 and 
E2  dated earlier than  1812.  Very  few  notes  were 
presented in response to the invitation ; the Directors 
were  encouraged  to go further, and in April, 1817, 
the price of  gold being 79s. and the treasure probably 
over  10  millions,  they  offered  repayment  in  gold 
on and after May 2 to all holders of  £r and £2 notes 
dated earlier  than 1816.  As  this too evoked little 
response and their  treasure was  near  12  millions, 
they gave notice in  September, 1817,  although the 
price of  gold had now risen to 80s., that they would 
on  and after October  I repay in  gold all notes of 
every denomination issued before January  I, 1817. 
Their failure to "  advert to the price of  bullion and 
the  foreign  exchanges " on  this  occasion  had  its 
natural  effect.  Melting  and  exportation  being 
now  profitable,  large  amounts of  notes  were  sent 
in for redemption :  the depletion was only gradual, 
presumably  owing  to the  law  against  export  pre- 
venting  more  than  a  dribble  of  coin  and  bullion 
outwards.  Between  August,  1817,  and  February, 
1819,  the treasure fell 74-  millions ; we  might expect 
to  find  the  notes  also  reduced  by  that  amount, 
and  if  they  had  been,  the  decrease  of  notes  and 
the increase, outside the Bank, of  gold might  well 
have  brought  gold  and  notes  to  a  parity  in  the 
mdrket.  But  while  repaying  the  pre-1817  dated 
notes,  the Bank must have been counteracting the 
effect of  that action by issuing additional new (and xxxii  INTRODUCTION  RESUMPTION  xxxiii 
still  inconvertible)  notes,  for  while  the  treasure 
diminished by 7B  millions, the total of  notes dimin- 
ished  by only 43.  About  half  the  difference  of 
3  millions is accounted  for  by a  greater excess of 
"  securities,"  public  and  private,  over  deposits, 
and  the  remainder  by a  diminution  of  the  Rest 
or  undivided  profit  which  was  the  consequence 
of  a  transaction  entered  into by  the Government 
and  the  Bank  in  1816.  In  that  year  the  Bank, 
which  had  been  steadily  increasing  its  "  Rest " 
for nine  years  till  it  stood  at over  8$  millions, 
capitalised nearly 3 millions of  this undivided profit, 
lending the amount (like the whole of  its previous 
capital) permanently to the State at  3 per cent., and in 
subsequent years it continued to pay its dividend at 
the usual 10  per  cent., which meant paying its Pro- 
prietors nearly ~300,000  per annum more than they 
had been receiving in 1807-15.  NOW  in fact a reduc- 
tion of  the Bank's profits which took place after the 
war-and  which surely could have been  foreseen- 
called for a smaller rather than a larger distribution. 
The joint  action of  the loan, the larger distribution, 
and  the  smaller  profits  was  to cause  the  Rest  to 
fall from E8,640,ooo at February, 1816,  to L5,192,ooo 
in  February,  1819,  and  further  to  E3,521,ooo  in 
February, 1821,  which greatly helps to explain  the 
astonishing feebleness of  the Bank at this important 
period  of  its history. 
Early in  1819  secret committees were  appointed 
by both Lords and Commons to consider the whole 
question of  Resumption.  Almost immediately both 
Committees  sent  in  i~~terim  reports  to  the  effect 
that the  "partial  resumption"  attempted by  the 
Bank  with  the exchanges  unfavourable  was  folly 
and  must  be  stopped.  Parliament  accordingly 
inhibited  the Bank  from going on  with  it. 
But what was to be done?  It was all very well 
for supporters of  the Bullion Report to recommend 
reduction of  issue, but how could the Bank reduce 
to any  considerable  extent ?  In the palmy  days 
of  1810,  when  the average  amount  of  commercial 
bills  discounted  was  20  millions,  the  Bank  could 
be blamed for not allowing this amount to reduce 
itself  and  cancelling notes  as they  came  in.  But 
in  1817  and 1818  the commercial bills were under 
43  millions.  The  whole  of  Private  Securities 
amounted to little more than 9 millions in February, 
1819,  and  this  was  double  what  it had  averaged 
in the two preceding half-  yearly accounts.  Whether 
notes  were  to be  substantially reduced  or  a  large 
sum  of  treasure acquired, it was  obvious that the 
one  considerable  debtor  to the Bank,  that is,  the 
State,  must  repay  a  large  portion  of  what  was 
under  Public  Securities.  Accordingly  both  Com- 
mittees  and Parliament  agreed  to  the  request  of 
the Bank that 10  millions of  Exchequer Bills held 
by it should be paid off.  The result of  this, coupled 
with  changes  of  quite minor  importance, was that 
the Bank, instead of defeating itself  by buying gold 
with additions to its note-issue, was able to accumu- 
late a great quantity of  the treasure which  it sup- 
posed to be required, while at the same time making  / 
that small reduction  in  the  note  issue, which,  as 
Ricardo  had  always contended,  was  all  that was 
necessary.  At  the  end  of  February,  1821,  the 
circulation was 19  per cent. less than it had beenat 
the highest  point  (August 1817)) while the treasure 
was a little greater than it was then and 84 millions 
above  the low  point  of  August, 1819,  though  the 
Bank had not paid more than the coinage price for 
the addition.  (See Table 11. p. xliv. below.) 
It is  not  surprising  that  even  the  Bank  then 
thought it safe to resume cash payments ;  it could 
have  paid  off  in metal  half  of  its note-issue,  and 
the remainder  would have  been  only  about  equal 
to the amount which it was able to keep in circu- 
lation  thirty  years  earlier,  before  suspension  was 
ever  thought  of.  An  elaborate  arrangement  sug- 
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gested by Ricardo as  far back as 1811 in the Appendix 
to his High Price of  Bullion a froof  of  the  lefrecia- 
tion  of  bank  notes,  had been made  by Parliament 
on the recommendation of  the  Committees.  Under 
this the Bank  was for  a time to have paid in big 
ingots of  bullion only, first at the rate of  an ounce 
to 81s., then to 79s.  6d., and lastly at the coinage 
rate of  77s.  IO@. before  beginning  to pay in coin 
on  May  I,  1823.  All  was  set aside by  agreement 
between the Bank and Parliament, and full Resump- 
tion took place on May I,  1821. 
Scarcely any diminution of  the treasure took place. 
Almost, if  not quite, to the last, the Bank officially, 
at any  rate,  denied  the  doctrine  of  the  Bullion 
Report.  On March 25, 1819, the Court of  Directors 
could  not "  refrain from  adverting to an opinion, 
strongly  insisted  on  by  some, that  the  Bank  has 
only  to reduce  its issues  to  obtain  a  favourable 
turn in the exchanges and a  consequent influx  of 
the precious  metals,''  and conceived  ('it to be its 
duty to declare  that it is unable  to discover  any 
solid foundation for such a  sentilnent " (Commons 
Secret  Committee  0%  Resumfition,  1819,  p.  263). 
But in 1827 this resolution  was  rescinded  on  the 
motion  of  a  Director,  who,  five  years  later, was 
able to say of  the opinion "  that the Bank should 
conduct  itself, in its issues, with  reference  to the 
state  of  the  foreign  exchanges  and  the  bullion 
market,"  that  he  did  not "  think  there  was  one 
person in the Bank of  England that denies it or  is 
disposed to act in opposition to it " (Bank-Charter 
Committee, Evidence, vol. vi. of  1831-2,  qq. 2072-7). 
We may well conclude by asking how it was that 
Horner's "  great evil " (above, p. xxii.) did not grow 
much greater than it did.  Why was not the incon- 
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vertible  currency  increased  much  above  the  very 
moderate amount which it actually attained ? 
Tooke ascribes the moderation of  the issue through- 
out simply  to the 5 per  cent. rate charged by the 
Bank, which he says was a high rate in the circum- 
stances of  the time (History of  Prices, vol. i. p. 161). 
Doubtless  additional  money  always  put  on  the 
market by way of  loan would be kept from flowing 
in a very large stream if  the issuer charged a very 
high rate of  interest for it.  A man with an inexhaus- 
tible  goldmine  workable  without  expense  in  his 
cellar  would  not  issue  enough  to bring  down  the 
value of  gold appreciably if  he did not sell his gold 
(or  coin  and  spend  it, which  is  the  same  thing) 
and refused to lend it except at 20 per cent. interest. 
But even if  5 per  cent. was sufficiently high  to be 
a  neariy  adequate  check  throughout  the  most  of 
the period and quite adequate after the end of  the 
war,  that will  not  explain  the  moderation  of  the 
issue,  inasmuch  as  the  Directors  could  at  any 
moment, if  they had  chosen,  reduce  the  rate  to 
4  or less.  Some  few  years  after  the  Resumption 
they  did  so  reduce  it;  why  did  they  not  do  so 
during  the  Suspension ?  Moreover,  it is  not  the 
fact that lending at 5 per cent. was the only means 
the Bank used  for issuing its notes :  it often lent 
them to the Government at lower rates, and it paid 
them away for any property or securities which it 
bought.  The  fixed,  or  rather customary, rate  of 
discount at 5 per cent. hindered but did not abso- 
lutely  preclude  the  issue  of  unlimited  amounts of 
notes. 
The  solution  seems  to  be  this.  In the  earlier 
Part and again during the last part of  the Suspension, 
the  Directors  expected  Resumption  to take  place 
soon ;  and  this  naturally  led  them  to act as 
!f  ltwere necessary that the Bank should be "  strong )' 
ln the sense of  easily able to meet its liabilities in 
gold if required to do so, and strength in this sense MORAL  xxxvii 
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was  clearly  incompatible  with  reckless  issue.  In 
the early  years of  the Suspension moderation  was 
made easier by the Government's  demands on  the 
Bank being held  in check by the alarm which the 
crisis of  1797  had created in the minds of  ministers 
who  knew  what had happened  to the assignats in 
France.  In the post-war period, while the conduct 
of  the Government  was much  less  creditable,  Re- 
sumption was a more insistent monitor. 
In  the  middle  period,  after  the  failure  of  the 
Peace  of  Amiens  had  accustomed  men's  minds  to 
the idea of  perpetual war, and the spectre of  Resump- 
tion faded away, the Directors did become somewhat 
slacker,  but  they  were  sharply  pulled  up  by  the 
criticism to which they were subjected in the Bullion 
controversy.  For in spite of  all their protestations 
that the currency was not  excessive and that  the 
doctrine of  the Bullion Report was without founda- 
tion, there is good reason to believe that they were 
to some important  extent influenced by it. 
In the first place it seems  @imk facie  altogether 
improbable  that the  Bank  Directors  could  fail  to 
be  to  some  extent  influenced  in  the  direction  of 
caution  by  all  the  criticism  of  the  Report  and 
parliamentary  debates,  and  equally  improbable 
that some  at least  of  the  twenty-four  would  not 
only feel that their Governor and Deputy-Governor 
had  made  out  a  poor  case  before  the Committee, 
(see Report, pp. 32-4,  46-8)  but also be inclined to 
doubt whether, after all, there was not "  something 
in " the idea that the price of  gold and the exchanges 
must  be  considered  in  determining  how  much  to 
advance. 
Secondly,  even in  the parliamentary  debates on 
the Report there are some indications of  a change 
of  opinion  in  the  Bank.  Embedded  in  the  vast 
mass of unimportant matter of  which Rose's speech 
is composed, there is a parenthesis  of  considerable 
interest.  " I  am  desirous  here  of  saying  a  ward 
in extenuation of  answers given suddenly on points  - -- --  on which witnesses have not been previously apprised 
that they were to be examined upon : I mean that 
if  the  Governor  and Deputy-Governor  had  been 
of  the question respecting their discounting 
at a low interest, they would have given a different 
answer ; which I am led to believe from a conver- 
sation with the former."  (Ha~zsard,  May, 1811,  p. 
863.)  This retractation by the Governor refers to the 
evidence  (part of which is  quoted  on p. 48  of  the 
Report) in which  the Governor, supported by  the 
Deputy-Governor, who  was  before  the  Committee 
at the same time, contended  that the requirement 
of  good  security in  each  individual case would  be 
a sufficient limitation of  the issue of  notes, however 
low the rate of  discount might be.  Rose failed to 
see that the withdrawal made it impossible to claim, 
as the Bank had claimed, that the regulation of  the 
inconvertible  currency  was  automatic,  requiring 
no exercise of  judgment on the part of  the Directors. 
It amounted to an admission  that the rate of  dis- 
count might be too low to limit advances sufficiently, 
in which case the Directors'  duty would be to raise 
it, or if  that were impossible owing to the maximum 
legal rate of interest (fixed at 5 per cent. by a statute 
of Anne) being already reached, to add some further 
check :  in either  case they would have to exercise 
their  judgment  on  the question  whether  the total 
of advances required further limitation or not, and 
Rose and his friends were as unable as the Governor 
to suggest  any criterion  other than that proposed 
by  the  Bullion  Committee.  Henry  Thornton's 
brother  Samuel, who was as well entitled to speak 
for the Bank as any one, having been Director  for 
over thirty years (he was in office from 1780-1833), 
also  seems to have  been  inclined  to  jettison  the 
Governor's  answer,  as Hamard says  (p. 1163)  he 
''  disclaimed  the idea  that the  Bank  issued  paper 
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four gentlemen at its head had a vote whether each 
sum was or was not too high."  This distinctly admits 
that  the  total  of  advances  was  not  beyond  the 
control  of  the  Directors :  they  were  obliged  to 
exercise  their  judgment  about  it,  and  it  is  cer- 
tainly difficult to see how they could do so without 
directly or  indirectly being  consciously  or  uncon- 
sciously influenced  by,  or  "  adverting  to,"  as the 
phrase was,  the price of  bullion and the exchanges. 
The effect  of  the report  is  suggested  much  less 
strongly by the mere inspection of the total of  notes in 
circulation  than  by an  examination of  the details 
which account  for that total.  The Directors, with 
some justice,  always contended that they had little 
control over the issue so far as it was occasioned by the 
demands of the Government, and wished to be judged 
by their policy in regard to discounts, so that whether 
they were  on the restrictive  or the expansive tack 
is to be decided chiefly by their control over "  private 
securities,"  and especially over that portion  of  this 
item which consisted of  commercial bills discounted. 
Now the Bank would not give the Bullion Committee 
a  plain  statement  of  the  annual  amount  of  this 
last item, and would not allow them to publish the 
"scale"  which  it  did  furnish, showing only  the 
percentage increases  from year to year  (See Report 
below, pp. 56-7).  The actual figures were obtained 
by the Bank-Charter  Committee  of  1832  and are 
given i11  Table 11. below.  It is not  surprising that 
the Bullion Committee were much impressed  by the 
"  scale "  and that the Bank did not care to publish the 
fact that the average amount of  commercial paper 
under discount had increased from under 3 millions 
in 1795 and just  over 39 in 1796  to 156  in 1809.  In 
1810, the year of  the Bullion Report, it  was further up 
to over zo  millions, after which it fell like a stone 
to £14,355,000 in  1811,  EI~,Z~~,OOO  in  1812,  and 
L12,330,000  in  1813,  which  is  actually  less  than 
it was in any of the four years preceding the Bullion 
Report.  After  recovering  to  15 millions  in  1815, 
it collapsed altogether, being in 1817  lower than in 
any  year since the Suspension.  Of  course 
the rise immediately before 1810 and the fall imme- 
diately after were due chiefly to the "  speculation " 
and depression after the speculation on which Tooke 
insists, and the later collapse was  due to the end 
of  the  war,  but  it  is  scarcely  credible  that  the 
Directors  would  not  have  withstood  with  greater 
success this enormous diminution in  the cream  of 
their  business if  they had  been  as impervious  to 
the  teachings  of  the  Report  as  they  professed 
themselves  to be. 
Whatever  may be the precise explanation, there 
can in these days be no doubt that the experiment 
of  entrusting what  no  conlmunity  should  entrust 
to  any  institution,  the  power  of  creating  money 
without  limit,  to the  Bank  of  England  compares 
very favourably with the modern plan of  entrusting 
it to the Government itself or to a State bank com- 
pletely  under  the control  of  the Government,  In 
the comparatively short war  of  1914-18  currencies 
"  not convertible at will into a coin which is export- 
able " (Report, p.  17)  were  issued by Governments 
and Government banks in amounts compared with 
which  the  IOO  per  cent. increase  in  thirteen years, 
which  made  the  Bullion  Committee  complain  so 
vigorously  in  1810, looks  absolutely  trifling.  The 
British  Government  brought  out  an entirely  new 
issue  of  £1 and 10s.  notes and increased  it to 293 
millions at the date of the armistice :  the Bank of 
France  increased  its issue from 6,000 million francs 
to 30,500 millions : the  Italian  increase  was  from 
2,500 millions to over 8,000.  The precise increase in 
Germany and Austria-Hungary is obscure but under- 
stood to have been much greater.  The record since 
the armistice is still less of  a kind to give the present 
day  Europeans  ground  for  boasting  themselves 
better  than  their  fathers.  In twenty-three weeks xl  INTRODUCTION  INTRODUCTION  xli 
the  British  Government  had  increased  the note 
issue  by 59 millions more, and the  total still stood 
on October I, 1919,  at  335 millions.  The French issue 
on October 2 was 36,250 millions, the Italian in July 
1919  was  about ~o,ooo  millions  and the  Russian 
rouble  is  being  manufactured  in  numbers  which 
suggest  astronomers'  calculations  rather than any- 
thing terrestrial. 
The result is what Horner and the Bullion Com- 
mittee feared.  The pound in October 1919  will buy 
just  about the  same  amount  of  gold  as it would 
when  the Bullion  Committee  sat in  1810,  that is, 
about  107  grains  instead of  the normal 123&, but 
it  is  respectable  compared  with  its  colleagues  in 
Europe :  the franc  will  buy  about  3i  instead of 
nearly 5 grains  : the case of  the lira is rather worse ; 
the mark will buy little more than I grain  instead 
of  6 ; the Austrian  krone and the  Russian  rouble 
are  worse.  Politicians  have  certainly  egregiously 
failed  to  "advert  to  the  foreign  exchanges  and 
the  price  of  bullion  in  regulating  their  issues " : 
instead  they amuse  their  ignorant  subjects  with 
fantastic  explanations  of  the perversity  of  the ex- 
changes and  chimerical  schemes  for "  correcting " 
them  by stopping imports or  borrowing  still more 
from abroad. 
No  one  can  contend  that these  paper  standards 
are  superior  to  the  gold  standard.  In  the  first 
place  they are all different,  and in the second the 
one common property that they possess in all making 
prices much higher than they would be if  paper and 
gold had not diverged,  marks them as all inferior. 
Gold has been produced in almost the usual quanti- 
ties throughout  the war,  it is almost  alone among 
metals in not having been used in the manufacture 
of  munitions of  war, and it has been thrown out of 
currency  use  over  a  wide  area.  Consequently  ~t 
is greatly depreciated as against commodities : that 
is, 123& grains of  gold or any freely exportable gold 
coin will buy far less of  ordinary commodities than 
before the war-perhaps  scarcely half.  Consequently 
each  of  the  particular  local  divergencies  between 
paper and gold simply constitutes a local aggravation 
of a world-wide rise of prices, a great part of  which 
is  itself  produced  by  the  general  introduction  of 
the paper currencies. 
When the scales at last fall from the eyes of  the 
people of  Europe, groaning under the rise of  prices, 
they will no longer cry to their Governments " Hang 
the profiteers ! " but "  Burn your paper money, and 
go on burning it till it will buy as much gold as it 
used  to do ! " 
It only remains to add here a few details which 
could not be conveniently introduced into the sketch 
given above. 
The Bullion Report was, of  course, originally printed 
in the usual parliamentary folio (in vol. 111. of  1810, 
which  includes  also  the reports of  the 1797 Lords 
Secret  Committee  on  the  Bank  and  of  the  1804 
Commons Committee on the Irish Currency frequently 
referred to by the Bullion Committee).  The Report 
itself  occupies  33  pages,  the  Minutes  of  Evidence 
118,  and the appendix of  Accounts and Tables 81. 
Though  it  was  only  published  in  August,  it  was 
out of  print by November  (Horner's Memoirs, vol. 
11.  p. 59), and an octavo  edition  dated  1810  was 
published by J. Johnson and Co. in which the Report 
occupies  78  pages,  the  Evidence  237  in  smaller 
print,  and  the Accounts  115  in  very  small  print. 
This is much more often met with than the original 
folio edition, and it is therefore hoped that readers 
who  wish  to consult  the evidence  will  be  assisted 
by the fact that it has been followed in the present 
reprint  of  the  Report, so  that the page-references 
to the Evidence are to it and not to the folio edition. xlii  INTRODUCTION  INTRODUCTION 
(If necessary, they can easily be converted into almost 
exact references  to the folio  by dividing  them  by 
z  and  adding  33  to  the  result.)  The  printers  of 
the octavo show intelligence on p. 47 by suggesting 
that  security"  in  the  folio  should  be  amended 
to "  scarcity,"  which is  certainly true. 
The list  of  members  of  the  Committee  given  in 
the  octavo  edition  is  defective  in  not  containing 
Charles Long, Joint  Paymaster  of  the Forces, who 
was  appointed,  as  the  Journals  of  the  House  of 
Commons record, as an additional member on March 
12, and who distinguished himself by being the only 
member  of  the  Committee  who  spoke  against  its 
report  in  the  Commons  debate.  Twelve  of  the 
members  have  obtained  admission  to  that rather 
wide-open temple of  fame, the Dictionary of  National 
Biography.  These are Alexander  Baring, J.  Leslie 
Forster,  Davies  Giddy  (vice  Rose,  who  declined), 
Pascoe  Grenfell,  Francis  Horner,  W.  Huskisson, 
H.  Parnell, Rt. Hon.  Spencer  Perceval,  R. Sharp, 
Rt. Hon.  R. B.  Sheridan,  G.  Tierney,  and Henry 
Thornton :  the other ten are Hon. J. Abercrombie, 
T.  Brand,  W.  Dicltinson,  J.  Irving, G. Johnstone, 
Charles  Long,  D.  M.  Magens,  W.  Manning,  Earl 
Temple, and Thomas Thompson. 
If  it be asked who was the "  very eminent Con- 
tinental Merchant " (p. 19) "  intimately acquainted 
with the trade between this Country and the Conti- 
nent"  (p.  25), the answer  is  that in the Evidence 
he, alone among the witnesses, appears as "  Mr.-- 
a  Continental  Merchant .)  '  Ricardo, who says that 
one of  his answers led the Committee (p. 5) to put 
the exchange  with  Hamburg at g  per  cent. below 
par  when  it was  really 17  below, refers  to him  as 
(( Mr. -  " simply (Wovks,  p. 322, and p. 311  note). 
An  obvious  conjecture  is  that  this  modest  Mi-: 
Blank was the great N. M.  Rothschild. 
The  two  tables  which  follow  will,  it  is  hoped, 
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Notes 
















NOTE TO  TABLE  I. 
Cols.  I and 2, Expenditure  and Revenue, are taken from the 4th 
Report of  the Commons' Committee on Public Income and Expendi- 
~ture,  1828  (vol. v. of  that session), Apps. Nos.  13, 14,  15.  Col. 2 
includes  besides  " ordinary  Revenue " certain  "  other  receipts " 
such as voluntary contributions and repayments of  monies advanced 
for relief  of  merchants and other public objects.  Col.  I  includes 
monies advanced for the same purposes, and also money raised for 
Austria ~4,600,ooo  in 1795. 
Col. 3 is obtained by deducting the amounts in col. 2  from those 
in col.  I, so that it shows how much money the State required  to 
-aise by some form  of  borrowing;  the total is,  of  course,  much 
Smaller than the addition to the national  debt made  during the 
Period, on account of  the practice of  raising loans in stock paying 
a low rate of  interest and therefore issued at a very large discount. xlvi  INTRODUCTION 
Col. 4 is taken from Jevons' Investigations in Currency  and Finance, 
p. 144.  It relates to the actual prices in pounds sterling.  Jevons 
gives  another column in which  he corrects these to allow for the 
depreciation of  the paper pound,  but it is not possible  to deduce 
from the fact that the price  of  gold is 25  per cent. more than it 
would  be if  paper were  convertible, that prices  would  be  at that 
moment  less exactly in that proportion.  All  that can  be  safely 
said is that they would  be  less. 
Col. 5, Con~mercial  paper under Discount, is from the Report of 
the Bank Charter Committee  1831-2  (in vol.  vi.  of  that session), 
App.  No.  59. 
Col. 6, average aggregate amount of public deposits, is from the same, 
App. No. 24.  The Committee asked for figures from 1800, but the  Bank 
returned the reply : "  The Bank is unable to furnish correctly the 
aggregate amounts of  Public Deposits previous  to the year  1807 ; 
the Public Accounts prior to that period not being required generally 
to be kept at  the Bank, and many public accounts at  that time were 
in the names of individuals, without reference to that part of  the 
Public Service to which  the Accounts  applied." 
The figures are from the Bank-Charter Committee's Report,1831-2, 
Appendix  No.  5.  The figures  of  the average of  Public Deposits 
given in Table I., last col., show that from 1807-1821,  and especially 
in the earlier years of that period, private deposits must have been 
almost negligible, and suggest that throughout  the war we  should 
probably get a better estimate of  the fluctuations in the assistance 
rendered  to Government  by the Bank if  we  took the figures  of 
Public Securities less the whole of  Deposits than by simply accepting 
the figures of  public securities as they stand.  It is done in the last 
column of the table above, which contains the excess of  col. 6 over 
col.  2. 
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FROM 
THE SELECT  COMMITTEE 
ON  THE 
HIGH  PRICE  OF  BULLION 
Ordered by The House of  Commons to be Printed 
8th June,  1810 
Reprinted  19  19 THE  SELECT COMMITTEE  appointed  to enquire 
into the Cause of  the High Price of  Gold Bullion, 
and to take into consideration  the State of  the 
CIRCULATING  MEDIUM, and  of  the  EXCHANGES 
between  Great Britain  and Foreign  Parts ;-and 
to report the same, with their Observations there- 
upon, from time to time, to The House ;-HAVE, 
pursuant  to the Orders  of  The I-Iouse,  examined 
the matters to them referred ; and have agreed 
to the following  REPORT : 
OUR  Committee  proceeded,  in the  first  instance,  to  Y  ascertain what  the price  of  Gold  Bullion had been, 
as well  as the rates of  the  Foreign  Exchanges,  for  some 
time past ;  particularly  during the last year. 
Your  Committee  have  found  that  the  price  of  Gold 
Bullion, which,  by the  regulations  of  His Majesty's  Mint, 
is £3 17s 104d. per ounce of standard fineness, was, during 
the years 1806, 1807 and 1808, as high as £4 in the market. 
Towards the end of  1808  it began to advance very rapidly, 
and continued very high during the whole year 1809 ; the 
market  price  of  standard  Gold  in  bars  fluctuating  from 
£4  9s. to £4  12s. per  oz.  The market  price  at £4  10s.  is 
,  about  154  per cent. above the Mint price. 
Your  Committee have found, that during the three first 
months of  the present  year, the price of  standard Gold in 
bars  remained  nearly  at the  same  price  as  during  last 
year ; viz, from £4  10s.  to £4 12s.  per oz.  In the course 
of the months  of  March  and April,  the price  of  standard 
Gold  is  quoted but once in Wettenhall's  tables ; viz.  on 
the 6th of  April last, at £4 6s. which is rather more than 10 
Per cent. above the Mint price.  The last quotations of the 
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price  of  Gold, which have been  given in those tables,  are 
upon the 18th and zznd of  May, when Portugal Gold in coin 
is quoted at £4 11s. per oz. :  Portugal Gold coin is about 
the same fineness as our standard.  It is stated in the same 
tables,  that in the month of  March last, the price of  new 
Doubloons rose from £4 7s. to £4  gs. per oz.  Spanish Gold 
is from 44 to 42 grains better than standard, making about 
4s.  per  oz.  difference in value. 
It  appears  by  the Evidence,  that the price  of  foreign 
Gold  coin  is generally  higher  than that of  bar  Gold,  on 
account of  the former finding a more ready vent in foreign 
markets.  The  difference  between  Spanish  and Portugal 
Gold in coin and Gold in bars, has of  late been about 2s. 
per ounce.  Your Committee have also to state, that there 
is said to be at present a difference of  between 3s. and 4s. 
per  ounce between  the price  of  bar  Gold  which  may  be 
sworn  off  for  exportation  as being  foreign Gold,  and the 
price of  such bar Gold as the Dealer will not venture to swear 
off ; while the former was about £4 10s. in the market, the 
latter is said to have been about £4  6s.  On account of  these 
extrinsic  differences, occasioned  either  by the  expense  of 
coinage, or by the obstructions of law, the price of  standard 
Gold in bars, such as may be  exported, is that which  it is 
most  material  to  keep  generally  in  view  through  the 
present enquiry. 
It appeared to Your Committee, that it might be of  use, 
in judging  of  the cause of  this high price of  Gold Bullion, 
to be informed also of the prices of Silver during the same 
period.  The price of  standard Silver in His Majesty's Mint 
is 5s. zd. per ounce ; at this standard price, the value of a 
Spanish Dollar is 4s. 4d. or, which comes to the same thing, 
Spanish Dollars are, at that standard price, worth 4s. II~. 
per ounce.  It is stated in Wettenhall's tables, that through- 
out the year 1809,  the price of new Dollars fluctuated from 
5s. gd. to 5s. 7d. per ounce, or from 10  to 13  per cent. above 
the  Mint  price  of  standard  Silver.  In the course  of  the 
last month, new Dollars have been quoted as high as 5s. 8d. 
per ounce, or more than 15  per cent, above the Mint price. 
Your  Committee have likewise  found, that towards  the 
end of the year  1808,  the  Exchanges  with the Continent 
became  very unfavourable  to this Country, and continued 
still more unfavourable through the whole of  1809, and the 
three first  months  of  the present  year. 
~~~b~rgh,  Amsterdam,  and  Paris,  are  the  principal 
places with which the Exchanges are established at prcsent. 
During the last  six months  of  1809,  and the  three  first 
of  the present  year, the Exchanges on  Hamburgh 
and Amsterdam  were  depressed  as low  as from  16  to 20 
per  cent.  below par ; and that on Paris still lower.  The 
Exchanges with Portugal have corresponded with the others ; 
but they are complicated by sotne circumstances which shall 
be  explained separatcly. 
Your  Cotnmittee  find,  that in the course of  the month 
of  March last, that is, from  the 2nd oi  March  to the  3rd 
April, the Exchanges with the three places above mentioned 
received  a  gradual  improvement.  The  Exchange  with 
Hamburgh  rose  gradually  from  29.4  to  31.  ; that with 
Amsterdam  from  31.8  to  33.5 ;  that with  Paris  from 
19-16  to 21.11.  Since the 3rd of  April last to the present 
time, they have remained nearly stationary at those rates, 
the  Exchange  with  Hamburgh,  as  stated  in  the  tables 
printed  for  the use  of  the  Merchants, appearing as much 
against this Country as £9 per cent. below par ; that with 
Amsterdam appearing to be  more  than £7 per  cent. below 
par ; and that with Paris more  than £14  per  cent. below 
par. 
So  extraordinary  a rise  in the market price  of  Gold  in 
this Country, coupled  with so remarkable  a  depression  of 
our Exchanges with the Continent, very early, in the judg- 
ment of  Your Committee, pointed to something in the state 
of our own domestic currency as the cause of  both appear- 
ances.  But  before  they  adopted that  conclusion,  which 
seemed agreeable to all former reasonings  and experience, 
they thought it proper to enquire more particularly into the 
circumstances  connected  with  each  of  those  two  facts ; 
and to hear, from persons of  commercial practice, and detail, 
what explanations they had to offer of  so unusual a state 
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With  this  view,  Your  Committee  called  before  them 
several  Merchants  of  extensive  dealings  and  intelligence, 
and  desired  to have  their  opinions  with  respect  to  the 
cause of the high price of Gold and the low rates of  Exchange. 
I 
It will  be  found by the Evidence  (Minutes of  Evidence, 
PP. 41-45,  135, 136, 178, 179)) that the high  price of  Gold 
is ascribed, by most of the Witnesses, entirely to an alleged 
scarcity of  that article, arising out of  an uriusual  demand 
for it upon the Continent of  Europe.  This unusual demand 
for Gold upon the Continent is described by some of  them 
as being chiefly for the use of the French Armies, though 
increased also by that state of  alarm, and failure of  confidence, 
which leads to the practice of  hoarding. 
Your Committee are of  opinion, that, in the sound  and 
natural  state  of  the  British  currency, the foundation of 
which is Gold, no increased  demand  for Gold from other 
parts of  the world, however great, or from whatever causes 
arising, can have  the effect  of producing here,  for  a  con- 
siderable period of  time, a material rise in the marltet price 
of  Gold.  But before they proceed to explain the grounds of 
that general opinion, they wish  to state some other reasons 
which alone would have led them to doubt whether, in point 
of  fact, such a demand for Gold, as is alleged, has operated 
in the manner  supposed. 
If  there  were  an  unusual  demand  for  Gold  upon  the 
Continent, such as could influence its market price in this 
country,  it would  of  course  influence also,  and indeed in 
the first  instance,  its  price  in  the  Continental  markets ; 
and it was to be expected that those who ascribed the high 
price  here  to a  great  demand  abroad,  would  have  been 
prepared to state that there was a corresponding high price 
abroad.  Your Committee did not find that they grounded 
their inference upon any such information ; and so far as 
Your Committee have been enabled to ascertain, it does not 
appear  that  during  the  period  when  the  price  of  Gold 
Bullion was rising here, as valued in our paper,  there was 
any corresponding rise in the price of  Gold Bullion in the 
market  of  the  Continent,  as  valued  in  their  respective 
Mr. Whitnzore, indeed,  the  late Governor  of 
the Bank, stated, iMin.  pp. 178,  179), that in his opinion it 
was the high price abroad which had carried our Gold coin 
out of  this Country ;  but he  did not  offer  to Your  Com- 
mittee  any  proof  of  this  high  price.  Mr.  Gre8ulhe,  a 
Continental  Merchant  (Min. p.  yo), who  appeared to be 
well  informed in the  details  of  trade,  being 
asked  by the  Committee,  If  he  could  state whether  any 
change had taken place in the price  of  Gold in any of  the 
foreign markets within the last year ?  answered, "  No  very 
material change that I am aware of."  Upon a subsequent 
day (Min. pp. 131,  I~z),  having had time to refer  to the 
actual prices,  he  again  stated to the  Committee, " I beg 
"  leave to observe, that there has been no alteration of  late 
"  in the Mint price of  Gold in foreign places, nor have the 
"  market prices experienced an advance at all relative to the 
" rise that has taken place in England ; one of  the papers 
" I have  delivered  shews  the  foreign  prices  reduced  into 
" sterling money at the present low rates of  Exchange, and 
"  the excess above our marltet price may be considered as 
"  about equal to the charges of  conveyance."  The paper 
he refers to will  be  found  in the Appendix  (Appendix of 
Accozs~zts ;  No. 56, 57, 58), and this statement made by Mr. 
Greffulhe throws great light upon this part of  the subject ;  as 
it shews, that the actual prices of  Gold in the foreign markets 
are just  so much lower than its market price  here, as the 
difference of  Exchange amounts to.  Mr.  Greffulhe's paper 
is confirmed by another  (Acc. No. 59, Ililin. p. II~),  which 
has  been  laid  before  Your  Committee.  MY.  Abraham 
Goldsmid has also stated to Your Committee, that, during 
that part of  last year when the market price  of  Gold here 
rose so high, its price at Hamburgh did not fluctuate more 
than from 3  to 4  per  cent. 
HereYour~ommittee  must observe, that both at  Hamburgh 
dnd  Amsterdam,  where  the measure of  value  is  not Gold 
as in this Country, but Silver, an unusual demand for Gold 
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and that as it does  not  appear that there has been  any 
considerable rise in the price of  Gold, as valued in Silver, 
at those places in the last year, the inference is, that  there 
was not any considerable increase in the demand for Gold. 
That permanent  rise  in the market  price  of  Gold  above 
its Mint price, which appears by Mr. Greffulhe's paper to have 
taken place for several years both at Hamburgh and Amster- 
dam, may in some degree be ascribed, as Your Committee 
conceive, to an alteration which has taken  place in the rela- 
tive  value  of  the two  precious  metals all over thc world ; 
concerning which, much curious and satisfactory Evidence 
will be found in the Appendix, particularly in the documents 
laid before  Your  Committee by Mr.  Allen.  (Acc. No.  21 
to 33).  From the same cause, a fall in the relative price 
of  Silver  appears to have taken place  in this Country for 
some  time  before  the  increase  of  our paper  currency be- 
gan to operate.  Silver having fallen  in its relative value 
to Gold throughout the world,  Gold  has appeared  to rise 
in price in those markets where Silver is the fixed measure, 
and Silver has appeared to fall in those where Gold is the 
fixed  measure. 
With respect to the alleged demand  for Gold  upon the 
Continent for the supply of  the French Armies, Your Com- 
mittee  must  further  observe,  that,  if  the  wants  of  the 
military chest have been latterly much increased, the general 
supply of  Europe  with  Gold  has  been  augmented  by all 
that  quantity  which  this  great  commercial  Country  has 
spared in consequence of  the substitution of  another medium 
of  circulation.  And Your Committee cannot omit remarking, 
that though the circumstances which  might  occasion such 
an increased  demand may recently have existed in greater 
force than at former periods,  yet in the former wars and 
convulsions of  the Continent, they must have existed in such 
a  degree  as to produce  some  effect.  Siv  Francis  Baying 
has very justly  referred (Min.  p. 199) to the seven  years' 
war  and  to  the  American  war,  and  remarks,  that  no 
want  of  Bullion was then felt in this Country.  And upon 
referring for a course of  years to the tables which are pub- 
lished for  the use of  the Merchants, such as Lloyd's Lists and 
wettenhall's  Course  of  Exchange,  Your  Committee  have 
found that  from  the middle  of  the year  1773,  when  the 
reformation of  the Gold coin took place, till about the middle 
of the year 1799, two years after the suspension of  the cash 
payments of  the Bank, the market price of  standard Gold 
in bars remained steadily uniform at the price of  £3 17s. 6d. 
[being, with the small allowance for loss by detention at the 
Mint,  equal to the Mint  price  of  £3 17s.  104d.l  with  the 
exception of  one year, from May 1783 to May 1784, when it 
was occasionally £3 18s.  During the same period it is to be 
noticed, the  price  of  Portugal Gold  coin was  occasionally 
as high as £4 2s. and Your Committee also observe, that it 
was stated to the Lords'  Committee in 1797  by Mr.  Abra- 
ham  Newland  (Rej~ort  Comnz.  oj Secresy,  p.  66), that the 
Bank had been frequently obliged to buy Gold higher than 
the Mint  price,  and upon  one particular  occasion gave as 
much for a small quantity, which their agent procured from 
Portugal,  as £4  8s.  But  Your  Committee  find,  that the 
price  of  standard Gold  in bars was  never  for  any length 
of  time materially above the Mint price, during the whole 
period  of  24  years which  elapsed from the reformation  of 
the Gold  coin to the suspension  of  the cash  payments of 
the Bank.  The two most remarkable periods prior to the 
present,  when  the market  price  of  Gold  in this  country 
has  exceeded  our  Mint  price, were  in  the reign  of  King 
William, when the Silver coin was very much worn below 
its standard, and in the early part of  His present Majesty's 
reign, when  the Gold  coin was  very much worn  below its 
standard.  In both those periods, the excess of  the market 
price  of  Gold above its Mint  price was found to be owing 
to the bad state of  the currency ; and in both instances, the 
reformation of  the currency effectually lowered the market 
price  of  Gold  to the level of  the Mint  price.  During the 
whole  of  the  years  1796  and  1797,  in  which  there  was 
such a scarcity of  Gold, occasioned by the great demands of 
the country Bankers in order to increase their deposits, the 
market price of  Gold never rose above the Mint price. 
Your  Committee have still further to remark  upon  this 
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entertain much  doubt of  the alleged fact, that a  scarcity 
of  Gold Bullion has been recently experienced in this country. 
That Guineas have disappeared from the circulation, there 
can be  no  question ;  but that does  not  prove  a  scarcity 
of  Bullion, any more than the high price proves that scarcity. 
If  Gold is rendered dear by any other cause than scarcity, 
those who cannot purchase it without paying the high price, 
will be very apt to conclude that it is scarce.  A very exten- 
sive home dealer who was examined, and who spoke very 
much of  the scarcity of  Gold, acknowledged  (Min,  p. 35), 
that he found no difficulty in getting any quantity he wanted, 
if  he was willing to pay the price for it.  And it appears to 
Your  Committee,  that,  though  in the  course  of  the  last 
year  there  have  been  large  exportations  of  Gold  to  the 
Continent,  there have been  also  very considerable  impor- 
tations of  it into this Country from South America,  chief- 
ly  through  the  West  Indies.  The  changes  which  have 
affected Spain and  Portugal, combined  with  our  maritime 
and commercial  advantages, would seem to have rendered 
this country a channel through  which  the produce  of  the 
mines  of  New  Spain  and  the  Brazils  passes  to the rest 
of  the world.  In such a situation, the imports of  Bullion 
and Coin  give  us the opportunity of  first  supplying our- 
selves ; and must render this the last of  the great markets 
in which  a  scarcity  of  that article  will  be  felt.  This  is 
remarkably  illustrated  by  the  fact,  that  Portugal  Gold 
coin  is  now  sent  regularly  from  this  Country  to  the 
Cotton  Settlements  in  the  Brazils,  Pernambuco,  and 
Maranham,  while  Dollars  are  remitted  in  considerable 
quantities to this country from  Rio  Janeiro. 
It  is important also to observe, that the rise in the market 
price of  Silver in this country, which has nearly corresponded 
to that of  the market price of  Gold, cannot in any degree be 
ascribed to a scarcity of  Silver.  The importations of  Silver 
have  of  late years  been  unusually  large,  while  the usual 
drain for India and China has been stopped.  (Acc. Nos. g 
& 10.) 
For  all  these  reasons,  Your  Committee  would  be  in- 
clined  to think,  that those who  ascribe the high  price  of 
~~ld  to an unusual  demand for  that article,  and a  con- 
sequent scarcity, assume  facts as certain of  which there is 
no  evidence.  But even if  these assumptions were proved, 
-to  ascribe  the  high  price  of  Gold  in  this  Country to 
its scarcity,  seems  to your  Committee  to involve  a  mis- 
conception, which they think it important to explain. 
In this Country, Gold is itself the measure of  all exchange- 
able value, the scale to which all money prices are referred. 
~t is so, not only by the usage and commercial habits of  the 
country, but likewise by operation of  law, ever since the Act 
of the 14th of  His present Majesty [finally rendered perpetual 
by an Act of  the 39th year of  the reign] disallowed a legal 
tender in Silver coin beyond the sum of  £25.  Gold being thus 
our measure of  prices,  a commodity is said to be  dear or 
cheap according as more  or less Gold is given in exchange 
for a given quantity of  that commodity; but a given quantity 
of Gold itself will never be exchanged for a greater or a less 
quantity of  Gold of  the same standard fineness.  At particular 
times it may be convenient, in exchange for Goldina particu- 
lar coin, to give more than an equal quantity of  other Gold ; 
but this difference can  never exceed a certain  small limit ; 
and thus it has happened that the Bank, while liable to pay 
its notes  in specie, has under particular  emergencies been 
put to the necessity  of  purchasing Gold at a loss, in order 
to keep up or to repair its stock.  But, generally speaking, 
the price  of  Gold, being  itself  measured  and expressed  in 
Gold, cannot be  raised  or  lowered  by an increased or di- 
minished demand for it.  An  ounce of  Gold will exchange 
for neither more nor less than an ounce of  Gold of  the same 
fineness, except  so  far  as  an allowance  is  to be  made,  if 
the  one  ounce  is  coined  or  otherwise  manufactured  and 
the other is not, for the expense of  that coinage or manu- 
facture.  An ounce of  sfandard Gold Bullian will not fetch 
Inore in our market than £3 17s.  ~oid.  unless £3 ~7s.  104d. 
in our actual currency is equivalent to less than an ounce 
Gold.  An  increase  or  diminution  in  the  demand  for 
G~;dJ  or, what  comes to the same thing, a  diminution or 
increase in the general supply of  Gold, will, no doubt, have 
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An  increased demand for Gold, and a  consequent scarcity 
of  that article,  will  make  it more  valuable in proportion 
to all other articles ; the same quantity of  Gold will pur- 
chase a  greater  quantity of  any other  article than it did 
before : in other words, the real price of  Gold, or the quantity 
of  commodities given in exchange for it, will rise, and the 
money prices of  all commodities will fall ; the money price 
of  Gold  itself  will  remain  unaltered, but the prices  of  all 
other  commodities  will  fall.  That this is  not  the present 
state of  things is abundantly manifest ; the prices  of  all 
commodities have risen and Gold appears to have risen in 
its  price  only  in  common  with  them.  If  this  common 
effect  is to be  ascribed  to one  and the same cause,  that 
cause  can only  be  found  in the state of  the currency  of 
this Country. 
Your Committee think it proper  to state still more spe- 
cifically, what appear to them to be  the principles  which 
govern  the  relative  prices  of  Gold  in  Bullion  and  Gold 
in Coin,  as well  as of  Paper  circulating  in  its place  and 
exchangeable  for  it.  They  cannot  introduce this subject 
more  properly,  than by adverting to those simple  princi- 
ples and  regulations, on which a coinage issuing  from the 
King's  Mint  is founded. 
The object is, to secure  to the people  a  standard  of  a 
determinate  value, by affixing a  stamp, under  the Royal 
authority,  to pieces  of  Gold,  which  are thus certified  to 
be  of  a  given  weight  and  fineness.  Gold .in  Bullion  is 
the standard to which the Legislature  has  intended  that 
the coin  should  be  conformed  and with  which  it should 
be identified as much as possible.  And  if  that intention 
of  the Legislature were completely fulfilled, the coined Gold 
would bear precisely the same price in exchange for all other 
commodities,  as it  would have borne had it  continued in 
the shape of  Bullion ;  but it is subject to  some small fluctua- 
tions. 
First,  there  is  some  expense  incurred  in  converting 
Bullion  into coin.  They who  send  Bullion  to be  coined, 
and it is allowed to any one to send it, though they are 
charged  with  no  seignorage,  incur  a  loss  of  interest  by 
the detention  of  their  Gold in the Mint.  This loss may 
hitherto have amounted to about £1 per cent. but it is to 
be  presumed  that the improveinents of  the system of  the 
new Mint will cause the detention and consequent loss to be 
smaller.  This  £1 per  cent.  has formed  the limit, 
or nearly the limit, to the possible rise of  the value of  coin 
above  that  of  Bullion ;  for  to suppose  that  coin  could, 
through any cause, advance much above this limit, would 
be to assui~le  that there was a high profit on a transaction, 
in which there is no risk, and everyone has an opportunity 
of  engaging. 
The  two  following  circun~stances conjoined,  account 
for the depression  of  the Coin below the price of  Bullion, 
and will  show what  must  have been  the limit  to its ex- 
tent before 1797,  the period  of  the suspension  of  the Cash 
payments of  the Bank of  England.  First, the Coin, after it 
had  become  current,  was  gradually  diminished in  weight 
by use, and therefore if  melted would produce a less quantity 
of  Bullion.  The  average  diminution  of  weight  of  the 
present  current  Gold  Coin  below  that of  the  same  Coin 
when fresh from the Mint, appears by the Evidence  (AGc. 
No.  zo) to be nearly £1 per cent.  This evil, in more ancient 
times, was occasionally very great.  It was particularly felt 
in an early period of  His present  Majesty's reign, and led to 
the reformation  of  the Gold  Coin in 1773. But it is now 
carefully  guarded against, not only by the legal punishment of 
every  wilful  deterioration of  the Gold  Coin,  but  also  by 
the regulation  of  the Statute, that Guineas,  of  which  the 
full weight when fresh from the Mint is 5 dwts. gj ;-  grains, 
shall not be a legal tender if  worn below 5  dwts. 8 grs. ;  the 
depreciation thus allowed being at the utmost 1-11  per cent. 
A  still more  material cause of  depression  is the difficulty 
under which the holders of  Coin have been placed when they 
wished to convert it into Bullion.  The Law of  this Country 
forbids any other  Gold  Coin  than that which has become 
light  to be  put  into  the  melting-pot,  and,  with  a  very 
ci~estionable  policy,  prohibits  the exportation of our Gold 
Coin, and of any Gold, unless an oath is taken that it has 
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by the Evidence, that the difference between the value of 
Gold Bullion which may be sworn off  for exportation, and 
that of the Gold produced or supposed to be produced from 
our own Coin, which by Law is convertible only to domestic 
purposes,  amounts at present  to between  3s.  and 4s.  per 
ounce. 
The two circumstances which have now  been mentioned 
have unquestionably constituted, in the judgement  of  Your 
Committee, the whole cause of  that depression of  the value 
of  the Gold Coin of this Country in exchange for commodities, 
below the value  of  Bullion  in exchange for commodities, 
which has occasionally arisen or could arise at those times 
when  the Bank paid in specie, and Gold  was  consequently 
obtainable in the quantity that was desired ; and the limit 
fixed, by those two circumstances conjoined, to this excess 
of  the  market  price  of  Gold  above  the  Mint  price,  was 
therefore a limit of about 5$ per  cent.  The chief  part of 
this depression is to be ascribed to that ancient but doubtful 
policy of  this Country, which, by attempting to confine the 
Coin within the Kingdom, has served, in the same manner 
as permanent restrictions on the export of  other articles, to 
place it under a disadvantage, and to give to it a less value 
in the market than the same article would have if  subject 
to no such prohibition. 
The truth of  these observations on the causes and limits 
of  the ordinary difference between the market and Mint price 
of  Gold,  may be  illustrated  by a  reference  to the mode, 
explained in the Evidence, of  securing a fixed standard of 
value for the great commercial payments of  Hamburgh.  The 
payments in the ordinary transactions of  life are made in a 
currency composed of  the coins of  the several surrounding 
States ; but Silver is the standard there resorted to  in the 
great  commercial  payments,  as Gold  is  in England.  No 
difference analogous to that which occurs in this Country, 
between the Mint and market price of  Gold, can ever arise 
at Hamburgh  with  regard  to Silver, because  provision  is 
made  that none  of  the three  causes  above specified  [the 
expense of  coinage, the depreciation by wear, or the obstruc- 
tion to exportation],  shall have any operation.  The large 
payments of  Hamburgh are effected in Bank money, which 
consists of  actual Silver of  a given fineness, lodged in the 
Hamburgh Bank by the merchants of  the place, who there- 
upon  have  a  proportionate  credit  in  the  Bank  books, 
which  they  transfer  according  to  their  occasions.  The 
Silver  being  assayed  and weighed  with  scarcely any loss 
of  time,  the  first-mentioned  cause  of  fluctuation  in  the 
relative value of  the current medium compared with Bullion 
is avoided.  Certain masses of  it being then certified (without 
any stamp being  affixed  on  the metal) to be  of  a  given 
quantity and fineness, the value is transferred from individual 
to individual by the medium merely of  the Bank books, and 
thus the wearing  of  the Coin  being  prevented,  one cause 
of  depreciation  is  removed.  A  free  right  is  also  given 
to withdraw, melt, and export it ; and thus the other and 
principal source  of  the occasional fall of  the value of  the 
current  medium  of  payment,  below  that  of  the  Bullion 
which  it is intended  to represent, is also  effectually  pre- 
cluded. 
In this  manner,  at Hamburgh,  Silver  is  not  only  the 
measure  of  all  exchangeable  value, but  it is rendered an 
invariable  measure,  except  in so far as the relative value 
of Silver itself  varies with the varying supply of  that pre- 
cious  metal  from  the  mines.  In the same  manner  the 
usage,  and  at last  the  law,  which  made  Gold  Coin  the 
usual and at last the only legal tender in large payments 
here, rendered that metal our measure of  value :  and from 
the period of the reformation of  the Gold Coin down to the 
suspension of  the Bank payments in specie in 1797,  Gold 
Coin  was  not  a  very  variable  measure  of  value ; being 
subject only to that variation in the relative value of Gold 
Bullion which depends upon its supply from the mines, to- 
gether with that limited variation which, as above described, 
might take place between the market and the Mint price of 
Gold Coin. 
The highest  amount of the depression of  the Coin which 
Ca-- take place when the Bank pays in Gold, has just  been 
Stated to be about 54 per cent. ; and accordingly it will be 
found, that in all the periods preceding 1797,  the difference 
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between what  is called the Mint price and market price of 
Gold  never  exceeded that limit. 
Since the suspension of  Cash payments in 1797,  however, 
it is certain, that, even if  Gold is still our measure of  value 
and standard of prices, it has been exposed to a new cause 
of  variation, from the possible excess of  that paper which 
is not convertible into Gold at will ; and the limit of  this 
new variation is as indefinite as the excess to which  that 
paper may be issued.  It may indeed be doubted, whether, 
since the new system of  Bank of  England payments has been 
fully  established,  Gold  has in truth continued  to be  our 
measure of  value ; and whether we have any other standard 
of  prices  than that circulating  medium,  issued  primarily 
by the Bank of  England and in a secondary manner by the 
country Banks,  the variations  of  which  in relative value 
may be as indefinite as the possible excess of  that circulating 
medium.  But whether our present measure of  value, and 
standard of  prices, be this paper currency thus variable in 
its relative value, or continues still to  be Gold, but Gold ren- 
dered more  variable than it was before in  consequence of 
being  interchangeable  for  a  paper  currency which  is not 
at will  convertible  into  Gold,  it is,  in either  case,  most 
desirable for the public that our circulating medium  should 
again  be  conformed,  as  speedily  as  circumstances  will 
permit, to its real and legal standard, Gold Bullion. 
If  the Gold  Coin  of  the Country were  at any time to 
become very much  worn  and lessened  in weight, or  if  it 
should  suffer  a  debasement  of  its standard,  it is evident 
that there  would  be a  proportionable rise of  the market 
price  of  Gold  Bullion  above its Mint price : for the Mint 
price  is  the sum in coin, which  is equivalent  in intrinsic 
value  to a  given  quantity,  an ounce for  example, of  the 
metal in Bullion ; and if  the intrinsic value  of  that sum 
of  Coin be lessened, it is equivalent to a less quantity of 
Bullion  than before.  The same rise  of  the market price 
of  Gold  above its Mint  price will  take place,  if  the local 
currency of  this particular  Country, being  no  longer  con- 
vertible into Gold, should at any time be issued to excess. 
That excess  cannot  be  exported  to other  countries,  and, 
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not  being  convertible into specie, it is  not  necessarily  re- 
turned upon those who issued it ; it remains in the chan- 
nel of  circulation, and is gradually absorbed by increasing 
the prices of all commodities.  An increase in the quantity 
of the local currency of  a particular country, will raise prices 
in that country exactly in the same manner as an increase 
in the general supply of precious metals raises prices all over 
the world.  By means of the increase of  quantity, the value 
of a given portion of that circulating medium, in exchange 
for other  commodities,  is  lowered ;  in  other  words,  the 
money prices of all other commodities  are raised, and that 
of Bullion with the rest.  In this manner, an excess of  the 
local currency of  a particular  country will  occasion a rise 
of the market price of  Gold above its Mint price.  It is no 
less evident, that, in the event of  the prices of  commodities 
being  raised  in  one  country  by  an  augmentation  of  its 
circulating  medium,  while  no  similar  augmentation  in 
the circulating medium  of  a neighbouring country has led 
to  a  similar  rise  of  prices,  the  currencies  of  those  two 
countries will no longer continue to bear the same relative 
value to each other as before.  The intrinsic value of  a given 
portion  of  the one  currency  being  lessened,  while  that of 
the other remains  unaltered, the Exchange will  be com- 
puted between  those two countries to the disadvantage of 
the former. 
In this manner, a general rise of  all prices,  a rise in the 
lnarket price of Gold, and a fall of  the Foreign Exchanges, 
will  be  the effect  of  an excessive  quantity of  circulating 
medium  in a  country which  has adopted a  currency  not 
exportable to other countries, or not convertible at will into 
a  Coin  which  is exportable. 
Your  Committee are thus led to the next head  of  their 
inquiry ; the present state of the Exchanges between this 
Country  and  the  Continent.  And  here,  as under  the 
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which  they have  received  from  practical  men,  respecting 
the causes of  the present state of  the Exchange. 
Mr. Greflulhe, a general merchant trading chiefly to the 
Continent,  ascribed  the  fall  of  Exchange  between  Lon- 
don and I-Iamburgh, near  18  per  cent. below  par, in  the 
year  1809  (Min. p.  63). "  altogether  to  the  commercial 
"  situation  oi  this  Country  with  the  Continent ;  to the 
" circumstance of  the imports, and payments of  Subsidies, 
" &c.  having  very  much  exceeded  the  exports."  He 
stated, however, that he formed his judgment of  the balance 
of  trade in a great measure from the state of  the Exchange 
itself, though  it was  corroborated  by what  fell under his 
observation.  He insisted particularly on the large imports 
from the Baltic, and the wines  and brandies  brought from 
France, in return for which no merchandize had been exported 
from this Country.  He observed, on the other hand, that 
the export of  Colonial produce to the Continent had increased 
in the last year  compared with  former  years ; and that 
during the last year there was an excess, to a considerable 
amount,  of  the  exports  of  colonial  produce  and  British 
manufactures to Holland  above the imports from thence, 
but not nearly equal, he thought, to the excess of imports from 
other parts of  the world, judging from the state of  the Ex- 
change  as well  as from  what  fell  generally under his ob- 
servation.  He  afterwards  explained,  (Min. p. 74),  that 
it was  not  strictly the balance  of  trade,  but the balance 
of  payments,  being  unfavourable  to this  Country, which 
he assigned as the principal cause of  the rate of  Exchange ; 
observing also, that the balance of  payments for the year 
may be  against us,  while the general  exports exceed  the 
imports.  He gave it as his opinion  (Min,  p. 72), that the 
cause of  the present  state of  Exchange was  entirely com- 
mercial,  with  the  addition  of  the foreign  expenditure of 
Government ; and that an excess of  imports above exports 
would  account  for  the  rates  of  Exchange  continuing  so 
high as 16  per cent, against this country, for a permanent 
period  of  time. 
It will  be  found  in the  Evidence,  that  several  other 
Witnesses  agree  in  substance  with  MY.  Gve#ulkze,  in  this 
of  the  unfavourable  state of  the  Exchange ; 
Mr. Chambeys  and h!l~  Coningham. 
Sir Fmncis Baring stated to the Committee (Min. p. 198), 
that he considered the two great circumstances which affect 
the Exchange in its present  unfavourable  state, to be the 
upon trade with the Continent, and the increased 
of  this  Country in paper  as productive  of  the 
scarcity of  Bullion.  And he instanced, as examples of  a 
contrary  state  of  things,  the  seven  years'  war,  and  the 
American war, in which  there were the  same  remittances 
to make to the Continent for naval and military expenditure, 
yet  no  want  of  Bullion was  ever  felt. 
The Committee likewise examined a very eminent Conti- 
nental Merchant, whose evidence will be found to contain 
a variety of  valuable information.  That Gentleman states, 
(&fin.  pp. 78, 82, 96, 102,) that the Exchange cannot fall 
in any country in Europe at the present time, if  computed 
in coin of  a definite value, or in something convertible into 
such coin, lower than the extent of  the charge of  transporting 
it, together with an adequate profit in proportion to the risk 
attending  such transmission.  He conceives  (Mi% p.  84) 
that such fall of  our Exchange as has exceeded that extent 
in the last  15  months, must certainly  be  referred  to the 
circumstance  of  our  paper  currency  not  being  convertible 
into specie ; and that if  that paper had been so convertible, 
and Guineas had been in general circulation, an unfavourable 
balance of trade could hardly have caused so great a fall in 
the Exchange  as to the  extent  of  5 or  6  per  cent.  He 
explains his opinion  upon  the subject more  specifically in 
the following Answers,  which are extracted from different 
paris of  his  Evidence. 
"  To what causes do you ascribe the present unfavourable 
course  of  Exchange ?-The  first  great  depreciation  took 
place  when  the  French  got  possession  of  the  North  of 
Germany,  and passed  severe penal decrees against a com- 
~unication  with  this  Country;  at the  same  time  that 
a sequestration  was  laid  upon  all English goods and pro- 
perty, whilst  the payments for  English account were  still 
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Country ; many more bills were in consequence to be sold 
than could be taken by persons requiring to make payments 
in England.  The communication by letters being also very 
difficult and uncertain, middlemen were not to be found, as 
in usual times, to purchase and send such bills to England for 
returns ; whilst  no suit at law  could  be  instituted in the 
Courts  of  Justice  there against  any person  who  chose  to 
resist  payment of  a returned bill, or todispute the charges 
of  re-exchange.  Whilst  those  causes  depressed  the  Ex- 
change,  payments  due  to  England  only  came  round  at 
distant  periods;  the  Exchange  once  lowered  by  those 
circumstances,  and Bullion  being  withheld  in England  to 
make up those occasional differences, the operations between 
this Country and the Continent have continued at  a low rate, 
as it is only matter of  opinion what rate a pound  sterling 
is there to be valuedat, not being able to obtain what it is 
meant to represent."  (Mi%.  p. 85.) 
"  The  Exchange  against  England  fluctuating from  15 
to zo per cent. how  much of  that loss may  be ascribed to 
the effect of  the measures taken by the enemy in the North 
of Germany, and the interruption of intercourse which has 
been the result, and how much to the effect of  the Bank of 
England paper not being convertible into cash, to which you 
have ascribed a part of  that depreciation ?-I  ascribe the 
whole of  the depreciation to have taken place originally in 
consequence of  the measures of  the enemy ;  and its not having 
recovered, to the circunlstance of  the paper of  England not 
being  exchangeable for  cash."  (Min.  p. go.) 
" Since the conduct  of  the enemy which  you have de- 
scribed, what  other  causes  have  continued  to operate on 
the  Continent  to lower  the  course  of  Exchange ?-Very 
considerable  shipments from the  Baltic, which were  drawn 
for and the bills negotiated immediately on the shipments 
taking place,  without  consulting  the  interest  of  the  Pro- 
prietors in  this country much, by  deferring  such a  nego- 
'  tiation  till  a  denland  should  take  place  for  such  bills : 
The  continued  difficulty  and  uncertainty  in  carrying  on 
the correspondence  between  this Country and the Conti- 
nent:  The  curtailed  number  of  houses  to  be  found  on 
the Continent willing to undertake  such operations, either 
by  accepting bills  for  English  account  drawn  from  the 
parts where  shipments take place, or by accepting 
bills  drawn  from  this  Country,  either  against  property 
or on a speculative idea that the Exchange either 
ought or  is likely to rise :  The length of  time that is re- 
quired  before goods can be  converted  into cash,  from  the 
 circuit^^^ routes they are obliged to take : The very large 
sums  of  money  paid  to foreign  Ship  Owners,  which  in 
some instasces, such as on the article of  Hemp, has amounted 
to nearly its prime cost in Russia : The want of  middlemen 
who as formerly used to employ great capitals in Exchange 
operations, who, from the increased difficulties and dangers 
to whick  such  operations are now subject, are at present 
rarely to be met with, to make combined exchange opera- 
tions, which tend  to anticipate probable ultimate results." 
(Min.  p. 96.) 
The preceding Answers, and the rest of  this Gentleman's 
Evidence, all involve this principle,  expressed more or less 
distinctly,  that  Bullion  is the true regulator  both of  the 
value  of  a  local  currency  and of  the rate of  Foreign  Ex- 
changes ; and that the free convertibility of  paper currency 
into the precious metals, and the free exportation of  those 
metals, place a limit to the fall of  Exchange, and not only 
check  the  Exchanges  from  falling  below  that  limit,  but 
recover  them  by restoring  the balance. 
You:  Committee need not particularly point out in what 
respects these opinions, received from persons  of  practical 
detail, are vague and unsatisfactory, and in what respects 
they are contradictory of oiie another ; considerable assis- 
tance however may be derived from the information which 
the evidence of  these persons affords, in explaining the true 
causes of  the present state of  the Exchanges. 
Your  Committee  conceive  that  there  is  no  point  of 
trade, considered politically,  which is better  settled, than 
the  subject  of  Foreign  Exchanges.  THE PAR of  EX- 
~hange  between two Countries is that sum of  the currency 
Of  either  of  the  two, which,  in point  of  intrinsic  value, 
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other ; that is, contains precisely an equal weight of  Gold 
or  Silver  of  the same  fineness.  If  25  livres  of  France 
contained precisely an equal quantity of  pure  Silver with 
twenty shillings sterling, 25  would  be  said to be  the Par 
of  Exchange  between  London  and  Paris.  If  one coun- 
try uses Gold for its principal measure of  value, and another 
uses  Silver, the  par  between  those  countries  cannot  be 
estimated  for  any particular  period,  without  taking  into 
account the relative value of  Cold and Silver at that particu- 
lar period ; and as the  relative value of  the  two precious 
metals is subject to fluctuation, the Par of  Exchange  be- 
tween two such countries is not strictly a fixed point, but 
fluctuates within certain limits.  An illustration of  this will 
be found in the Evidence (Min.  pp. 78,79),  in the calculation 
of  the Par between Londonand Hamburgh, which isestimated 
to  be 34/3+ Flemish shillings for  a pound sterling.  That rate 
of  exchange,  which  is  produced  at any particular  period 
by a balance of  trade or payments between the two countries, 
and by a consequent disproportion between the supply and 
the demand of  bills drawn by the one upon the other, is a 
departure on one side or the other from the real and fixed 
Par.  But this real Par will be altered if  any change takes 
place in the currency of  one of  the two countries, whether 
that change consists in the wear or debasement of  a metallic 
currency below its standard, or in the discredit of  a forced 
paper  currency,  or in the excess of  a  paper  currency  not 
convertible into specie ; a  fall having taken place In  the 
intrinsic value  of  a  given portion  of  one  currency,  that 
portion will  no  longer  be  equal  to the  same  portion,  as 
before,  of  the other currency.  Rut though the real  Par 
of the currencies is thus altered, the dealers, having little 
or no occasion to refer to the par, continue to reckon their 
course of  Exchanges from the former denomination of  the 
par ; and in this state of  things a distinction is necessary to 
be made between the real and conzputed course of  Exchange. 
The  computed  course  of  Exchange,  as  expressed  in  the 
tables used  by the Merchants, will then include, not  only 
the  real  difference of  exchange  arising  from  the  state  of 
trade, but likewise  the  difference between  the original par 
and  the  new  par.  Those  two  sums  may  happen  to be 
added  together  in  the  calculation  or  they  may  happen 
to be  set against  each other.  If  the country, whose  cur- 
rency has been  depreciated in comparison with the other, 
has  the  balance  of  trade  also  against  it,  the  computed 
rate of exchange will  appear to be still Inore unfavourable 
than the real  difference of  exchange will be found to be ; 
and so  if  that same country has the balance  of  trade in 
its favour, the computed  rate of  exchange will  appear to 
be  much  less  favourable  than  the  real  difference  of  ex- 
change  will  be  found  to be.  Before  the new  coinage  of 
om silver in King  William's  time, the Exchange  between 
England  and  Holland,  computed  in  the  usual  manner 
according  to the standard of  their respective  mints,  was 
25 per  cent. against England ;  but  the value of  the cur- 
rent  coin  of  England was  more  than 25  per  cent. below 
the standard value ; so that if  that of  Holland was at its 
full standard, the real  exchange was  in fact in favour of 
England.  It may happen  in the same manner,  that the 
two  parts  of  the  calculation  may  be  both  opposite  and 
equal, the real exchange in favour of  the country by trade 
being equal to the nominal exchange against it by the state 
of  its  currency :  in  that  case,  the  computed  exchange 
will be at par, while the real exchange is in fact in favour 
of that country.  Again the currencies of  both the countries 
which  trade together  may have  undergone  an alteration, 
and that either in an equal degree, or unequally :  in such 
a case, the question of  the real state of  the exchange between 
them becomes a little more complicated, but it is to be re- 
solved exactly upon the same principle.  Without going out 
(of the  bounds  of  the  present  inquiry,  this  may  be  well 
illustrated  by  the  present  state  of  the  Exchange  of 
London  with  Portugal, as quoted  in  the tables  for  the 
18th of  May  last.  The  exchange  of  London  on  Lisbon 
appears to be  67+ ; 674d. sterling for a mill ree is the old 
established  par  of  exchange  between  the  two  countries ; 
"nd  674 accordingly is still said to be the par.  But by the 
evidence  of  Mr. Lyne, it appears,  (Min. p.  50) that, in 
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money, and one-half  in Government paper;  and that this 
paper is depreciated at a  discount  of  27  per  cent.  Upon 
all payments made in Portugal, therefore, there is a discount 
or loss of  133 per  cent. ; and the exchange at 67*, though 
nominally  at par,  is  in  truth  13*  per  cent.  against  this 
Country.  If  the exchange  were really  at par, it would be 
quoted at 56+;5,-,  or  apparently 133 per cent. in favour of 
London,  as  compared  with  the old  par which  was  fixed 
before the depreciation  of  the Portuguese medium  of  pay- 
ments.  Whether this 13i per  cent., which stands against 
this Country by the present Exchange on Lisbon, is a real 
difference of  Exchange, occasioned by the course of  trade 
and by the remittances to Portugal on account of  Govern- 
ment, or a nominal and apparent Exchange occasioned by 
something in the state of  our own currency, or is partly real 
and partly  nominal, may  perhaps be  determined  by what 
Your  Committee have  yet  to state. 
It appears to Your Committee to have been long settled 
and understood  as a principle,  that the difference of  Ex- 
change  resulting  from  the  state  of  trade  and  payments 
between  two  countries  is limited  by the expence  of  con- 
veying  and insuring  the  precious  metals  from  one  coun- 
try to the other ;  at least that it cannot for any considerable 
length of  time  exceed  that limit.  The real  difference  of 
Exchange,  resulting  from  the  state  of  trade  and  pay- 
ments,  never  can  fall  lower  than  the  amount  of  such 
expense of  carriage, including  the Insurance.  The  truth 
of  this position is so plain,  and it is so  uniformly  agreed 
to by all  the  practical  authorities,  both  commercial  and 
political,  that  Your  Committee  will  assume  it  as  indis- 
putable. 
It  occurred however to Your Committee, that the amount 
of  that charge and premium of  insurance might be increased 
above what  it has been  in ordinary periods  even  of  war, 
by  the  peculiar  circumstances  which  at present  obstruct 
the commercial intercourse between  this Country and the 
Continent of  Europe ; and that as such an increase would 
place  so  much  lower  than usual  the  limit  to which  our 
Exchanges  might  fall,  an explanation  might  thereby  be 
furnished of  their  present  unusual fall.  Your  Committee 
accordingly directed their enquiries to this point. 
~t  was  stated  to  Your  Committee,  by  the  Merchant 
who has  been  already  mentioned  as being  intimately  ac- 
quainted  with  the  trade  between  this  Country  and  the 
Continent  (Min. pp. 83,  84), that  the  present  expense  of 
transportil1g  Gold  from  London  to Hamburgh,  indepen- 
dent  of  the  premium  of  Insurance,  is  from  19  to 2  per 
cent. ; that the risk  is  very variable  from day to day, so 
that there is no fixed premium, but he conceived the average 
for  the fifteen months preceding  the  time when  he 
spoke, to have been about 4 per cent. : making the whole 
cost of  sending Gold from London to Hamburgh for those 
fifteen months, at such average of  the risk, from 54 to 6 per 
cent.-MY.  Abraha~n  Goldsrnid stated, that in the last five 
or six months of the year 1809, the expense of  sending Gold 
to Holland  varied exceedingly, from 4 to 7 per cent. for all 
charges, covering the risk as well as the costs of  transporta- 
tion.  By the Evidence which was  taken before the Com- 
mittees upon the Bank affairs in 1797, it appears that the 
cost of  sending specie from London to Hamburgh in that 
time of  war, including all charges as well as an  average insur- 
ance,  was  estimated  at a  little  more  than 39  per  cent. 
It is clear,  therefore,  that in consequence  of  the peculiar 
circumstancesof the present stateof the war, and theincreased 
difficulties of  intercourse  with  the Continent, the cost  of 
transporting the precious metals thither from this  Country 
has not only been rendered more  fluctuating than it used 
to be, but, upon the whole, is very considerably increased. 
It would appear, however, that upon an average of  the risk 
for that period when it seems to have been highest, the last 
half of the last year, the cost and insurance of  transporting 
Gold to Hamburgh or to Holland did not exceed 7 per cent. 
It  was of course greater at particular times, when the risk was 
above  that  average.  It is evident also  that the risk, and 
co.lsequently the whole cost of  transporting it to an inland 
market, to Paris for example, would, upon an average, be 
higher than that of  carrying it to Amsterdam or Hamburgh. 
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resulting from the state of  trade, might fall and continue un- 
favourable  for  a  considerable  length  of  time,  has,  during 
the period  in  question,  been  a  good  deal  lower  than  in 
former  times  of  war;  but it appears  also,  that  the  ex- 
pense of remitting specie has not been increased  so much, 
and that the limit,  by which  the  depression  of  the  Ex- 
changes  is  bounded,  has  not  been  lowered  so  much,  as 
to  afford  an adequate  explanation  of  a  fall  of  the  Ex- 
changes  so  great  as  from  16  to 20  per  cent.  below  par. 
The increased  cost  of  such  remittance  would  explain,  at 
those moments when the risk was greatest, a fall of  some- 
thing more than 7 per cent. in  the Exchange with  Ham- 
burgh  or  Holland, and a  fall still greater perhaps  in the 
Exchange with Paris ; but the rest  of  the fall, which has 
actually  talien  place,  remains  to  be  explained  in  some 
other manner. 
Your  Committee  are disposed to think, from the result 
of  the  whole  evidence,  contradictory  as  it  is,  that  the 
circumstances  of  the trade of  this Country, in the course 
of  the last year, were such as to occasion a real fall of  our 
Exchanges  with  the  Continent  to  a  certain  extent,  and 
perhaps  at one  period  almost  as low  as  the  limit  fixed 
by the expense  of  remitting  Gold  from  hence  to the re- 
spective markets.  And Your Committee is inclined to this 
opinion,  both  by what  is  stated regarding  the  excess  of 
imports  from  the  Continent  above  the  exports,  though 
that is the part of  the subject which is left most in doubt ; 
and also by what  is stated respecting the mode in which 
the payments  in our trade have been  latterly effected, an 
advance being  paid upon  the imports from the  Continent 
oi  Europe, and  a  long  credit  being  given  upon  the  ex- 
ports to other parts  of  the world. 
Your  Committee,  observing  how  entirely  the  present 
depression  of  our  Exchange  with  Europe  is  referred  by 
many persons  to a great excess of  our imports above our 
exports, have called for an account  of  the actual value of 
those for the last five years ; and Mr.  Irving, the Inspec- 
tor  General  of  Customs,  has  accordingly  furnished  the 
most  accurate Estimate of  both that he has been enabled 
to form.  He has also endeavoured to forward the object of 
the  Committee,  by  calculating  how  much  should  be  de- 
ducted  from  the value  of  goods imported, on  account of 
in return for which  nothing  is  exported.  These 
deductions  consist  of  the  produce  of  Fisheries,  and  of 
imports from the East and West  ~ndies,  which  are of  the 
nature  of  rents,  profits,  and capital remitted  to Proprie- 
tors in this  Country.  The balance  of  trade  in  favour  of 
this Country, upon the face of the Account thus made up, 
was 
In 1805 about  .  .  £6,616,000 
1806  .  f;10,4.37,000 
1807  .  .  £5,866,000 
1808  .  ~12,4.81,000 
1809  .  .  £14,834,000 
So  far, therefore,  as any inference  is  to be  drawn  from 
the  balance  thus  exhibited,  the  Exchanges  during  the 
present  year,  in  which  many  payments  to this  Country 
on account  of  the very advantageous balances  of  the two 
former  years  may be  expected  to take place, ought  to be 
peculiarly  f avourable. 
Your  Committee,  however,  place  little  confidence in 
deductions made even from the improved document which 
the industry and intelligence of  the Inspector General has 
enabled  him  to furnish.  It  is  defective,  as  Mr.  Irving 
has himself stated, inasmuch as it supplies no account of the 
sum drawn by Foreigners  (which is at the present  period 
peculiarly large) on account of  freight due to them for the 
employment of  their shipping, nor, on the other hand, of 
the sum receivable from them (and forming an addition to 
the value  of  our  exported articles)  on  account  of  freight 
arising from the employment of  British shipping.  It leaves 
out  of  consideration  all  interest  on  capital  in  England 
Possessed by Foreignel-s, and on capital abroad belonging 
to Inhabitants  of  Great  Britain,  as well  as the pecuniary 
transactions  between  the  Governments  of  England  and 
Ireland.  It takes no cognizance of  contraband trade, and of 
exported  and  imported  Bullion,  of  which  no  account 
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important article, the variations of  which, if  correctly stated, 
would probably be found to correspond in a great degree with 
the fluctuations of the  apparently favourable  balance ;  namely 
the bills drawn on Government for our naval, military, and 
other  expenses  in  Foreign  parts.  Your  Committee  had 
hoped  to receive  an account  of  these  from  the table  of 
the House ; but there  has been  some difficulty  and con- 
sequent delay in executing  a  material  part  of  the  Order 
made  for  them.  It appears  from  '' an  Account,  as  far 
as it could be made out, of sums paid for Expenses Abroad 
in 1793,  4,  5,  and  6,"  inserted in  the Appendix  of  the 
Lords'  Report  on  the  occasion  of  the  Bank  Restriction 
Bill,  that the sums so paid  were, 
1111793  ,  &:2,785,252 
4  -  l8,335,591 
5  .  l11,040,2.6 
6  .  ,C;10,649,916 
The following is an account  of  the official  value of  our 
Imports and Exports  with the  Continent of  Europe alone, 
in each  of  the last  five years : 
The balances with Europe alone in favour of  Great Britain 
as exhibited in this imperfect statement, are not far from 
corresponding with the general and more accurate balances 
before given.  The favourable balance of  1809 with Europe 
alone, if computed according to the actual value, would be 
much more considerable than the value of  the same year, in 
the former general statement. 
IMPORTS. 
--  .--  - 
A favourable balance of  trade on the face of  the Account 
of Exports and Imports, presented annually to Parliament, 
is a very probable consequence of  large drafts on Govern- 
ment for foreign expenditure ; an augmentation of  exports, 
and  a  diminution  of  imports,  being  promoted  and  even 
by the means of  such drafts.  For if  the supply 
of bills drawn abroad, either by the Agents of  Government, 
or by  individuals, is  disproportionate to the  demand, the 
price of  them in foreign money falls, until it is so low as 
to invite purchasers ; and the purchasers, who are generally 
Foreigners,  not  wishing  to  transfer  their  property  per- 
manently to England, have a reference to the terms on which 
the bills on England will purchase those British commodities 
which  are in  demand, either in  their own  country, or in 
intermediate  places,  with  which  the account  may be  ad- 
j usted.  Thus, the price of  the bills being regulated in some 
degree by that of  British commodities, and continuing to fall 
till it becomes so low as to be likely to afford a profit on the 
purchase and exportation of  these commodities,  an actual 
exportation  nearly  proportionate  to the  amount  of  the 
bills  drawn  can  scarcely  fail  to take  place.  It  follows 
that there cannot be,  for  any long  period,  either a high- 
ly favourable or  unfavourable  balance  of  trade ; for  the 
balance  no sooner affects the price  of  bills, than the price 
of  bills,  by its re-action  on the state of  trade,  promotes 
an equalization of  commercial exports and imports.  Your 
Committee have here considered Cash and Bullion as forming 
a part of  the general mass of  exported or imported articles, 
and as transferred according to the state both of  the supply 
and  the  demand ;  forming  however,  under  certain  cir- 
cumstances, and especially in the case of  great fluctuations 
in the general commerce, a  peculiarly  commodious remit- 
tance. 
Your Committee have enlarged on the documents supplied 
by  Mr.  Irving,  for  the sake  of  throwing  further light  on 
the general question  of  the balance  of  trade and the Ex- 
ch;,lges,  and of  dissipating some very prevalent errors which 
have a great practical influence on the subject now  under 
consideration. 
EXPORTS. 
Balance in favour 
of  Great Britain, 
reckoned in 
Official Value. 
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That  the  real Exchange  against this  Country with  the 
Continent  cannot  at any time  have  materially  exceeded 
the limit fixed by the cost at  that time of  transporting spe- 
cie,  Your  Committee  are  convinced  upon  the  principles 
which  have  been  already stated.  That  in  point  of  fact 
those  Exchanges  have  not  exceeded  that limit,  seems  to 
receive a very satisfactory illustration from one part of  the 
evidence of  Mr. Greffulhe,  who, of  all the Merchantsexamiaed, 
seemed most wedded to the opinion, that the state of  the 
balance of  payments alone was sufficient to account for any 
depression  of  the Exchanges, however  great.  From what 
the Committee have already stated with respect to the par 
of  Exchange,  it is  manifest  that  the  Exchange  between 
two countries is at its real par,  when  a given quantity of 
Gold or Silver in the one country is convertible at  the market 
price into such an amount of  the currency of  that country, 
as will purchase a bill of  Exchange on the other country for 
such an amount of  the currency of  that other country as will 
there be convertible at the market price into an equal quan- 
tity of  Gold or Silver of  the same fineness.  In the same 
manner the real Exchange is in favouv  of  a country having 
money transactions with another, when a given quantity of 
Gold  or  Silver  in the former  is  convertible  for  such  an 
amount  in  the  currency  of  that  latter  country,  as  will 
there  be  convertible  into  a  greater  quantity  of  Gold  or 
Silver  of  the same fineness. 
Upon  these  principles,  Your  Committee  desired  Mr. 
Greffulhe  to  make  certain  calculations,  which  appear  in 
his Answers to the following Questions ; viz. : 
" Supposing  you  had  a  pound  weight  troy  of  Gold  of 
the English standard at Paris, and that you wished by means 
of  that to procure a Bill of  Exchange upon London, what 
would be  the amount of  the Bill of  Exchange which you 
would  procure  in  the  present  circumstances ?-I  find 
that a pound of  Gold of  the British standard at the present 
market price of  105  francs, and the exchange at 20 livres, 
would purchase a Bill of  Exchange of  £59 8s. 
" At the present market price of  Gold in London, how 
much  standard  Gold  can  you  purchase  for  £59  8s. ? 
~t  the price of  k4 12s. I find it will purchase 13 ounces of 
~~ld,  within  a  very  small fraction. 
lr Then what  is the difference per cent. in the quantity 
of  Standard Gold  which  is equivalent  to £59  8s. of  our 
currency as at Paris and in London ?-About  8*  per cent. 
" Suppose you  have a pound weight troy of  our stand- 
ard Gold at Hamburgh, and that you wished to part with 
it for a Bill of Exchange upon London, what would be the 
amount  of  the Bill  of  Exchange,  which,  in the present 
circumstances,  you  would  procure ?-At  the  Hamburgh 
pice of  101, and the Exchange at 29, the  amount  of  the 
Bill purchased on London would be £58 4s. 
"  What  quantity of  our  standard Gold,  at the present 
price of  £4  12s.  do you  purchase  for £58  4s. ?-About  12 
ounces and  3  dwts. 
" Then  what  is  the  difference  per  cent.  between  the 
quantity of  standard  Gold  at Hamburgh and in London, 
which  is  equivalent  to  £58  4s.  sterling ?-About  54 per 
cent. 
" Suppose you had a pound weight  troy of  our standard 
Gold at Amsterdam,  and wished to part  with it for a Bill 
of  Exchange  upon  London,  what  would  be  the  amount 
sterling  of  the  Bill  of  Exchange which  you  would  pro- 
cure ?-At  the  Amsterdam price  of  148, Exchange  31.6, 
and Bank agio I per cent. the amount of  the Bill onLondon 
would  be  £55  18s. 
"  At  the present  price  of  £4  12s.  what  quantity of  our 
standard  Gold  do  you  purchase  in  London  for  £58  18s. 
sterling ?-12  oz.  16  dwts. 
"  How much is that per cent. ?-7  per cent."  (Min. p. 
133.) 
Similar  calculations,  but  made upon  different assumed 
data, will  be found in the evidence of  Mr.  Abraham  Gold- 
mid.  (Min.  pp.  115,  116.)  From  these  answers  of  Mr. 
Greffulhe, it appears, that  when  the computed  Exchange 
with  Hamburgh was  29,  that is,  from  16  to 17  per  cent. 
below  par, thc real difference of  Exchange, resulting from 
the state of  trade and balance of  payments was no more than 
5i  Per cent. against this Country ;  that when the computed 
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Exchange  with Amsterdam  was 31.6, that is about  15  per 
cent. below par, the real Exchange was no more than 7 per 
cent.  against  this  Country;  that,  when  the  computed 
Exchange with Paris  was  20,  that is  20  per  cent. below 
par,  the  real  Exchange  was  no  more  than  Sg per  cent. 
against this Country.  (Mi~t.  p, 133.)  After making these 
allowances, therefore, for the effect of  the balance  of  trade 
and payments upon our Exchanges with those places, there 
will still remain a fall of  11  per cent. in the Exchange with 
Hamburgh,  of  above  8 per  cent. in  the  Exchange  with 
Holland, and of  114  per cent. in the Exchange with Paris, 
to be explained in some other manner. 
If  the  same mode of  calculation be applied to the  more 
recent  statements of  the Exchange  with  the Continent,  it 
will perhaps  appear, that though the computed Exchange 
is  at present  against  this  Country,  the real  Exchange  is 
in its favour. 
From  the foregoing  reasonings  relative  to the state of 
the  Exchanges,  if  they are considered  apart, Your  Com- 
mittee find  it difficult  to resist  an inference, that a  por- 
tion at least  of  the great fall which  the Exchanges lately 
suffered  must have  resulted  not  from  the  state of  trade, 
but from a  change in  the relative  value  of  our  domestic 
currency.  But when  this  deduction  is  joined  with  that 
which Your Committee have stated, respecting the change 
in the market price  of  Gold, that inference appears to be 
demonstrated. 
In consequence  of  the opinion  which  Your  Committee 
entertain, that, in the  present  artificial  condition  of  the 
circulating  medium  of  this  Country, it is most  important 
to watch the Foreign Exchanges and the market price  of 
Gold,  Your  Committee  were  desirous  to  learn,  whether 
the Directors of  the Bank of  England held the same opinion, 
and derived from it a practical rule for the control of  their 
circulation ; and particularly whether, in the course of  the 
last year,  the great depression of  the Exchanges, and the 
great rise in the price of  Gold, had suggested to the Directors 
any suspicion of  the currency of the Country being excessive. 
Mr.  WHITMORE,  the  late  Governor of  the  Bank, stated 
to the  Committee  (Min. p.  111),  that in regulating  the 
general amount  of  the loans  and discounts,  he  did "  not 
fl advert to the circumstance of  the Exchanges ; it appearing 
upon a reference to the amount of our notes in circulation, 
and  the course  of  Exchange,  that they frequently have 
" no  connexion."  He  afterwards  said  (Mi~z.  p.  IIZ), 
" My  opinion  is, I do not  know  whether  it is  that of  the 
"  Bank, that the amount of  our paper circulation  has no 
"  reference at all to the state of the Exchange."  And  on 
subsequent  day,  Mr.  Whitmore  stated  (Mi~z.  p.  174)~ 
that " the present  unfavourable  state of Exchange has no 
"  influence upon the amount of  their issues, the Bank having 
"  acted precisely  in the same way as they did before."  He 
was  likewise asked  (Min,  p.  IIO),  Whether, in regulating 
the amount of  their circulation, the Bank ever adverted to 
the difference between  the market and Mint price of  Gold ? 
and having desired to have time to consider that question, 
Mr.  Whitmore, on a  subsequent  day, answered  it in  the 
following terms, which  suggested  these  further questions : 
" In taking into consideration the amount of  your notes 
"  out  in  circulation,  and in limiting the  extent  of  your 
"  discount  to Merchants, do you  advert to the difference, 
"  when such exists, between the market and the Mint price 
" of  Gold ?-We  do  advert to that, inasmuch  as we  do 
"  not discount at any time for those persons who we know, 
I( or have good reason to suppose, export the Gold. 
" Do you  not advert to it any further than by refusing 
6'  discounts  to  such  persons ?-We  do  advert  to it, inas- 
"  much  as  whenever  any  Director  thinks  it bears  upon 
'I  the  question  of  our discounts,  he presses  to bring  for- 
''  ward  the  discussion. 
<, 
I'  The market price  of  gold having,  in the course of  the 
I'  last year,  risen  as high  as £4  10s.  or  £4  12s.  has that 
rt circumstance  been  taken  into  consideration  by  you, 
I, So  as to have had any effect in diminishing or enlarging 
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"  been  taken  into  consideration  by  me  in  that  view.'' 
(Min.  p.  125.) 
Mr.  PEARSE,  now  Governor  of  the  Bank,  agreed  with 
Mr. Whitmore in this account of  the  practice of  the Bank, 
and expressed his full concurrence in the same opinion. 
Mr. PEARSE.-"  In considering this subject with reference 
"  to the manner in which Bank notes are issued, resulting 
"  from the applications  made for  discounts to supply the 
"  necessary  want  of  Bank notes,  by which  their  issue  in 
('  amount is so controlled that it can never amount to an 
"  excess, I cannot see how the amount of  Bank notes issued 
"  can  operate  upon  the price  of  Bullion,  or  the  state of 
"  the Exchanges, and therefore I am  individually of  opinion 
"  that the price of  Bullion, or the state of  the Exchanges, 
"can  never be a reason for lessening the amount  of  Bank 
"  notes to be issued, always understanding the control which 
" I have  already  described. 
" Is  the  Governor  of  the  Bank  of  the  same  opinion 
"  which has now been expressed by the Deputy Governor ? 
Mr.  WHITMORE.-" I  am  so  much  of  the  same  opin- 
"  ion,  that  I never  think it necessary  to advert  to the 
"  price of  Gold, or the state of  the Exchange, on the days 
"  on which  we  make  our  advances. 
"  Do you advert to these two circumstances with a view 
"  to regulate the general amount of  your advances ?-I  do 
not  advert  to it  with  a  view  to our  general  advances, 
"  conceiving it not to bear upon the question."  (Mia.  p. 126.) 
And  Mr.  HARMAN,  another  Bank  Director,  expressed 
his opinion in these terms :--"  I must very materially alter 
I( my opinions, before  I can suppose that the Exchanges 
"  will  be  influenced  by  any  modifications  of  our  paper 
"  currency."  (Min.  p.  221.) 
These  Gentlemen,  as  well  as several  of  the  Merchants 
who  appeared  before  the  Committee,  placed  much  reli- 
ance  upon  an argument  which  they drew  from  the want 
of  correspondence  in  point  of  time,  observable  between 
the amount  of  Bank  of  England  Notes  and the  state of 
the  Hamburgh  Exchange  during  several  years ; and Mr. 
Pearse presented a Paper on this subject, which is inserted 
in the Appendix.  (Ace. No.  49.)  Your  Committee  would 
feel no  distrust  in the  general principles which they have 
stated, if  the  discordance had been  greater;  considering 
the variety of  circumstances which have a temporary effect 
on  exchange,  and  the  uncertainty  both  of  the  time  and 
the  degree  in  which  it  may  be  influenced  by  any given 
of  paper.  It may be  added, that the numerical 
amount of  Notes (supposing LI  and l2  Notes to be  excluded 
from the  statement)  did  not  materially  vary  during  the 
period of  the comparison ; and that in the last year, when 
the  general  Exchanges  with  Europe  have  become  much 
more unfavourable,  the notes  of  the Bank of  England, as 
well  as those  of  the country  Banks,  have  been  very  con- 
siderably  increased.  Your  Committee  however,  on  the 
whole, are not of  opinion that a material depression of  the 
Exchanges has been manifestly to be traced in its amount 
and  degree  to  an  augmentation  of  notes  corresponding 
in point  of  time.  They  conceive,  that the  more  minute 
and ordinary fluctuations of Exchange are generally referable 
to  the  course  of  our  commerce;  that  political  events, 
operating upon the state of trade, may oftenhavecontributed 
as well to the rise as to the fall of  the Exchange ; and in 
particular, that the first remarkable depression  of  it in the 
beginning  of  1809, is to be  ascribed,  as has been  stated 
in the evidence already quoted, to commercial events arising 
out of  the occupation of  the North of  Germany by the troops 
of  the French emperor.  The evil has been,  that the Ex- 
change, when fallen, has not had the full means of  recovery 
under  the  subsisting  system.  And  if  those  occasional 
depressions,  which  arise  from  commercial causes,  are not 
after a  time  successively  corrected  by the remedy  which 
used to apply itself before the suspension of  the cash pay- 
ments of  the Bank,  the consequences  may ultimately  be 
exactly similar to those which  a  sudden and extravagant 
issue  of  paper  would  produce.  The  restoration  of  the 
Exchange  used  to be  effected  by  the  clandestine  trans- 
mission of  Guineas, which improved it for the moment, by 
serving as a remittance ; and unquestionably also in part, 
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total  quantity  of  the  remaining  circulating  medium,  to 
which  reduction the Bank  were led  to contribute  by the 
caution which every drain of  Gold naturally excited.  Under 
the present  system, the former of  these remedies must be 
expected more  and more to fail, the Guineas in  circulation 
being even now apparently so few as to form no important 
remittance ; and the reduction of  paper seems therefore the 
chief, if  not  the sole corrective,  to be  resorted  to.  It is 
only after the Bank shall have for some time resumed  its 
cash payments, that both can again  operate, as they did 
on  all former  occasions prior  to the restriction. 
The Committee cannot refrain  from  expressing it to be 
their opinion, after a  very  deliberate consideration of  this 
part  of  the subject,  that it is  a  great  practical  error  to 
suppose that the Exchanges  with  Foreign  Countries,  and 
the price  of  Bullion,  are not  liable to be  affected  by  the 
amount of  a paper  currency,  which  is issued  without the 
condition  of  payment  in specie at the will  of  the holder. 
That  the  Exchanges  will  be  lowered,  and  the  price  of 
Bullion raised, by an issue of  such paper  to excess, is not 
only established as a principle by the most eminent autho- 
rities upon Commerce and Finance ; but its practical truth 
has been  illustrated by the history of  almost  every  State 
in modern  times which  has used  a  paper  currency ; and 
in all those  countries,  this  principle  has  finally  been  re- 
sorted to by their Statesmen as the best criterion to judge 
by, whether such currency was or was not excessive. 
In the instances which are most familiar in the history 
of  Foreign  Countries, the excess of  paper has been usually 
accompanied by another circumstance, which has no place 
in our  situation  at present,  a want  of  confidence in  the 
sufficiency of  those funds upon  which the paper had been 
issued.  Where  these  two circumstances, excess and want 
of  confidence, are conjoined, they will co-operate and pro- 
duce their  effect much  more  rapidly than when  it is the 
result of  the excess only of  a paper of  perfectly good credit ; 
and in both cases, an effect  of the same sort will be  pro- 
duced upon the Foreign Exchanges, and upon the price of 
Bullion.  The  most  remarkable  examples  of  the  former 
kind are to be found in the history of  the paper currencies 
of the British Colonies in North America, in the early part 
of the last century, and in that of the assignats of  the French 
Republic : to which the Committee have been enabled to add 
another, scarcely  less  remarkable  (Mi%.  p.  85), from  the 
money  speculations of  the Austrian  Government  in the 
last campaign, which will be found in the Appendix.  The 
present state of  the currency  of  Portugal  affords, also, an 
instance  of  the same kind. 
Examples  of  the other  sort,  in  which  the  depreciation 
was  produced  by excess alone, may be gathered from  the 
experience of  the United  Kingdom at different  times. 
In  ScotIand,  about  the  end  of  the  seven  years'  war, 
Banking  was  carried  to  a  very  great  excess ; and by a 
practice of  inserting in their promissory notes an optional 
clause of  paying at sight, or in 6 months after sight with 
interest, the convertibility of  such notes into specie at the 
will  of  the holder  was  in effect  suspended.  These  notes 
accordingly became depreciated in comparison with specie ; 
and  while  this  abuse lasted,  the  exchange between  Lon- 
don  and Dumfries, for example, was  sometimes four  per 
cent. against Durnfries, while the exchange between Lon- 
don  and Carlisle,  which  is  not  thirty miles  distant  from 
Dumfries,  was  at par.  The Edinburgh  Banks,  when  any 
of  their  paper  was  brought  in to be  exchanged  for  bills 
on  London,  were  accustomed  to  extend  or  contract  the 
date of  the bills  they gave, according to the state of  the 
Exchange ; diminishing in this manner the value of  those 
bills,  nearly  in  the  same  degree  in  which  the  excessive 
issue had caused their paper to be  depreciated.  This ex- 
cess  of  paper  was  at last  removed  by  granting bills  on 
London  at a fixed date ; for the payment  of  which  bills, 
or,  in  other  words,  for  the  payment  of  which  excess  of 
paper, it was necessary in the first instance to provide, by 
placing  large  pecuniary  funds in the hands  of  their  Lon- 
don correspondents.  In  aid of  such precautionary measures 
on the part of  the Edinburgh Banks, an act of  parliament 
prohibited  the  optional  clauses,  and  suppressed  ten  and 
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Scotland  was  speedily  restored to  its natural rate ;  and 
bills  on  London  at a  fixed  date having  ever  since  been 
given  in Exchange for  the  circulating  notes  of  Scoiland, 
all  material  excess of  Scottish paper above Bank of  Eng- 
land  has  been  prevented,  and  the  Exchange  has  been 
stationary  (Wealth  of  Nations,  vol.  I. p.  492.-Report 
of  Committee  upon  Irish  Exchange,  1804,  Mr. Mansfield's 
Evidence  .) 
The  experience  of  the  Bank  of  England  itself,  within 
a  very short period  after its first  establishment, furnishes 
a  very instructive  illustration  of  all the foregoing princi- 
ples  and  reasonings.  In this  instance,  the  effects  of  a 
depreciation of  the coin, by wear and clipping, were coupled 
with the effect of  an excessive issue of  paper.  The Directors 
of  the Bank of  England did not at once attain a very accurate 
knowledge of  all the principles by which such an institution 
must be conducted.  They lent money not only by discount, 
but  upon  real  securities, mortgages,  and even  pledges  of 
commodities  not  perishable ;  at the same time the Bank 
contributed  most  materially to the service  of  Government 
for the support of  the Army upon the Continent.  By the 
liberality of  those loans to private individuals,  as well  as 
by the large advances to Government, the quantity of  the 
notes of  the Bank became excessive, their relative value was 
depreciated, and they fell to a discount of  17  per cent.  At 
this time there appears to have been no failure of  the public 
confidence in the funds of  the Bank ; for its Stock sold for 
IIO  per cent. though  only 60 per cent. upon  the subscrip- 
tions  had  been  paid  in.  By  the  conjoint  effect  of  this 
depreciation  of  the paper of  the Bank  from excess, and of 
the depreciation  of  the Silver  coin from wear and clipping, 
the price of  Gold Bullion was so much raised, that Guineas 
were as high as 30s. ; all that had remained of  good Silver 
gradually disappeared  from the circulation ; and the Ex- 
change with Holland, which had been before a little affected 
by the remittances for the Army, sunk as low as 25 per cent. 
under par, when the Bank notes were at a discount of  17 per 
cent.  Several expedients were  tried,  both  by  Parliament 
and by the Bank, to force a better Silver  coin into circula- 
tion, and to reduce the price of Guineas, but without effect. 
~t  length the true remedies were resorted  to :  first, by a 
new  coinage  of  Silver,  which  restored  that  part  of  the 
currency to its standard value, though the scarcity of  money 
occasioned  by calling  in the  old  coin  brought  the  Bank 
into  straights,  and  even  for  a  time  affected  its credit ; 
secondly, by  taking  out  of  the  circulation  the  excess  of 
Bank  Notes.  This  last  operation  appears  to have  been 
effected very judiciously.  Parliament consented to enlarge 
the  Capital  Stock of  the Bank, but annexed a  condition, 
directing that a certain proportion of  the few subscriptions 
should be made good in Bank Notes.  In proportion to the 
amount  of  Notes  sunk in this manner,  the value of  those 
which remained in circulation began presently to rise ; in a 
short time the notes were at par, and the Foreign Exchanges 
nearly  so.  These  details are all very fully  mentioned  in 
authentic tracts published at the time, and the case appears 
to Your  Committee  to afford  much instruction  upon  the 
subject  of  their  present  Enquiry.  (See a short Account 
of the Bank, by Mr. Godfrey, one of  the original Directors ; 
and A  short  History of  the last Parliament,  1699,  by Dr. 
Drake ; both in Lord Somers' Collection of  Tracts.) 
Your  Committee  must  next  refer  to  the  confirmation 
and sanction which  all their  reasonings  receive  from the 
labours of  the Committee of  this House, which was appointed 
in a former  Parliament to examine  into the causes  of  the 
great depreciation  of  the Irish Exchange with England in 
1804.  Most  of the mercantile  persons  who gave evidence 
before that Committee, including two Directors of  the Bank 
of Ireland, were unwilling to admit that the fall of  the Ex- 
change was in any degree to be ascribed to an excess of  the 
paper  currency arising out of  the restriction of  1797 ; the 
whole  fall in  that case,  as  in the  present, was  referred 
to an unfavourable  balance  of  trade or of  payments ; and 
it was  also  then  affirmed,  that " Notes  issued  only  in 
proportion to the demand, in exchange for good and con- 
vertible  securities  payable  at specific periods,  could  not 
tend to any excess in the circulation, or to any depreciation." 
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Witnesses,  pervades  most  of  the  evidence  given  before 
that  Committee,  with  the  remarkable  exception  of  Mr. 
Mansfield,  whose  knowledge  of  the  effects  of  that  over 
issue  of  Scotch  paper,  which  has  just  been  mentioned, 
led  him  to  deliver  a  more  just  opinion  on  the  subject. 
Many  of  the  Witnesses  before  the  Committee,  however 
unwilling to acknowledge the real nature of  the evil, made 
important  concessions, with  neccssarily  involved  them  in 
inconsistency.  They could not, as practical men, controvert 
the truth of  the general  position,  that "  the fluctuations 
of  Exchange  between  two  countries  are generally  limited 
by the price at which any given quantity of  Bullion can be 
purchased in the circulating  medium of  the debtor country, 
and converted into the circulating medium  of  the creditor 
country,  together  with  the  insurances  and  charges  of 
transporting it from the one to the other."  It was at the 
same time admitted, that the expense of  transporting Gold 
from  England  to Ireland,  including  insurance,  was  then 
under one per cent. ; that before the restriction, the fluctua- 
tions had never  long and much  exceeded this limit ; and 
moreover,  that the exchange  with  Belfast, where  Guineas 
freely circulated  at the time of  the  investigation by that 
Committee,  was  then  I* in  favour  of  Ireland,  while  the 
Exchange with  Dublin, where  only paper was in use, was 
~TIO per  cent. against that country.  It also appeared from 
such imperfect documents as it was practicable to furnish, 
that the balance of  trade was then favourable to Ireland. 
Still,  however,  it  was  contended  that  there  was  no  de- 
preciation  of  Irish  paper,  that  there  was  a  scarcity  and 
consequent  high  price  of  Gold,  and that the  diminution 
of  Irish  paper  would  not  rectify  the  Exchange.  "  The 
depreciation of  Bank paper in Ireland  it was said by one 
of  the  Witnesses,  a  Director  of  the  Bank  of  Ireland,  is 
entirely a relative term with respect to the man who buys 
and  sells  in  Dublin  by  that  common  medium ;  to him 
it is  not  depreciated  at all ; but  to the  purchaser  of  a 
Bill  on  London,  to him  in that relation,  and under  that 
circumstance,  there  is  a  depreciation  of  ten  per  cent." 
By thus avoiding all comparison with a view to the point 
in issue, between  the value  of  their own  paper  and that 
of  either the then circulating  medium  of  this Country  or 
of  Gold  Bullion,  or  even  of  Gold  coin  then passing  at a 
premium  in  other  parts of  Ireland,  they appear  to have 
retained a  confident  opinion,  that no depreciation  of  Irish 
paper  had taken place. 
It is further observable, that the value of  a considerable 
quantity of  Dollars  put  into  circulation  by the  Bank  of 
Ireland at this period,  was raised  to 5s. a  Dollar,  for the 
professed  purpose  of  rendering  the  new  Silver coin  con- 
formable to the existing state of  the Exchange ; a circum- 
stance  on  which  the  Committee  animadverted  in  their 
Report,  and  which  serves  to shew  that  the  Irish  paper 
currency could not stand a comparison with the standard 
price  of  Silver, any more  than with that of  Gold  Bullion, 
with Gold in coin, or with the then paper currency of  this 
kingdom. 
A  fact  was  mentioned  to that Committee  on  the  evi- 
dence of  Mr.  Colville, a  Director of  the Bank  of  Ireland, 
which, though it carried no conviction to his mind of  the 
tendency  of  a  limitation  of  paper  to  lower  Exchanges, 
seems  very  decisive  on  this  point.  He  stated,  that  in 
1753 and  1754,  the  Dublin  Exchange  being  remarkably 
unfavourable,  and  the  notes  of  the  Dublin  Bank  being 
suddenly  withdrawn,  the  Exchange  became  singularly 
favourable.  The  mercantile  distress  produced  on  that 
occasion was great, through the suddenness of  the operation ; 
for it was  effected,  not  by  the  gradual  and  prudential 
measures  of  the  several  Ranks,  but  through  the  violent 
pressure  which  their  unguarded  issues  had brought  upon 
them.  The general result, however, is not the less observable. 
With  a  view  to  the further elucidation  of  the subject 
of the  Irish  Exchanges, which  so lately  attracted the at- 
tention  of  Parliament, it may be  proper  to remark,  that 
Ireland  has  no  dealings  in  Exchange  with  foreign  coun- 
tries,  except  through  London;  and  that  the  payments 
from Ireland to the Continent are consequently converted 
into English currency,  and then into the currency  of  the 
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1804,  the  Exchange  of  England  with  the  Continent  was 
above  par,  and  the  Exchange  of  Ireland  was  in  such  a 
state that £118  10s.  of  the  notes  of  the  Bank  of  Ireland 
would purchase only £100  of  those of  the Bank of  England. 
Therefore,  if  the  notes  of  the  Bank  of  Ireland  were  not 
depreciated,  and it  was  so  maintained,  it  followed  that 
the notes of  the Bank of  England were at more than 18  per 
cent. premium above the standard coin of  the two countries. 
The  principles  laid  down  by  the  Committee  of  1804 
had probably some weight with the Directors of  the Bank 
of  Ireland ; for between  the period  of  their  Report  (June 
1804)~  and January 1806, the circulation of  the notes of  the 
Bank of  Ireland was gradually (though with small occasional 
fluctuations),  reducedfrom about three millions to &2,41o,ooo, 
being  a  diminutioii  of  nearly  $th ; at the same time,  all 
the currency  which  had  been  issued  under  the name  of 
Silver Tokens was by law suppressed.  The paper currency, 
both of  the Bank of  England, and of  the English Country 
Banks,  seems  during  the  same  period  to  have gradually 
increased.  The combination  of  these  two  causes is likely 
to have had a material effect in restoring to par the Irish 
Exchange  with  England. 
The  Bank  of  Ireland  has  again  gradually  enlarged its 
issues  to about  ~3,1oo,ooo,  being  somewhat  higher  than 
they stood in  1804, an increase  probably  not  dispropor- 
tionate to  that which has occurred  in England  within  the 
same period.  Perhaps, however, it ought not to be assumed, 
that the diminution of  issues of  the Bank of  Ireland between 
1804  and 1806, would produce a coresponding reduction in 
the issues of  private Banks in Ireland, exactly in the same 
manner in which a diminution of  Bank of  England paper 
produces that effect on the Country Banks in Great Britain ; 
because  the  Bank  of  Ireland  does not  possess the  same 
exclusive  power  of  supplying  any  part  of  that  country 
with a paper currency, which the Bank of  England enjoys 
in respect to the metropolis of  the Empire.  The Bank of 
England, by restricting the quantity of  this necessary article 
in that important  quarter, can more effectually  secure the 
improvement of  its value ; and every such  improvement 
must  necessarily  lead,  by  a  corresponding  diminution  in 
amount, to a similar augmentation of  the value of  Country 
Bank paper exchangeable for it.  That the same diminution 
of  the  circulation  of  private  Banks took place  in Ireland 
is more than probable, for the private Banks in Ireland are 
accustomed  to give  Bank  of  Ireland  paper  for  their  own 
circulating notes when required to do so, and therefore could 
not but feel the effect of  any new limitation of  that paper 
for which their own was exchangeable. 
It is  due,  however,  in justice  to the present  Directors 
of  the Bank  of  England,  to remind  the House,  that the 
suspension  of  their  cash payments, though  it appears in 
some degree  to have originated  in a mistaken view  taken 
by the Bank of  the peculiar  difficulties of  that time,  was 
not a measure sought for by the Bank, but imposed upon 
it by the Legislature for what were held to be urgent reasons 
of  State policy and public expediency.  And it ought not 
to be urged as matter of  charge against the Directors, if  in 
this  novel  situation in  which  their  comnlercial  Company 
was  placed  by the law, and intrusted with the regulation 
and control of  the whole circulating medium of  the Country, 
they  were  not fully  aware  of  the principles  by which  so 
delicate a trust should be executed, but continued to conduct 
their business of  discounts and advances according to their 
former routine. 
It is important, at the same time, to observe, that under 
the former system, when  the Bank  was bound  to answer 
its Notes in specie upon demand, the state of  the Foreign 
Exchanges  and  the  price  of  Gold  did  most  materially 
influence its conduct in the issue of  those Notes, though it 
was  not  the  practice  of  the  Directors  systematically  to 
watch  either the one or the other.  So long as Gold was 
demandable  for  their  paper,  they were  speedily apprized 
of  a  depression  of  the Exchange,  and a  rise  in the price 
of  Gold, by a run upon  them for that article.  If  at any 
time they incautiously  exceeded the proper  limit  of  their 
advances and issues, the paper  was  quickly brought back 
to them, by those who were tempted to profit by the market 
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the evil soon cured itself.  The Directors of  the Bank having 
their apprehensions excited by the reduction of  their stock 
of Gold, and being able to replace their loss only by reiterated 
purchases  of  Bullion at a very losing price, naturally con- 
tracted their issues of  paper, and thus gave to the remaining 
paper, as well as to the Coin for which it was interchangeable, 
an increased value, while the clandestine exportation either 
of  the  coin,  or  the Gold  produced  from  it, combined in 
improving the state of  the Exchange, and in producing  a 
corresponding  diminution  of  the  difference  between  the 
market price and Mint price of Gold, or of  paper convertible 
into Gold. 
Your Committee do not mean to represent that themanner, 
in which this effect resulted from the conduct which they 
have  described,  was  distinctly  perceived  by  the  Bank 
Directors.  The fact of  limiting their paper as often as they 
experienced any great drain of  Gold, is, however,  unques- 
tionable.  Mr.  Bosanquet  stated,  in  his  evidence  before 
the Secret  Committee of  the House  of  Lords, in the year 
1797, That in 1783,  when  the Bank  experienced  a  drain 
of  Cash which alarmed them, the Directors took a bold step, 
and refused to make the advances on the loan of  that year. 
This, he said, answered the purpose of  making a temporary 
suspension in the amount of  the drain of  their Specie.  And 
all the three Directors who have been examined before Your 
Committee,  represent  some restriction  of  the Bank issues 
as having usually taken place at those periods  antecedent 
to the suspension of  the cash payments of  the Bank, when 
they experienced any material run.  A very urgent demand 
for Guineas, though arising not from the high price of  Gold 
and the state of  the Exchange, but from a fear of  Invasion, 
occurred  in  1793, and also in  1797,  and in each  of  these 
periods theBank restrained their discounts, and consequently 
also the amount of  their Notes, very much below the demand 
of the Merchants.  Your Committee question the policy of 
thus limiting the accommodation in a period of  alarm, unac- 
companied  with  an  unfavourable  Exchange  and  high 
price  of  Bullion ; but  they  consider  the  conduct  of  the 
Bank  at  the  two  last-mentioned  periods,  as  affording 
illustration  of  their  general  disposition,  antecedently  to 
1797, to contract their  loans  and their paper,  when  they 
found their  Gold  to be  taken from them. 
It  was  a  necessary  consequence  of  the  suspension  of 
cash  payments,  to exempt  the Bank  from  that  drain  of 
Gold,  which,  in former times, was  sure to result  from  an 
unfavourable Exchange and a high price  of  Bullion.  And 
the Directors, released from all fears of  such a drain, and no 
longer feeling any inconvenience from such a state of  things, 
have not been prompted to restore the Exchanges and the 
price of  Gold to their proper level by a reduction  of  their 
advances and issues.  The Directors, in former times, did not 
perhaps  perceive  and acknowledge the principle  more  dis- 
tinctly than those  of  the present  day, but they  felt  the 
inconvenience, and obeyed its impulse ; which practically 
established a check and limitation to the issue of  paper.  In 
the present  times,  the inconvenience is not  felt ; and the 
check, accordingly,  is no longer in force.  But Your Com- 
mittee beg leave to report it to the House as their most clear 
opinion, that so long as the suspension of  Cash  Payments 
is permitted to subsist, the price  of  Gold Bullion and the 
general Course  of Exchange with Foreign Countries,  taken 
for  any  considerable  period  of  time,  form  the  best 
general  criterion from which any inference can be  drawn, 
as to the  sufficiency or  excess of  paper  currency  in cir- 
culation ;  and  that the  Bank  of  England  cannot  safely 
regulate the amount of  its issues, without having reference 
to  the  criterion  presented  by  these  two  circumstances. 
And  upon  a  review  of  all the facts and reasonings  which 
have  already been  stated, Your  Committee are further of 
opinion, that, although the commercial state of  this Country 
and  the  political  state of  the  Continent,  may  have  had 
some influence on the high price of  Gold  Bullion and the 
unfavourable Course of  Exchange with Foreign  Countries, 
this price,  and this  depreciation,  are also  to be  ascribed 
to the want of  a permanent check, and a sufficient limitation 
of  the paper  currency in this  Country. 
In connexion  with  the general  subject  of  this  part  of 
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ing  the  amount  of  their  circulation,  Your  Committee 
have  now  to call  the attention of  the House  to another 
topic, which was brought under their notice in the course 
of  their  Enquiry,  and which  in their  judgment  demands 
the  most  serious  consideration.  The  Bank  Directors,  as 
well  as some  of  the Merchants who  have been  examined, 
shewed  a  great  anxiety  to  state  to Your  Committee  a 
doctrine, of  the truth of  which they professed themselves 
to be  most  thoroughly  convinced,  that there  can  be  no 
possible  excess  in  the issue  of  Bank  of  England  paper, 
so  long  as the  advances  in which  it is  issued  are  made 
upon  the principles  which  at present  guide  the  conduct 
of  the Directors, that is,  so long as the discount  of  mer- 
cantile  Bills  is  confined  to paper  of  undoubted  solidity, 
arising  out  of  real  commercial  transactions,  and payable 
at short  and  fixed  periods.  That  the  Discounts  should 
be  made  only upon  Bills growing  out of  real  commercial 
transactions,  and falling  due in a  fixed and short period, 
are  sound  and  well-established  principles.  But  that, 
while the Bank is restrained  from paying in specie, there 
need  be  no  other limit  to the issue  of  their  paper  than 
what  is fixed  by such rules  of  discount,  and that during 
the  suspension  of  Cash  payments  the  discount  of  good 
Bills  falling  due  at short periods  cannot  lead  to any ex- 
cess in the amount of  Bank paper  in circulation, appears 
to  Your  Committee  to  be  a  doctrine  wholly  erroneous 
in  principle,  and  pregnant  with  dangerous  consequences 
in practice. 
But  before  Your  Committee  proceed  to  make  such 
observations  upon  this  theory  as it appears  to  them  to 
deserve,  they think  it right  to shew  from  the  Evidence, 
to what  extent it is entertained by  some of  those indivi- 
duals who have been at the head of  the affairs of  the Bank. 
The opinions held by those individuals are likely to have an 
important practical influence ; and appeared to Your Com- 
mittee, moreover, the best evidence of  what has constituted 
the  actual  policy  of  that  establishment  in  its  corporate 
capacity. 
Mr.  Whitmore,  the  late  Governor  of  the  Bank,  ex- 
pressly  states  (Min. p.  g~),  "  The  Bank  never  force  a 
"  Note  in  circulation,  and  there  will  not  remain  a  Note 
"  in  circulation  more  than  the  immediate  wants  of  the 
"  public  require ;  for  no  Banker,  I  presume,  will  keep 
"  a  larger  stock  of  Bank  Notes  by  him  than  his  imme- 
" diate payments  require,  as he  can at all  times  procure 
"  them."  The  reason  here  assigned  is  more  particularly 
explained by Mr.  Whitmore, when  he says  (Min. p.  127)~ 
"  The Bank Notes  would  revert  to us  if  there was  a  re- 
"  dundancy  in circulation,  as no  one  would  pay interest 
"  for a Bank Note that he did not want to make use of." 
MY.  Whitmore further states (Min.  p.  127), "  The criterion 
"  by which I judge of  the exact proportion to be  maintained 
"  between the occasions of the Public, and the issues of  the 
"  Bank, is by avoiding as much as possible to discount what 
"  does not appear to be legitimate mercantile paper."  And 
further, when asked, What measure the Court of  Directors 
has to judge  by,  whether  the quantity of  Bank Notes  out 
in circulation is at  any time excessive ?  Mr. Whitmore states 
that their measures of  the security [scarcity ?I or abundance 
of  Bank Notes is certainly by the greater or less applica- 
tion that is made to them for the discount of  good paper. 
MY. Pearse,  late  Deputy  Governor,  and  now  Gover- 
nor  of  the  Bank,  stated  very  distinctly  his  concurrence 
in opinion  with  Mr.  Whitmore upon  this particular  point. 
(Min. p.  126.)  He  referred  "  to  the  manner  in  which 
"  Bank  Notes  are issued,  resulting  from  the applications 
"  made for discounts to supply the necessary want of  Bank 
'' Notes,  by which  their  issue  in amount is  so  controlled 
"  that it can never  amount to an excess."  He considers 
"  the  amount  of  the  Bank  Notes  in circulation  as being 
"controlled  by  the  occasions  of  the  public,  for  internal 
I (  purposes,  and (*Win.  p. 157) that "  from  the manner in 
"  which the issue of  Bank Notes  is controlled, the public 
"  will  never  call for more  than is  absolutely necessary  for 
their  wants." 
Another  Director  of  the  Bank,  Mr.  Harman,  being 
asked  (Min. p.  220),  If  he  thought  that the sum  total 
of  discounts  applied for,  even  though the accommodation 
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afforded  should  be  on  the  security  of  good  bills  to safe 
persons,  might  be  such as to produce  some excess in the 
quantity of  the Bank  issues  if  fully  complied  with ; he 
answered, "  I think if we  discount  only for solid persons, 
"  and such paper  as is for real  bona  fide  transactions, we 
"  cannot materially err."  And  he afterwards states, that 
what  he should consider  as the test  of  a  superabundance 
would  be, "  money  being  more  plentiful  in the  market." 
It is material to observe,  that both Mr.  Whitmore and 
Mr. Pearse  state (LWia. p.  ~g),  that "  the Bank does not 
"  comply with the whole demand upon them for discounts, 
"  and that they are never induced, by a view to their own 
"  profit,  to push their issues beyond what  they deem con- 
"  sistent with the public interest.'' 
Another  very important  part  of  the  Evidence  of  these 
Gentlemen upon  this point,  is contained in the following 
Extract  iMin. p. 128) : 
"  Is it your opinion  that the same security would exist 
"  against any excess in the issues of  the Bank, if  the rate 
"  of  the discount were reduced from £5 to £4 per cent. ? " 
Answer.-"  The security of  an excess of  issue would be, I 
"  conceive, precisely  the same."  Mr. Pearse.-"  I concur 
in that Answer." 
" If  it  were  reduced  to  £3  per  cent. ? "-Mr.  Whit- 
more,  "  I  conceive  there  would  be  no  difference,  if  our 
" practice  remained  the  same  as  now,  of  not  forcing  a 
"  note  into  circulation."  MY.  Pearse.-"  I  concur  in 
"  that Answer." 
Your  Committee  cannot  help  again  calling  the  atten- 
tion  of  the  House  to the  view  which this  Evidence  pre- 
sents, of  the consequences  which  have resulted  from  the 
peculiar situation in which the Bank of  England was placed 
by the suspension of  Cash payments.  So long as the paper 
of  the Bank was  convertible into specie at the will  of  the 
holder, it was enough, both for the safety of  the Bank and 
for  the  public  interest  in  what  regarded  its  circulating 
medium, that the Directors attended only to the character 
and quality of  the Bills discounted, as real ones and payable 
at fixed  and short periods.  They could  not much  exceed 
the proper  bounds in respect of  the quantity and arnount 
of Bills discounted, so as thereby to produce an excess of  their 
paper in circulation, without quickly finding that the surplus 
returned  upon  themselves  in  demand  for  specie.  The 
private interest of  the Bank to guard themselves against a 
continued demand of that nature, was a sufficient protection 
for the public  against  any such excess of  Bank paper, as 
would occasion a material fall in the relative value of  the 
circulating medium.  The restriction  of  cash payments,  as 
has already been shown, having rendered the same preventive 
policy no longer necessary to the Bank, has removed  that 
check upon its issues which was the public security against 
an excess.  When the Bank Directors were no  longer  ex- 
posed to the inconvenience of  a drain upon them for Gold, 
they  naturally felt  that they had no  such  inconvenience 
to guard against by a more restrained system of  discounts 
and advances ; and it was very natural for them to pursue 
as before  (but without  that sort of  guard and limitation 
which was now become unnecessary to their own security), 
the  same  liberal and prudent  system  of  commercial  ad- 
vances from which the prosperity of  their own establishment 
had resulted,  as well as in a great degree the commercial 
prosperity  of  the whole  Country.  It was  natural for  the 
Bank  Directors to believe, that nothing but benefit  could 
accrue to the public at large, while they saw the growth 
of  Bank profits go hand in hand with the accommodations 
granted to the Merchants.  It was  hardly to be  expected 
of  the Directors  of  the Bank,  that they  should  be  fully 
aware  of  the  consequences  that might  result  from  their 
pursuing, after the suspension of  cash payments, the same 
system which they had found a safe one before.  To watch 
the operation  of  so new a law, and to provide against the 
injury which  might  result  from it to the public interests, 
was the province, not so much of  the Bank as of  the Legis- 
lature :  And, in the opinion  of  Your  Committee,  there is 
room to regret that this House has not taken earlier notice 
of  all the  consequences  of  that law. 
By  far the  most  important  of  those  consequences  is, 
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as a  check to an over issue of  paper,  the Bank Directors 
have  not  perceived  that the removal  of  that check  ren- 
dered it possible that such an excess might  be issued  by 
the  discount  of  perfectly  good  bills.  So  far  from  per- 
ceiving this, Your Committee have shown that they main- 
tain  the  contrary  doctrine  with  the  utmost  confidence, 
however it may be qualified occasionally by some of  their 
expressions.  That this  doctrine  is  a  very  fallacious  one, 
Your  Committee  cannot  entertain a  doubt.  The fallacy, 
upon which it is founded, lies in not distinguishing between 
an advance  of  capital  to  Merchants,  and  an  additional 
supply of  currency to the general mass of  circulating medium. 
If the advance of  capital only is considered, as made to those 
who  are ready to employ it in judicious  and productive 
undertakings,  it is  evident  there  need  be  no  other  limit 
to the total amount of  advances than what  the means of 
the lender, and his prudence  in the selection of  borrowers, 
may impose.  But, in the present  situation  of  the Bank, 
intrusted as it is with the function of  supplying the public 
with  that paper  currency  which  forms the  basis  of  our 
circulation,  and  at the  same  time  not  subjected  to the 
liability of  converting the paper into specie, every advance 
which it makes of  capital to the Merchants in the shape of 
discount, becomes an addition also to the mass of  circulating 
medium.  In the first instance, when the advance is made 
by notes paid in discount of  a bill, it is undoubtedly so much 
capital, so much power of  making purchases, placed in the 
hands of  the Merchant who receives the notes ; and if  those 
hands are safe, the operation is so far, and in this its first 
step,  useful  and  productive  to the public.  But  as  soon 
as the portion  of  circulating  medium,  in which  the ad- 
vance  was  thus made,  performs  in  the hands  of  him  to 
whom  it  was  advanced this its first  operation  as capital, 
as soon as the notes are exchanged by him for some other 
article which  is capital, they fall into the channel of  circu- 
lation as so much circulating medium, and form an addition 
to  the  mass  of  currency.  The  necessary  effect  of  every 
such addition to the mass, is to diminish the relative value 
of  any given portion of that mass in exchange for commodi- 
ties.  If  the addition were  made by notes  convertible into 
specie, this  diminution  of  the relative  value  of  any given 
portion of  the whole mass would speedily bring back upon 
the Bank, which issued the notes, as much as was excessive. 
But if  by law  they are not  so convertible,  of  course this 
excess  will  not  be  brought  back,  but will  reniain  in the 
channel of  circulation, until paid in again to the Bank itself 
in discharge  of  the bills which were originally discounted. 
During the whole time they remain  out, they perform  all 
the functions of  circulating medium ; and before they come 
to be  paid  in discharge  of  those  bills,  they have already 
been followed by a new issue of  notes in a similar operation 
of discounting.  Each successive advance repeats the same 
process.  If  the  whole  sum  of  discounts  continues  out- 
standing  at  a  given  amount,  there  will  remain  perma- 
nently out in circulation a corresponding amount of  paper ; 
and if  the amount of  discounts is progressively increasing, the 
amount of  paper, which remains out in circulation over and 
above what  is  otherwise wanted  for the occasions of  the 
Public,  will  progressively  increase  also,  and  the  money 
prices  of  commodities  will  progressively  rise.  This  pro- 
gress may be as indefinite, as the range of  speculation and 
adventure in a great  commercial  country. 
It is necessary  to observe,  that the law,  which  in this 
Country limits the rate of  interest, and of  course the rate 
at which the Bank can legally discount, exposes  the  Bank 
to still more  extensive demands for commercial discounts. 
While  the rate of  commercial  profit  is  very  considerably 
higher than five per cent. as it has lately  been  in  many 
branches  of  our  Foreign  trade,  there  is  in  fact  no  limit 
to the demands which  Merchants  of  perfectly  good  capi- 
tal, and of  the most  prudent spirit of  enterprise, may be 
tempted to make upon  the Bank for accommodation and 
facilities by discount.  Nor can any argument or illustration 
place in a more striking point of  view the extent to which 
such of  the Bank Directors, as were  examined before  the 
Committee, seem to have in theory embraced that doctrine 
upon which Your Committee have made these observations, 
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may lead in periods of  a high spirit of  conlmercial adventure, 
than the opinion which Mr. Whitmore and Mr. Pearse have 
delivered ; that the same complete security to the public 
against any excess in the issues of  the Bank would exist if 
the rate of  discount were reduced from five to four, or even 
to three per cent.  From the Evidence, however, of  the late 
G~vernor  and Deputy Governor  of  the Bank, it appears, 
chat  though  they state the  principle  broadly,  that there 
can be  no  excess of  their  circulation  if  issued  according 
to their  rules  of  discount,  yet  they disclaim  the idea  of 
acting up to it in its whole  extent.  Though  they stated 
the applications  for  the discount of  legitimate  bills  to be 
their  sole  criterion  of  abundance  or  scarcity,  they  gave 
Your Committee to understand, that they do not discount 
to the full extent  of  such  applications.  In other  words, 
the Directors  do  not  act up to  the  principle  which they 
represent  as  one  perfectly sound  and safe,  and must  be 
considered,  therefore,  as  possessing  no  distinct  and  cer- 
tain rule to guide their discretion in controlling the amount 
of  their  circulation. 
The  suspension  of  Cash  payments  has  had  the  effect 
of  committing into the hands of  the Directors of  the Bank 
of  England,  to  be  exercised  by  their  sole  discretion,  the 
important  charge  of  supplying  the  Country  with  that 
quantity of  circulating  medium  which  is  exactly  propor- 
tioned to the wants  and occasions of  the  Public.  In the 
judgment  of  the  Committee,  that is  a  trust, which  it is 
unreasonable to expect that the Directors of  the Bank of 
England  should  ever  be  able  to  discharge.  The  most 
detailed  knowledge  of  the  actual  trade  of  the  Country, 
combined  with  the profound science in all the principles 
of  Money  and Circulation,  would  not  enable any man or 
set of  men to adjust, and keep  always  adjusted, the right 
proportion  of  circulating  medium  in  a  country  to  the 
wants  of  trade.  When  the currency  consists  entirely  of 
the precious  metals,  or  of  paper  convertible  at will  into 
the precious  metals,  the natural process of  commerce, by 
establishing  Exchanges  among  all  the  different  countries 
of  the  world,  adjusts,  in  every  particular  country,  the 
proportion  of  circulating  medium  to its actual occasions, 
according to that supply of  the precious metals which the 
mines  furnish  to  the  general  market of  the world.  The 
proportion, which is thus adjusted and maintained by the 
natural  operation  of  commerce,  cannot  be  adjusted  by 
any human  wisdom  or  skill.  If  the  natural  system  of 
currency and circulation be abandoned, and a discretionary 
issue  of  paper  money  substituted in its stead,  it is  vain 
to think that any rules can be advised for the exact exer- 
cise  of  such  a  discretion ; though  some  cautions may be 
pointed  out to check and control its consequences,  such 
as are indicated by the effect of  an excessive issue upon 
Exchanges  and the price  of  Gold.  The Directors  of  the 
Bank  or'  England,  in the judgment  of  Your  Committee, 
have  exercised  the  new  and extraordinary discretion  re- 
posed in them  since 1797,  with an integrity and a regard 
to the  public  interest,  according  to their  conceptions  of 
it, and indeed  a  degree  of  forbearance  in turning it less 
to the profit  of  the Bank than it would  easily  have  ad- 
mitted  of,  that merit  the  continuance  of  that confidence 
which  the public has so long and so justly  felt in the in- 
tegrity with which its affairs are directed, as well as in the 
unshaken stability and ample funds of  that great establish- 
ment.  That  their  recent  policy  involves  great  practical 
errors,  which  it  is  of  the  utmost  public  importance  to 
correct,  Your  Committee  are fully  convinced ; but those 
errors are less to be imputed to the Bank Directors, than 
to be stated as the effect of  a new system, of  which, how- 
ever it originated, or was  rendered  necessary as a  tempo- 
rary  expedient,  it  might  have  been  well  if  Parliament 
had sooner  taken into view  all  the consequences.  When 
Your  Committee  consider  that  this  discretionary  power, 
of  supplying  the Kingdom  with  circulating  medium,  has 
been  exercised  under an opinion  that the paper  could not 
be issued to excess if  advanced in discounts to Merchants 
in good  bills  payable  at stated periods,  and likewise un- 
der an opinion  that neither  the  price  of  Bullion  nor  the 
course  of  Exchanges  need  be  adverted  to,  as  affording 
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such paper, Your  Committee cannot hesitate to say,  that 
these opinions of  the Bank must be regarded as in a great 
measure  the  operative  cause  of  the  continuance  of  the 
present  state of  things. 
Your  Committee  will  now  proceed  to state,  from  the 
information which  has been  laid  before  them, what  ap- 
pears  to have  been  the  progressive  increase,  and to be 
the present  amount of  the Paper circulation  of  this Coun- 
try, consisting primarily of  the Notes of  the Bank of  England 
not at present convertible into specie ; and, in a secondary 
manner,  of  the Notes  of  the  Country  Bankers which  are 
convertible,  at the  option  of  the  holder,  into  Bank  of 
England Paper.  After having stated the amount of  Bank 
of  England Paper, Your Committee will explain the reasons 
which  induce  them to think  that the numerical  amount 
of  that  Paper  is  not  alone  to  be  considered  as decisive 
of  the  question  as to its excess :  and before  stating the 
amount  of  Country  Bank  Paper,  so  far  as that can  be 
ascertained,  Your  Committee  will  explain  their  reasons 
for thinking that the amount of  the Country Bank circulation 
is limited by the amount of  that of  the Bank of  England. 
I.  It appears  from  the  Accounts  laid  before  the Com- 
mittees  upon  the  Bank  Affairs  in  1797,  that for  several 
years  previous  to the year  1796,  the average amount  of 
Bank  Notes  in circulation  was  between  ~IO,OOO,OOO and 
E~~,ooo,ooo,  hardly ever falling below  £g,ooo,ooo and not 
often exceeding to any great amount E~~,ooo,ooo. 
The following Abstract of  the several Accounts  referred 
to Your  Committee, or ordered by Your  Committee from 
the Bank, will shew  the progressive  increase  of  the Notes 
from the year 1798  to the end of  the last year. 
Average  Amount  of  Bank of  England Notes  in circula- 
tion in each of  the following years : 
Notes of  A5  and 
upwards, including 
Bank  Post Bills. 
Notes under i55.  Total. 
Taking  from  the  Accounts  the  last  half  of  the year 
1809,  the average will be found higher than for the whole 
year,  and amounts to £19,880,310. 
The Accounts  in the Appendix  give  very  detailed Re- 
turns for the first four months of  the present  year,  down 
to the  12th  May,  from  which  it will  be  found  that the 
amount  was  then  increasing,  particularly  in  the  smaller 
Notes.  The whole amount of  Bank Notes  in circulation, 
exclusive  of  £939,990 of  Bank  Post  Bills,  mill  be  found 
on  the average  of  the two Returns for the 5th and 12th 
May last, to be £14,136,610  in Notes of  £5 and upwards, and 
£6,173,380 in Notes under £5, making the sumof ~zo,3og,ggo, 
and, including the Bank Post Bills, the sum of  Ez1,zqg,g80. 
By far the most considerable  part of  this increase since 
1798,  it is to be observed, has been in the article of  small 
notes,  part  of  which  must  be  considered  as having  been 
introduced  to  supply  the  place  of  the  specie which was 
deficient at the period of  the suspension of  cash payments. 
It  appears however  that the first  supply of  small notes, 
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very  small  in  comparison  of  their  present  amount ;  a 
large augmentation of  them  appears to have taken place 
from the end  of  the year  1799  to that of  the year  1802 ; 
and a  very rapid increase has also  taken place  since  the 
month of  May in the last year to the present  time ; the 
augmentation of  these  small notes  from  1st May  1809  to 
the  5th of  May  1810,  being  from  the  sum of  £4,509,470 
to the sum of  jtT6,161,ozo. 
The notes of  the Bank of  England are principally issued 
in advances to Government for the public service, and in 
advances  to  the  Merchants  upon  the  discount  of  their 
bills. 
Your Committee have had an Account laid before them, 
of  Advances  made  by  the Bank to Government  on  Land 
and Malt,  Exchequer  Bills,  and other securities, in every 
year since the suspension  of  cash payments ; from which, 
as compared  with  the Accounts  laid  before  the Commit- 
tees  of  1797,  and  which  were  then  carried  back  for  20 
years, it will appear that the yearly advances of  the Bank 
to  Government  have  upon  an  average, since the suspen- 
sion, been considerably lower in amount than the average 
amount of  advances prior to that event ; and the amount 
of  those  advances  in  the  two  last  years,  though greater 
in amount than those  of  some years  immediately  preced- 
ing, is less than it was for any of  the six years preceding 
the restriction  of  cash payments. 
With  respect  to the  amount  of  commercial  discounts, 
Your  Committee did not  think it proper  to require  from 
the  Directors  of  the  Bank  a  disclosure  of  their  absolute 
amount,  being  a  part  of  their  private  transactions  as a 
commercial  Company,  of  which,  without  urgent  reason, 
it  did  not  seem  right  to demand  a  disclosure.  The late 
Governor  and  Deputy  Governor,  however,  at the  desire 
of  Your  Committee,  furnished  a  comparative  Scale,  in 
progressive  numbers,  shewing the increase of  the amount 
of  their  discounts  from  the  year  1790  to 1809,  both  in- 
clusive.  They  made  a  request,  with  which  Your  Com- 
mittee have thought it proper to comply, that this document 
might not be made public ; the Committee therefore have 
not  placed  it in the Appendix to the present  Report, but 
have returned it to the Bank.  Your  Committee  however 
have  to  state in general  terms,  that the  amount  of  dis- 
counts  has  been  progressively  increasing  since  the  year 
1796 ; and that their amount in the last year  (1809) bears 
a very high proportion to their largest amount in any year 
preceding  1797.  Upon this particular subject, Your Com- 
mittee are only anxious to remark, that the largest amount 
of  mercantile discounts by the Bank, if  it could be considered 
by itself, ought never, in their judgment,  to be regarded as 
any other than a great public benefit ; and that it is  only 
the excess of  paper currency thereby issued, and kept out 
in circulation, which is to be considered as the evil. 
But  Your  Committee must not  omit  to state one  very 
important principle, That the mere numerical return of  the 
amount of  Bank  notes  out in circulation,  cannot be  con- 
sidered as at all deciding the question, whether such paper 
is or is not excessive.  It is necessary  to have recourse to 
other tests.  The same amount of  paper  may at one time 
be  less  than  enough,  and  at  another  time  more.  The 
quantity  of  currency required  will  vary in some  degree 
with the extent of  trade ; and the increase of  our  trade, 
which  has  taken  place  since  the  suspension,  must  have 
occasioned some increase in the quantity of  our currency. 
But  the  quantity  of  currency  bears  no  fixed  sportion 
to the quantity of  commodities ; and any inferences pro- 
ceeding upon such a supposition would be entirely errone- 
ous.  The  effective  currency  of  the  Country  depends 
upon the quickness  of  circulation,  and the number  of  ex- 
changes  performed  in  a  given  time,  as well  as  upon  its 
numerical amount ; and all the circumstances, which have 
a tendency to quicken or to retard the rate of  circulation, 
render  the  same  amount  of  currency  more  or  less  ade- 
quate  to  the  wants  of  trade.  A  much  smaller  amount 
is  required  in  a  high  state of  public  credit  than  when 
alarms make  individuals  call in their  advances,  nnd  pro- 
vide  against  accidents  by  hoarding ;  and in a  period  of 
commercial  security  and  private  confidence,  than  when 
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any distant  time.  But,  above  all,  the  same  amount  of 
currency will  be  more  or  less  adequate in proportion  to 
the skill which the great money-dealers  possess in manag- 
ing  and economising  the use  of  the circulating  medium. 
Your  Committee  are of  opinion,  that  the  improvements 
which have taken place of  late years  in this Country, and 
particularly  in the district  of  London, with regard  to the 
use and economy of  money among Bankers, and in the modes 
of adjusting commercial payments, must have had a much 
greater effect than has hitherto been  ascribed to them, in 
rendering the same sum adequate to a much greater amount 
of  trade  and  payments  than  formerly.  Some  of  those 
improvements will be found detailed in the Evidence ; they 
consist  principally in the increased  use  of  Bankers'  drafts 
in the common payments of  London ; the contrivance of 
bringing all such drafts daily to a common receptacle, where 
they  are balanced  against  each  other ; the  intermediate 
agency of  Billybrokers ; and several other changes  in the 
practice  of  London  Bankers,  are  to the  same  effect,  of 
rendering it unnecessary for them to keep so large a deposit 
of  money  as  formerly.  Within  the  London  district,  it 
would  certainly  appear,  that a  smaller  sum of  money  is 
required  than  formerly  to  perform  the  same  number  of 
exchanges  and amount of  payments, if  the rate of  prices 
had remained the same.  It is material also to observe, that 
both  the  policy  of  the Bank  of  England  itself, and  the 
competition  of  the Country bank  paper,  have  tended  to 
compress the paper of  the Bank of  England, more and more, 
within  London  and the adjaceat  district.  All  these  cir- 
cumstances  must  have  co-operated  to  render  a  smaller 
augmentation of  Bank of  England paper necessary to supply 
the demands of our increased trade than might otherwise 
have been required  ; and shew how impossible it is, from 
the numerical  amount alone of  that paper,  to pronounce 
whether it is excessive or not :  a more sure criterion must 
be resorted to, and such a criterion, Your Committee have 
already shown, is only to be found in the state of  the Ex- 
changes,  and the price  of  Gold  Bullion. 
The  particular  circumstances  of  the  two  years  which 
are so remarkable in the recent history of  our circulation, 
1793 and 1797,  throw great light upon the principle which 
Your  Committee have last stated. 
In the year 1793, the distress was occasioned by a failure 
of  confidence in the country circulation,  and a consequent 
pressure  upon  that  of  London.  The  Bank  of  England 
did not  think it advisable  to enlarge their issues to meet 
this increased demand,  and their  Notes, previously issued, 
circulating  less  freely in consequence  of  the  alarm  that 
prevailed,  proved  insufficient  for  the necessary  payments. 
In this  crisis,  Parliament  applied  a  remedy,  very similar 
in its effect, to an enlargement of  the advances and issues 
of  the Bank ; a loan  of  Exchequer  Bills was  authorized 
to be  made  to as many mercantile  persons,  giving  good 
security, as should apply for them ; and the confidence with 
this measure diffused, as well as the increased means which 
it afforded of obtaining Bank Notes through the sale of  the 
Exchequer Bills, speedily relieved the distress both of  Lon- 
don  and  of  the  country.  Without  offering  an  opinion 
upon the expediency of  the particular  mode in which this 
operation was effected, Your Committee think it an import- 
ant illustration of  the principle, that an enlarged accommo- 
dation is the true remedy for that occasional failure of  con- 
fidence  in the country  districts,  to which  our  system  of 
paper  credit is unavoidably exposed. 
The  circumstances  which  occurred  in  the beginning 
of  the year  1797, were  very  similar  to those  of  1793 ;- 
an alarm of  Invasion, a run upon the Country Banks for 
Gold,  the failure  of  some  of  them,  and a  run  upon  the 
Bank  of  England, forming  a  crisis like  that of  1793, for 
which,  perhaps,  an  effectual  remedy  might  have  been 
provided,  if  the  Bank  of  England  had  had  courage  to 
extend instead of  restricting its accommodations and issue 
of  Notes.  Some few persons,  it appears from the Report 
of  the Secret Committee of  the Lords, were  of this  opin- 
ion  at  the  time;  and  the  late  Governor  and  Deputy 
Governor  of  the  Bank  stated to Your  Committee  (Min. 
pp. 153,  154)  that they,  and many of  the  Directors,  are 
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the diminution of  their Notes in that emergency increased 
the public distress :  an opinion in the correctness of  which 
Your  Committee entirely concur. 
It  appears  to  Your  Committee,  that  the  experience 
of  the Bank of  England in the years  1793  and 1797,  con- 
trasted with the facts which have been stated in the present 
Report, suggests a distinction most  iillportant  to be  kept 
in view,  between  that  demand  upon  the  Bank  for  Gold 
for  the  supply  of  the  domestic  channels  of  circulation, 
sometimes a very great and sudden one, which is  occasioned 
by a temporary failure of  confidence, and that drain upon 
the  Bank  for  Gold  which  grows  out  of  an unfavourable 
state of  the  Foreign  Exchanges.  The  former,  while  the 
Bank  maintains  its high  credit,  seems  likely  to be  best 
relieved  by a  judicious  increase  of  accommodation to the 
Country:  the latter, so long  as the Bank  does  not  pay 
in specie,  ought  to suggest  to  the  Directors  a  question, 
whether  their issues may not be already too abundant. 
Your  Commit  tee  have  much  satisfaction  in  thinking, 
that the Directors are perfectly  aware that they may err 
by a  too  scanty  supply  in  a  period  of  stagnant  credit, 
And Your Committee are clearly of  opinion, that although 
it ought  to  be  the general  policy  of  the  Bank  Directors 
to diminish their paper in the event of  the long continuance 
of  a  high  price  of  Bullion  and a  very  unfavourable  Ex- 
change,  yet  it is  essential  to  the commercial interests of 
this Country,  and to the general fulfilment  of  those mer- 
cantile engagements which a free issue of  paper may have 
occasioned, that the accustomed degree  of  accommodation 
to the  Merchants should  not  be  suddenly  and materially 
reduced ;  and  that  if  any general  and  serious  difficulty 
or  apprehension  on  this  subject  sho~zld  arise,  it may, in 
the judgment of  Your Committee, be  counteracted  without 
danger, and with advantage to the public, by a liberality 
in the issue of  Bank of  England paper proportioned to the 
urgency of  the particular  occasion.  Under  such  circum- 
stances, it belongs to the Bank to Sake likewise into their 
own  consideration, how  far it may be  practicable,  consis- 
tently with a due regard to the imnlediate interests of  the 
public service,  rather to reduce their paper  by a gradual 
reduction  of  their advances  to Government,  than by  too 
suddenly abridging the discounts to the Merchants. 
z. Before  Your  Committee proceed  to detail what  they 
have  collected  with  respect  to  the  amount  of  Country 
Bank paper, they must observe,  that so long as the Cash 
payments  of  the  Bank  are  suspended,  the  whole  paper 
of  the  Country  Bankers  is  a  superstructure  raised  upon 
the foundation of  the paper of  the Bank of  England.  The 
same  check,  which  the  convertibility  into  specie,  under 
a better system, provides against the excess of  any part of 
the paper circulation, is, during the present system, provided 
against an excess of  Country Bank paper, by its converti- 
bility into Bank of  England paper.  If  an excess of  paper 
be issued in a country district, while the London circulation 
does  not  exceed  its due proportion,  there will  be  a  local 
rise of  prices in that country district, but prices in London 
will remain as before.  Those who have the country paper 
in their hands will prefer buying in London where things are 
cheaper,  and  will  therefore  return  that  country  paper 
upon the Banker who issued it, and will demand from him 
Bank of  England Notes  or Bills upon London ; and thus, 
the  excess  of  country  paper  being  continually  returned 
upon  the issuers for Bank of  England paper, the quantity  ' 
of  the latter necessarily and effectually limits the quantity 
of  the former.  This is illustrated  by  the Account  which 
has been already given of  the excess, and subsequent limita- 
tion, of the paper of  the Scotch Banks, about the year 1763. 
If  the  Bank of  England  paper  itself  should  at any time, 
duting the suspension of  Cash payments, be issued to excess, 
a corresponding excess may be issued of  Country Bank paper 
which will not  be  checked ;  the foundation being enlarged, 
the  superstructure  admits  of  a  proportionate  extension. 
And  thus,  under  such  a  system,  the  excess  of  Bank  of 
England paper will produce its effect upon prices not merely 
in the ratio of its own increase, but in a much higher pro- 
portion. 
It  has  not  been  in  the  power  of  Your  Committee  to 
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with  anything  like  accuracy,  the  amount  of  Country 
Bank  paper  in  circulation.  But  they  are  led  to  infer 
from all the Evidence they have been  able to procure on 
this subject, not only that a great  number  of  new  Court- 
try Banks has been established within these last two years, 
but also that the amount of  issues of  those which  are of 
an  older standing has in general been very considerably in- 
creased : whilst on the other hand, the high state of  mer- 
cantile and public credit, the proportionate facility of  con- 
verting at short notice all public and commercial securities 
into  Bank  of  England  paper,  joined  to  the  preference 
generally given within the limits of  its own circulation to 
the paper of  a well established Country Bank over that of 
the Bank of  England, have probably not rendered it neces- 
sary for  them  to keep  any large  permanent  deposits  of 
Bank of  England Paper in their hands, And it seems reason- 
able to believe, that the total amount of  the unproductive 
stock of  all the Country Banks, consisting of  specie and Bank 
of  England paper, is much less at  this period, under a circula- 
tion  vastly  increased  in  extent,  than  it was  before  the 
restriction  of  1797.  The  temptation  to establish  Coun- 
try  Banks,  and  issue  Promissory  Notes,  has  therefore 
greatly  increased.  Some  conjecture as  to  the  probable 
total amount of  those issues, or at least as to their recent 
increase,  may  be  formed,  as  Your  Committee  conceive, 
from  the amount  of  the  duties  paid  for  stamps  on  the 
reissuable notes of  Country Banks in Great  Britain.  The 
total amount  of  these  duties  for  the year  ended  on  the 
10th of  October 1808, appears to have been £60,52'2 15s. 3d, 
and for the year ended on the 10th of  October 1809, £175,129 
17s 7d.  It must, however, be observed, that on the 10th 
of  October 1808, these duties experienced an augmentation 
somewhat exceeding one-third ; and that some regulations 
were  made,  imposing  limitations  with respect  to the re- 
issue of  all notes not exceeding two Pounds two Shillings, 
the effect of  which has been to produce a much more than 
ordinary  demand  for  stamps or  notes  of  this denomina- 
tion  within  the year  1809.  Owing to this circumstance, 
it  appears  impossible  to ascertain  what  may  have  been 
the real  increase in the circulation  of  the notes,  not  ex- 
ceeding  two  Pounds  two  Shillings,  within  the last  year; 
but with  respect  of  the notes  of  a  higher value, no alter- 
ation having  been  made in the Law  as to  their  re-issue, 
the following  Comparison  affords  the best statement that 
can  be  collecled  from  the  Documents  before  the  Com- 
mittee, of  the addition made in the year 1809 to the number 
of  those  Notes. 
Number  of  Country Bank  Notes  exceeding  £2  2s.  each 
stamped  in  the  year  ended the 10th of  October 1808, 
and 10,th of  October  1809,  respectively. 
Assuming that the notes in the two first  of  these cla~~e: 
were  all issued  for  the lo\vest  denomination  to  which 
the  duties respectively  attach, and such as are most  com- 
nlonly met  with  in  the circulation  of  country paper, viz. 
Notes  of  L5  and LIO  (although in the second  class there 
is  a  considerable  number  of  Lzo), and even omitting alto- 
gether  from the  comparison  the  Notes  of  the  three  last 
classes,  the  issue  of  which  Your  Committee  understands 
is in fact confined to the chartered Banks of  Scotland, the 
result  would  be,  that,  exclusive  of  any  increase  in  the 
number  of  notes  under  £2  2s.  the  amount  of  Country 
Bank paper stamped in the year ended the 10th of October 
1809,  has exceeded that of  the year ended  on the 10th of 
October 1808, in the sum of  £3,095,340  Your Committee 
can form no positive conjecture as to the amount of  Country 
Bank paper  cancelled  and withdrawn  from  circulation  in 
the course of  the last year.  But considering that it is the 
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interest  and practice  of  the Country  Bankers to use  the 
same notes as long as possible ; that, as the law now stands, 
there is no limitation of  time to the reissuing  of  those not 
exceeding  £2  as. ;  and that  all  above  that  amount  are 
reissuable for three years from the date of  their first issuing ; 
it  appears  difficult  to suppose that the amount  of  notes 
above £2  2s.  cancelled in 1809,  could be equal to the whole 
amount stamped in 1808 : but even upon that supposition, 
there would still be an increase for 1809 in the notes of  £5 
and £10  alone, to the amount above specified of  £3,095,340, 
to  which  must  be  added  an  increase  within  the  same 
period  of  Bank of  England Notes to the amount of  about 
~1,5oo,ooo,  making  in  the year  1809  an addition  in the 
whole of  between four and five millions to the circulation 
of  Great Britain alone, deducting only the Gold which may 
have been withdrawn in the course of  that year from actual 
circulation, which cannot have been very considerable, and 
also making an allowance for some increase in the amount 
of  such country paper, as, though stamped, may not be in 
actual  circulation.  This  increase  in  the  general  paper 
currency in last year, even  after  these  deductions,  would 
probably  be  little short  of  the amount  which  in  almost 
any one  year, since  the  discovery  of  America,  has been 
added to the circulating coin of  the whole of  Europe.  Al- 
though,  as  Your  Committee  has  already  had  occasion 
to observe,  no  certain  conclusion  can  be  drawn  from the 
numerical  amount  of  paper  in  circulation,  considered 
abstractedly  from  all  other  circumstances,  either  as  to 
such paper  being in excess, or  still less as to the propor- 
tion of  such excess, yet they must remark, that the fact of 
any very great and rapid increase in that amount, when 
coupled  and attended with all the indications of  a  depre- 
ciated  circulation,  does  afford the strongest  confirmatory 
evidence,  that, from  the want  of  some  adequate  check, 
the issues of  such paper have not been restrained within their 
proper  limits. 
Your  Committee  cannot  quit  this  part  of  the  subject 
without  further  observing,  that the addition  of  between 
four  and five  millions  sterling to the paper  circulation  of 
this  Country,  has doubtless  been  made  at a  very  small 
expense  to  the  parties  issuing  it,  only  about  ~IOO,OOO 
having  been  paid  thereupon in stamps  to the  Revenue, 
and  probably  for  the  reasons  already  stated,  no  corre- 
sponding  deposits  of  Gold  or  Bank  of  England  Notes 
being  deemed  by  the  Country  Banks  necessary  to  sup- 
port  their  additional  issues.  These  parties  therefore,  it 
may  be  fairly  stated, have  been  enabled  under  the pro- 
tection  of  the law,  which  virtually secures  them  against 
such  demands,  to create  within  the  last  year  or  fifteen 
months, at a very trifling expense, and in a manner almost 
free from all prksent risk to their respective credits as dealers 
in paper  money,  issues  of  that article  to the amount  of 
several millions, operating, in the first instance and in their 
hands, as capital for their own benefit, and, when used  as 
such  by  them, falling into and in succession mixing itself 
with the mass of  circulation of  which the value in exchange 
for all other commodities is gradually lowered in proportion 
as that mass is augmented.  If  Your Committee could be of 
opinion that the wisdomof Parliament would not be directed 
to apply a proper remedy to a state of  things so unnatural, 
and teeming,  if  not corrected in time,  with  ultimate  con- 
sequences  so prejudicial  to the public welfare, they would 
not hesitate to declare an opinion, that some mode ought 
to be  devised  of  enabling  the State to participate  much 
more largely in the profits accruing from  the present system ; 
but as this is by no means the policy they wish to recom- 
mend,  they will  conclude their observations  on  this part 
of  the  subject,  by observing,  that  in  proportion  as they 
most  fully  agree with  Dr.  Adam  Smith and all the most 
able writers and Statesmen of  this Country, in considering 
a paper circulation constantly convertible into specie, as one 
of  the greatest  practical improvements which can be made 
in the political and domestic economy of  any State ; and in 
viewing  the establishment  of  the  Country  Banks  issuing 
such paper as a most valuable and essential branch of  that 
improvement in this  Kingdom ;  in the same proportion is 
Your Committee anxious to revert, as speedily as possible, 
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convinced on the one hand, that anything like a permanent 
and systematic departure from that practice must ultimately 
lead  to results,  which,  among other attendant calamities, 
would  be  destructive  of  the  system  itself ;  and  on  the 
other, that such an  event would be the more to be deprecated, 
as it is only in a Country like this, where good faith, both 
public  and private, is held so high, and where, under the 
happy union of  liberty and law, property and the securities 
of  every  description by which it is represented, are equally 
protected  against  the  encroachments  of  power  and  the 
violence of  popular commotion, that the advantages of  this 
system,  unaccompanied  with  any  of  its  dangers,  can  be 
permanently enjoyed, and carried to their fullest extent. 
Upon  a  review  of  all  the  facts  and  reasonings  which 
have  been  submitted to  the  consideration  of  Your  Com- 
mittee in the course  of  their  Enquiry,  they have  formed 
an  Opinion,  which  they  submit  to  the  House :-That 
there  is  at present  an excess in the  paper  circulation  of 
this  Country,  of  which  the  most  unequivocal  symptom 
is  the  very  high  price  of  Bullion,  and next  to that, the 
low state of  the Continental  Exchanges ;  that this excess 
is  to be  ascribed  to the  want  of  a  sufficient  check  and 
control in the issues of  paper from the Bank of  England ; 
and originally, to the suspension  of  cash payments, which 
removed  the natural and true control.  For upon a gene- 
ral view  of  the subject,  Your  Committee  are of  opinion, 
that no  safe,  certain,  and ,constantly  adequate  provision 
against  an excess  of  paper  currency,  either occasional or 
permanent,  can be  found,  except  in the convertibility of 
all such paper into specie.  Your Committee cannot, there- 
fore, but see reason to regret,  that the suspension  of  cash 
payments,  which,  in  the  most  favourable  light  in which 
it  can  be  viewed,  was  only  a  temporary  measure,  has 
been  continued  so  long ;  and  particularly,  that  by  the 
manner  in which  the  present  continuing  Act  is  framed, 
the character should have been given to it of  a permanent 
war  measure. 
Your  Committee  conceive  that it would be  superfluous 
to point  out, in detail, the disadvantages  which  must re- 
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sult to the Country, from any such general excess of  currency 
as lowers its relative value.  The effect of  such an augmen- 
tation of prices upon all money transactions for time ; the 
unavoidable injury suffered by annuitants, and by creditors 
of  every  description,  both private and public ; the unin- 
tended  advantage  gained  by  Government  and  all  other 
debtors ; are consequences  too  obvious  to require  proof, 
and too repugnant to justice to be left without remedy.  By 
far the most important portion of  this effect appears to Your 
Committee to be that which is communicated to the wages of 
common country labour, the rate of  which, it is well known, 
adapts itself  more slowly to the changes which happen in 
the value of  money, than the price of  any other species of 
labour or commodity.  And it is enough for Your Committee 
to allude  to  some  classes  of  the  public  servants,  whose 
pay,  if  once  raised  in  consequence  of  a  depreciation  of 
money,  cannot  so  conveniently  be  reduced  again  to its 
former  rate,  even  after money  shall  have  recovered  its 
value.  That future progress  of  these  inconveniences  and 
evils,  if  not  checked, must,  at no  great distance of  time, 
work  a  practical  conviction  upon  the  minds  of  all  those 
who  may  still  doubt  their  existence ;  but  even  if  their 
progressive  increase  were  less  probable  than  it  appears 
to Your Committee, they cannot help expressing an opinion, 
that the integrity and honour of  Parliament are conctrned, 
not  to  authorize,  longer  than  is  required  by  imperious 
necessity, the continuance in this great commercial Coulltry 
of  a system of  circulation, in  which  that natural check or 
control is absent which maintains the value of  money, and, 
by  the  permanency  of  that  common  standard  of  value, 
secures the substantial justice and faith of  monied contracts 
and obligations between  man and man. 
Your  Committee  moreover  beg  leave  to  advert  to  the  ' 
temptation  to resort  to a  depreciation  even  of  the  value 
of  the Gold coin by an alteration  of  the standard, to which 
Parliament  itself  might  be  subjected by a great and long 
continued  excess of  paper.  This has been  the resource  of 
many  Governments under such circumstances,  and is  the 
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it is unnecessary to dwell on the breath of  public faith and 
dereliction of  a primary duty of  Government, which  would 
manifestly  be  implied  in preferring  the reduction  of  the 
coin down to the standard of  the paper, to the restoration 
of  the paper to the legal standard of  the coin. 
Your  Committee  therefore, having  very  anxiously  and 
deliberately considered this subject, report it to the House, 
as their Opinion, That the system of  the circulating medium 
of  this Country ought to be  brought back,  with as much 
speed as is compatible with a wise and necessary  caution, 
to the original  principle  of  Cash  payments  at the option 
of  the holder  of  Bank  paper. 
Your  Committee  have  understood  that  remedies,  or 
palliatives,  of  a  different  nature,  have  been  projected; 
such  as, a  compulsory limitation of  the amount of  Bank 
advances  and  discounts,  during  the  continuance  of  the 
suspension ; or, a con~pulsory  limitation, during the same 
period, of  the rate of  Bank profits and dividends, by carrying 
the surplus of  profits above that rate to the public account. 
But,  in  the  judgment  of  Your  Committee, such  indirect 
schemes, for palliating  the possible evils resulting from the 
suspension  of  cash  payments,  would  prove  wholly  inade- 
quate for  that purpose,  because  the necessary  proportion 
could never be adjusted, and, if  once fixed, might aggravate 
very  much  the inconveniences  of  a  temporary pressure ; 
and even  if  their 'efficacy  could  be made to appear, they 
would  be  objectionable as  a  most  hurtful and improper 
interference with the rights of  commercial property. 
According  to the  best  judgment  Your  Committee  has 
been  enabled  to  form,  no  sufficient remedy  for the pre- 
sent, or security for the future, can be pointed out, except 
the Repeal of  the Law which suspends the Cash Payments 
of  the Bank  of  England. 
In effecting  so  important  a  change,  Your  Committee 
are of  opinion  that some difficulties must be encountered, 
and that there are some contingent  dangers to the Bank, 
against which  it ought most  carefully and strongly to be 
guarded.  But  all those  may  be  effectually  provided  for, 
by intrusting to the discretion of  the Eank itself the charge 
of  conducting and completing the operation, and by allowing 
to the Bank so ample a period  of  time for conducting it, 
as will be more than sufficient to effect its compIetion.  To 
the  discretion,  experience,  and integrity  of  the  Directors 
of  the  Bank,  Your  Committee  believe  that  Parliament 
may safely intrust the charge of  effecting that which Parlia- 
ment may in its wisdom  determine upon  as necessary  to 
be effected ; and that the Directors of  that great institution, 
far from making themselves a party with those who have 
a temporary interest in spreading alarm, will take a much 
longer  view  of  the  permanent  interests  of  the Bank,  as 
indissolubly blended with those of the Public.  The particu- 
lar  mode  of  gradually  effecting  the  resumption  of  cash 
payments  ought  therefore, in  the  opinion  of  Your  Com- 
mittee, to be left  in a  great measure  to the discretion of 
the Bank, and Parliament ought to do little more than to 
fix,  definitely,  the  time  at which  cash  payments  are to 
become  as before compulsory.  The period  allowed ought 
to be  ample, in order  that the Bank  Directors  may  feel 
their  way,  and that, having  a  constant watch  upon  the 
varying  circumstances  that  ought  to  guide  them,  and 
availing themselves only of  favourable circumstances, they 
may tread back their steps slowly, and may preserve  both 
the course of  their own affairs as a  Company, and that of 
public and commercial credit, not  only safe but unembar- 
rassed. 
With  this  view,  Your  Committee  would  suggest,  that 
the  Restriction  on  Cash  payments  cannot  safely  be  re- 
moved at an earlier period  than two  years  from  the pre- 
sent  time;  but  Your  Committee  are  of  opinion,  that 
early provision  ought  to be  made  by Parliament  for  ter- 
minating, by the end of  that period, the operation of  the 
several Statutes which  have  imposed  and continued  that 
restriction. 
In suggesting this period of  two years,  Your  Committee 
have  not  overlooked  the  circumstance,  that,  as the  law 
stands at present,  the  Bank  would  be  compelled  to pay 
in cash at the end of  six months after the ratification of  a 
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concluded within that period, the recommendation of  Your 
Committee might  seem  to have  the effect  of  postponing, 
instead of  accelerating, the resumption  of  payments.  But 
Your Committee are of  opinion, that if  Peace were immedi- 
ately to be ratified, in the present state of  our circulation 
it would  be most  hazardous to compel  the Bank  to pay 
cash in six months, and would be found wholly  impractic- 
able.  Indeed,  the restoration  of  Peace,  by opening  new 
fields of  commercial  enterprise, would  n~ultiply  instead  of 
abridging  the demands upon  the Bank for  discount, and 
would  render  it peculiarly  distressing  to the  commercial 
world if  the Bank were suddenly and materially to restrict 
their  issues.  Your  Committee  are  therefore  of  opinion, 
that even if  Peace  should intervene, two years should be 
given  to the  Bank for resuming its payments ; but  that 
even if  the War should be prolonged, Cash payments should 
be resumed  by the end  of  that period. 
Your  Committee have  not  been  indifferent  to the con- 
sideration  of  the  possible  occurrence  of  political  circum- 
stances, which may be thought hereafter to furnish an argu- 
ment in favour of  some prolongation of  the proposed period 
of  resuming cash payments, or even in favour of  a new law 
for  their  temporary  restriction  after  the Bank shall have 
opened.  They are, however, far from anticipating a neces- 
sity, even in any case, of  returning to the present  system. 
But if  occasion for a new  measure of  restriction could be 
supposed  at any time  to  arise,  it can  in no  degree  be 
grounded, as Your  Committee think, on any state of  the 
Foreign  Exchanges  (which  they  trust  that  they  have 
abundantly  shown  the  Bank  itself  to  have  the general 
power  of  controlling),  but  on  a  political  state  of  things 
producing,  or  likely  very  soon  to produce,  an alarm  at 
home, leading to so indefinite a demand for cash for  domestic 
uses as it must be impossible for any Banking establishment 
to provide  against.  A  return to the ordinary  system  of 
Banking is,  on  the  very  ground  of  the  late extravagant 
fall  of  the Exchanges  and high  price  of  Gold, peculiarly 
requisite.  That  alone  can  effectually  restore  general 
confidence in the value of  the circulating  medium  of  the 
kingdom ;  and the serious expectation of  this event must 
enforce a preparatory reduction of  the quantity of  paper, 
and all other measures which accord with the true principles 
of  Banking.  The anticipation of  the time when  the Bank 
will be constrained to open, may also be expected to con- 
tribute to the improvement of  the Exchanges ; whereas  a 
postponement of this era, so indefinite as that of  six months 
after the termination of  the War, and especially in the event 
of an  Exchange continuing to fall (whichmore and more would 
generally be perceived to arise from an excess of  paper, and 
a  consequent  depreciation  of  it), may lead,  under an un- 
favourable state of  public affairs, to such a failure of  con- 
fidence (and especially among foreigners), in the determina- 
tion  of  Parliament  to enforce  a  return  to the  professed 
standard of  the measure of  payments, as may serve to pre- 
cipitate the further fall of  the Exchanges, and lead to  conse- 
quences at once the most discreditable and disastrous. 
Although  the  details of  the best  mode  of  returning  to 
cash  payments  ought  to be  left  to the  discretion  of  the 
Bank  of  England,  as  already  stated,  certain  provisions 
would  be  necessary,  under  the  authority  of  Parliament, 
both for  the convenience  of  the Bank itself,  and for  the 
security of  the other Banking establishments in this Country 
and in Ireland. 
Your  Committee  conceive  it  may  be  convenient  for 
the Bank to be permitted  to issue Notes  under the value 
of  £5 for some little time after it had resumed payments in 
specie. 
It will  be  convenient  also  for  the  Chartered  Banks  of 
Ireland  and  Scotland,  and  all  the  Country  Banks,  that 
they should not be cumpelled to pay in specie until  some 
time  after  the  resumption  of  payments  in  Cash  by  the 
Bank  of  England ; but  that they  should  continue for  a 
short  period  upon  their  present  footing,  of  being  liable 
to pay their own notes on demand in Bank of  England paper. 
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